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Abstract 
 
This thesis identifies and analyses the legitimacy claims of regional security 
organizations in relation to their policies and their existence as relatively new 
sites of authority. Hence, it explores the normative context underpinning 
security regionalism between global and national levels. In this regard, it 
proposes a conceptual and theoretical framework for the study of self-
legitimation, which is understood as a dynamic and intersubjective social 
process of justification of the right to rule. This framework is based on the 
intersection between the literatures on security, regionalism, and political 
legitimacy. Its main focus is the identification of the arguments of legitimation 
that can justify the unequal power relations between rulers and ruled. This 
thesis’ case studies are the security missions and policies of crisis management 
of the African Union and the European Union in response to the crisis in Darfur 
(2003-) and adjacent areas such as Chad and Central African Republic. Building 
on the framework of self-legitimation and on the analysis of documents 
produced by both regional organizations, the empirical part identifies fours large 
patterns of arguments, which are called ‘images of security regionalism’. These 
images are the beneficial regionalism, the necessary regionalism, the inevitable 
regionalism, and the multilateral regionalism. The images of security 
regionalism show that the legitimation of policies and actions, on the one hand, 
and the legitimation of regional organizations and their positions within security 
governance, on the other, are indissociable. Moreover, they also reveal that, 
more than the legitimation of actions, it is often the legitimation of the 
perceived inaction that is crucial to the organizations’ role as security actors. 
Finally, the patterns of arguments referring to the inter-organizational relations 
and to the multilateral and collective character of the organizations’ policies 
point to a trend of mutual recognition and, by consequence, mutual legitimation 
among regional organizations. 
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The fates of human beings are not equal. Men differ in 
their states of health or wealth or social status or what 
not. Simple observation shows that in every such 
situation he who is more favoured feels the never 
ceasing need to look upon his position as in some way 
"legitimate," upon his advantage as "deserved," and the 
other's disadvantage as being brought by the latter's 
"fault." That the purely accidental causes of the 
difference may be ever so obvious makes no difference. 
 
Max Weber, Economy and Society. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Today’s global politics are marked by the coexistence of multiple sites of 
authority that are permanently being constructed and reaffirmed. Concepts such 
as neo-medievalism,1 multilevel governance, 2 post-national constellation,3 and 
even globalization4, all highlight in their own terms this state of affairs that might 
question the Westphalian principle of non-overlapping sovereignties. This 
construction of authority is a quasi-permanent process of not only unequal 
material and hard power, but also of intersubjective relations among multiple 
social actors, which include rulers in position of authority, the subjects to said 
authority, and even those outside the hierarchical relationship. 
Hence, multiple actors in position of power lay authoritative claims, 
leading individuals, families, and communities into hierarchical and unequal 
relations between rulers and ruled. A person living in Scotland, for example, is 
subject to the political authority of the local government in Edinburgh, the laws 
enacted by the British Parliament in London, the European Union’s directives 
and regulations coming from Brussels, and occasionally the resolutions passed in 
                                                
1 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society, 3rd ed.(New York: Palgrave, 1971), 245-7. 
2 Marks, Gary and Liesbet Hooghe, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration (Oxford: 
Rwoman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
3  Habermas, Jürgen, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cornwall: MIT Press, 
2001). 
4 Held, David and Anthony Mcgrew, Globalization/ Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007). 
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New York by the United Nation’s Security Council or other UN agencies.5 
Edinburgh, London, Brussels, and New York along with their political bodies are 
all possible sites of authority, among many others, to which individuals might be 
subject. But this context of overlapping authorities is by no means exclusive to 
the ‘Western and developed’ world as it reaches the most ‘remote places on 
Earth’ such as, for instance, the Sudanese province of Darfur. 
Since the beginning of the current crisis in Darfur in 2003, the on-going 
conflict has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands and displaced millions, 
the majority of which is still settled in refugee and IDPs camps. If anything, this 
crisis allowed for even more authoritative claims and intrusion from different 
national and transnational actors that respond to the situation and ‘intervene’ in 
the region with a wide array of policies, from funding and political mediation up 
until military intervention and coercion.6 Any individual living in Darfur in the 
last decade is simultaneously subject to the rules and policies of a large number 
of political institutions such as the state of Sudan, the United Nations and its 
different bodies like the UNHCR, the African Union and the European Union, 
the local tribal leader, and the chief of the armed militia, to name a few. All 
could lay down authoritative claims in the conflictual region to ‘solve’ and 
‘manage’ the crisis or to ‘win the war’. Hence, the case of the international 
response to Darfur points to at least three levels where authority might be 
located: the national and sub-national, the global, and the regional. 
                                                
5  A similar example is to be found in Held, David and Anthony Mcgrew, "The Great 
Globalization Debate: An Introduction," in The Global Transformations Reader: An 
Introduction to the Globalization Debate, ed. D. Held and A. McGrew (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2003). 
6 Williams, Paul D., War & Conflict in Africa (Malden: Polity Press, 2012); De Waal, Alex, 
"Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect", International Affairs, 83 (2007), 
1039-54. 
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The provision of security and the use of force to, among other goals, 
address a crisis such as the one in Darfur have been traditionally seen as an 
almost exclusive responsibility of sovereign national states (SNS). As Max 
Weber famously argued, the state is the sole source of the right to use physical 
force as it successfully claims the monopoly to legitimate coercion.7 Although 
inaccurately, since it is above all a claim to a monopoly, it has been usually 
simplified that states have the monopoly of legitimate violence. The Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648 famously marks this “normative trajectory” 8 , gradually 
articulated until the early 19th century, underpinning a system composed of 
unitary, territorial, non-overlapping and autonomous polities. Civil wars, 
rebellions, and national power struggles as well as the consequent violence were, 
for the most part and unless affecting the interest of other states, considered 
domestic affairs. Interventions to ‘save lives’ of non-nationals or to stop 
bloodshed in other countries as it has been often seen and claimed over the last 
couple of decades, are actually, in the long run of centuries, the exception rather 
than the norm.9 
Less than a century ago, a global dimension was added to this system of 
sovereign states as international organizations such as the League of Nations, 
from 1919 to 1946, and the United Nations (UN), since 1945, were gradually 
given the responsibility of maintaining the international peace and protecting 
human rights. These global institutions may also be seen as generating political 
                                                
7  Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An outline of an Interpretative Sociology (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1978). 
8  Held, David and Anthony Mcgrew, Globalization/ Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great 
Divide, 15. 
9  Finnemore, Martha, The Purpose of Intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
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obligations to its members, as the obligation to settle disputes peacefully, in an 
analogue way as citizens are perceived as having moral duties vis-à-vis their 
states. The rights to declare and wage war, for example, are attached to the UN, 
more particularly to the Security Council (UNSC), which must legally authorize 
any transnational use of force by the member states that goes beyond self-
defence.10 Furthermore, besides the right to wage war (jus ad bellum), global 
governance is also the main site framing the legal basis of actor’s rights and 
obligations during (jus in bello) and after (jus post bellum) conflicts, regulating 
military interventions, creating rules for arms production and trade, supporting 
initiatives against illegal traffic, piracy, terrorism, and many other perceived 
security issues. The UNSC, it was agreed upon by states signing the UN Charter, 
has a universal primacy to determine what constitutes a threat to international 
peace, and to act and authorize actions to address it. In time, issues previously 
considered internal matters of states began to be seen as threats to international 
peace and, given the number of humanitarian interventions and the rise of the 
idea of responsibility to protect, the global level became ever more intrusive and 
authoritative within national states. 
Finally, more recently and especially following the wave of post-
hegemonic new regionalism 11 , one can witness the emergence of regional 
organizations as yet another site of authority in world politics, in general, and in 
security governance, in particular. Many security organizations were created over 
                                                
10 Weiss, Thomas G. et al., The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2014). 
11  Telò, Mario, International Relation: A European Perspective (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); 
Fawcett, Louise, "Exploring regional domains : a comparative history of regionalism", 
International Affairs, 80 (2004), 429-46; Hurrell, Andrew, "One world? Many worlds? 
The place of regions in the study of international society", International Affairs, 83 
(2007), 127-46. 
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the last three decades and other regional institutions were granted security 
mandates that coexist with both national and global levels. Such regional 
institutions vary in scope, objective, membership, capacity, and level of 
institutionalization. They also overlap in time and space, meaning that a country 
might be member of two or more regional security organizations at the same time 
as it is the case of the overlapping membership of the EU, NATO, and the 
Council of Europe. In the present day, virtually every world region has at least 
one security organization and the vast majority of countries in the world are 
members of at least one, if not many different overlapping security arrangements. 
Examples of such organizations include the European Union (EU) and its 
Common Defence and Security Policy, the South-American Defence Council of 
the recently created Union of South-American Nations (UNASUR), the African 
Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and the Regional Forum of Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), among others. In the context of the crisis of Darfur, for instance, the 
AU took a leading role while supported by other regional organizations such as 
the EU, NATO, and the Arab League. 
As regional security organizations flourish around the world, growing in 
number, mandate and capacity, they stand between the ‘sovereignty’ of states in 
a national level, on the one hand, and the ‘universal primacy’ of the UNSC in a 
global level, on the other. Being the combination of their member states and of 
transnational bureaucracies, regional organizations build on a certain degree of 
autonomy and constitute sites – and sources – of authority on their own without, 
of course, being omnipotent or completely independent from their member 
  6 
states. 12  Be it through simple arrangements or highly institutionalized 
organizations, the regional level of governance can, in some cases, be perceived 
as more effective and as more legitimate than global or national authorities.13 In 
addition, the ‘rise’ of the regional level and the on-going construction of these 
“transnational regional polities”14 are also seen as potentially influencing the 
direction of changes in the global order to the point where it is possible to talk 
about “multiregionalism”15 in a “world of regions”16, “regiopolarity”17, and a 
“regionalized international order”18. 
And as regional organizations become more intrusive in the lives of 
individuals and in the politics and domestic affairs of member states, they do not 
escape, as any other political institution, questions about the normative 
underpinnings of their acts, of their own existence, and of the authority they 
claim to have as security actors. This is even more the case as they stand not only 
as complements, but also as possible alternatives to sovereign states and to the 
UN, which are more traditional and established polities and institutions within 
security governance. In sum, regional organizations do not escape questions 
                                                
12 Finnemore, Martha and Michael Barnett, Rules for the World, International organizations in 
global politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
13 Breslin, Shaun and Stuart Croft, eds., Comparative Regional Security Governance (Abingdon: 
Ashgate, 2012), 7. 
14  Schimitter, Philippe C., "Foreword," in Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and 
Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations, ed. A.R. Hoffmann and A.v.d. 
Vleuten (Adelshort: Ashgate, 2007). 
15 Hettne, Björn, "Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US Models," in 
European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a 
Post-Hegemonic Era, ed. M. Telò (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 107. 
16 Katzenstein, Peter J., A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005). 
17 Acharya, Amitav, "Regional Worlds in a Post-Hegemonic Era", Spirit Working Papers, June 
(2009), 6-7. 
18 Buzan, Barry, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty‐First 
Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 143. 
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about the ‘rightfulness’ and the ‘desirability’ of their existence as security actors 
and of their acts and policies. 
 
Authority, the classic formula establishes, equals power and legitimacy.19 
Much has been written about the first element of this equation: power in world 
politics. The discipline of International Relations (IR) is, to a very large extent, 
an exercise to understand what power is, how it is distributed and how it can be 
‘measured’, what forms it might take, how it is used and constructed, and how 
the unequal relations of power – above all among states – affect the international 
system and are, of course, balanced. Thus, concepts such as hard and soft power, 
normative and civilian power, smart power, material and military power, or 
biopower abound in the literature, and so do theories such as balance of power 
and the endless categorizations of superpowers, great powers, regional powers, 
middle powers, and the like. 
The second element of the equation, however, has lagged behind in the 
literature. Certainly, there have been attempts to understand subjective and 
normative aspects of international politics by invoking the concept of 
legitimacy20, but these approaches were far from the discipline’s ‘mainstream’ 
that would restrict legitimacy to national politics. If the international realm was 
                                                
19 Wight, Martin, International Theory: The Three Traditions (New York: Holmes & Meier, 
1992), 99. See also: Hurd, Ian, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics", 
International Organization, 53 (1999), 379-408; Christiano, Thomas, "Authority", in 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy2012. 
20 For early works, refer to: Claude Jr., Inis L., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function 
of the United Nations", International Organization,  (1966); Wight, Martin, 
"International Legitimacy", International Relations, 4 (1972), 1-28; Franck, Thomas M., 
"Legitimacy in the International System", The American Journal of International Law, 
82 (1988), 705-59. 
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marked by an overwhelming feature of anarchy, the underlining reasoning 
implied, and if legitimacy was about the ‘rightfulness’ of hierarchical relations 
between rulers and ruled, then legitimacy had no place in international relations. 
Nevertheless, it has been gradually accepted that, even in the absence of an 
overarching power, “there have always been pockets of authority in international 
society”21. And not only legitimacy can be analysed beyond national politics, but 
the fact that there is no world government to ensure obedience and compliance 
means that legitimacy becomes even more relevant in the world stage.22 
What was a shy resurgence of the concept of legitimacy in the 1990s is 
now a booming field of research with ramifications in international law 23 , 
normative theory of international relations24, EU studies25, and traditional IR 
approaches such as constructivism and the English School26. By building on 
more traditional scholarships of political science analysing and sometimes 
defining legitimacy such as Max Weber, Niklas Luhmann, David Beetham, 
Jacques Lagroye, and Rodney Barker 27 , the current literature already 
                                                
21 Zaum, Dominik, "International Organizations, Legitimacy, and Legitimation," in Legitimation 
of International Organizations, ed. D. Zaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
5. 
22  Hurd, Ian, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics", 61; See also: Wendt, 
Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
23 Franck, Thomas M., "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International 
Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium", The American Journal of International Law, 
100 (2006), 88-106. 
24 Frost, Mervyn, "Legitimacy and International Organizations: The Changing Ethical Context," 
in Legitimation of International Organizations, ed. D. Zaum (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
25 Schmidt, Vivien A., "The problems of identity and legitimacy in the European Union: Is more 
politics the answer?," in Debating Political Idendity and Legitimacy in the European 
Union, ed. S. Lucarelli, F. Cerutti, and V.A. Schmidt (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); 
Scharpf, Fritz W., "Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy", MPIfG Working Paper,  
(2007). 
26 Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?", Review of 
International Studies, 31 (2005), 15-32. 
27 For the main titles of these authors concerning legitimacy, refer to: Weber, Max, Economy and 
Society: An outline of an Interpretative Sociology; Luhmann, Niklas, "The 
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acknowledges the importance of subjective and normative elements in 
hierarchical relations among various actors for the study of international 
politics. 28  However, there is not yet sufficient research and analysis on 
legitimacy that can shed light on the puzzling question about the normative 
underpinnings of security regionalism between state’s claim to the monopoly of 
legitimate violence and the universal primacy of the UNSC as well as on the 
quasi-permanent construction of its legitimacy. Hence, the need of bringing 
together at least three bodies of literature – security studies, regionalism, and 
legitimacy – in order to grasp the dynamics of legitimation of security 
regionalism and regional security organizations. 
Figure 1. Intersections of the Main Literatures 
 
                                                                                                                               
Representation of Society within Society", Current Sociology, 35 (1987), 101-08; 
Beetham, David, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991); 
Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation," in Traité de Science Politique, ed. M. Grawitz and 
J. Leca (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985); Barker, Rodney, Legitimating 
Identities: the self-presentations of rulers and subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
28 See, for instance, the notable edited volumes: Hurrelmann, Achim, Steffen Schneider, and Jens 
Steffek, eds., Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007); Coicaud, Jean-Marc and Hilary Charlesworth, eds., Fault Lines of International 
Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Zaum, Dominik, ed. 
Legitimating International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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First of all, the large amount of work on security regionalism and other 
related concepts (e.g. regional security, regionalization of security, regional 
security governance, security communities, etc.)29 reveals that there is already 
much intersection between security studies and the regional level. Yet, since 
much of this scholarship has been ‘imported’ from the so-called global level30, 
meaning that the analyses of regional security tend to privilege questions of 
power over those of legitimacy, there is little reflection on what justifies the 
existence of regional organizations as security actors and their policies.  
Secondly, there is, of course, research on the legitimacy of regional 
organizations and of regionalism, with a strong focus on the European Union’s 
experience and notable exceptions going beyond Europe31. Nevertheless, most of 
this scholarship at the intersection between legitimacy and regionalism leaves 
security aside to focus on the EU’s democratic deficit, the project of European 
integration, specific EU institutions, and high profile policies such as trade, 
environment and migration.32 Relatively less attention is given to the legitimacy 
                                                
29 See, for example: Katzenstein, Peter J., A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American 
Imperium; Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kingah, 
Stephen and Luk Van Langenhove, "Determinants of Regional Organisation’s Global 
Role in Peace and Security", South African Journal of International Affairs, 19, no. 2  
(2012); Breslin, Shaun and Stuart Croft, Comparative Regional Security Governance; 
Kirchner, Emil J. and Roberto Dominguez, "The Security Governance in a Comparative 
Regional Perspective", UNU-CRIS Working Papers, 8 (2013); Lake, David A., 
"Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach," in Regional orders: building 
security in a new world (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997). 
30 Kelly, Robert E., "Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism'", International Affairs, 9 (2007), 
197-229. 
31 Hoffmann, Andrea Ribeiro and Anna Van Der Vleuten, eds., Closing or Widening the Gap? 
Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organisations (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007). 
32 See, among others: Moravcsik, Andrew, "In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing 
Legitimacy in the European Union", Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 
603-24; Fuchs, Dieter, "European identity and support for European intergration," in 
Debating Political Idendity and Legitimacy in the European Union, ed. S. Lucarelli, F. 
Cerutti, and V.A. Schmidt (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Schmidt, Vivien A., 
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of regional organizations as security actors and of their security policies, and 
even less in a comparative perspective going beyond the EU. 
Finally, perhaps the largest body of literature among all three can be 
located at the last intersection, between security and legitimacy. On the one hand, 
there are the debates over the national state and its claim to legitimate coercion, 
over the legitimacy of the society of states and war among them, and over the 
legitimacy deficit of international organizations as ‘security providers’ and of 
security governance as a whole. On the other hand, there are the debates over the 
legitimacy, hence the right, to use force in international relations, in general, and 
as humanitarian interventions, in particular.33 This literature, however, tends to 
overlook the regional organizations’ policies and role in crisis management as it 
focuses on the actions of the United Nations and high profile interventions such 
as the US-led invasion of Iraq and the NATO bombing campaigns in the 
Balkans. In sum, regional organizations have acquired a role in crisis 
management34 that is not yet adequately matched by the scholarship analysing 
the legitimacy of the use of force. 
                                                                                                                               
"Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 
‘Throughput’", Political Studies, 61 (2013), 2-22; Biegoń, Dominika, "Specifying the 
Arena of Possibilities: Post-structuralist Narrative Analysis and the European 
Commission's Legitimation Strategies", Journal of Common Market Studies, 51 (2013), 
194-211. 
33  See, for example: Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be 
squared?"; Olsson, Christian, ""Legitimate Violence" in the Prose of Counterinsurgency: 
An Impossible Necessity?", Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 38 (2013), 155-71; 
Chesterman, Simon, "Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the 
Security Council, and the Rule of Law", Security Dialogue, 33 (2002), 293-307; 
Coleman, Katharina P., International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The 
Politics of International Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
34 Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace?: Regionalization and 
Contemporary Peace Operations", International Security, 29 (2005), 157-95. 
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Hence, this thesis aims at contributing to these growing ‘intersections’ 
between security, regionalism, and legitimacy by bridging elements of all three 
scholarships. It does so in order to address the puzzle that is to understand the 
normative underpinnings of security regionalism in between national states and 
the global security governance in a context of multiple sites of authority. 
However, there is one main caveat that must be taken into account when looking 
at the construction of regional organizations as sites of authority within security 
governance: the use of legitimation35 instead of legitimacy as the object of study. 
While legitimacy can be, in very general terms, understood as “a virtue of 
political institutions”36 or the “right to rule”37, any definition that is more precise 
would be subject to controversy to the point where it is possible to say that 
legitimacy is an “essentially contested concept”38. Defining political legitimacy 
or selecting criteria that would have to be fulfilled for an organization or policy 
to be legitimate imply a normative stand taken by the scholar. Another approach 
to the concept would be to look at the belief on the legitimacy and on the right to 
rule, meaning that an institution would be legitimate if a given community 
believes it is. However, even if the problems of actually grasping these beliefs 
were ignored, this would still imply arbitrary choices regarding, for instance, 
what community matters and how much it has to ‘believe’ in order for the 
institutions to be legitimate. Both this approaches, known respectively as 
                                                
35 This thesis uses the term legitimation, and derived vocabulary such as legitimated and the verb 
‘to legitimate’, instead of legitimization, legitimized or legitimize. However, it makes no 
distinction regarding the meaning between these two radicals – both can be found in the 
literal quotations from the literature, they were reproduced as in the original texts. 
36 Peter, Fabienne, "Political Legitimacy", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy2010. 1. 
37 Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. Keohane, "The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions", 
Ethics and International Affairs, 3 (2006), 596-624. 
38 Gallie, W. B., "Essentially Contested Concepts", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 
(1956), 167-98. 
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normative and sociological, essentialize the concept of legitimacy and risk 
treating it as a ‘substance’ that is inherent to certain political institutions in 
detriment of others according to the researcher’s own choices and preferences. 
Moreover, both approaches eventually lead to a static understanding of 
legitimacy based on a set of universal criteria or a ‘picture’ of the current support 
a community gives to a political order. 
Therefore, the choice for legitimation instead of legitimacy is the 
acknowledgement of a dynamic and intersubjective social process of justification 
of unequal power relations between rulers and ruled. Thus, legitimation is 
preferable to legitimacy as an object of study because no institution can be said 
to be inherently legitimate – its political legitimacy derives from a successful 
process of claiming the right to rule and the rightfulness of the inequality 
between rulers and subjects. It is understood that these power relations are not 
legitimate because they meet certain normative criteria or because a given 
community believes they are, but because they “can be justified in terms of their 
beliefs”39.  
This justification of the right to rule can be translated into legitimacy 
claims in discursive acts, which might originate from the rulers, from the 
subjects, or even from social actors who are a priori outside the hierarchical 
relationship. In this research, legitimation is restricted to self-legitimation, 
meaning the legitimacy claims of the rulers themselves who, intentional or 
unintentional, might link their policies and the existence of regional security 
organizations to the communities’ normative beliefs. The underlying postulate 
                                                
39 Beetham, David, The Legitimation of Power, 11. 
  14 
here is that every political institution, every system of domination, attempts to 
legitimate itself, and that regional organizations, even if above all composed by 
transnational bureaucracies, are no different.40 
Building on these assumptions, this thesis proposes a theoretical and 
conceptual framework of self-legitimation, which is defined, for the purposes of 
the present research as an auto-referential discourse, intentional or unintentional, 
made by one or a set of actors in the position of authority within a system of 
political domination, that is capable of justifying unequal power relations by 
linking its social reality to an audience’s beliefs. With this definition, the concept 
of legitimation is de-essentialize so that social actors themselves, in this case the 
regional organizations, can add meaning to it41.  
Various questions might arise from this definition, which could look, for 
example, at what audiences are being privileged, at how the legitimating 
discourse is elaborated and ‘propagated’, or even at whether and how the 
audiences are convinced by the legitimacy claims and to what extent. This 
research, however, focuses on the arguments of legitimation given by regional 
organizations in relation to their own security policies, or the lack thereof. By 
doing so, it is possible to grasp the normative context, at least in the view of the 
organizations themselves, on the standing of security regionalism between 
national states and global institutions. Hence, the main research question, which 
is explored in the later part of this thesis, is the following: 
                                                
40 Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An outline of an Interpretative Sociology, 213 and 954; 
See also:Barker, Rodney, Legitimating Identities: the self-presentations of rulers and 
subjects; Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation."  
41 Pouliot, Vincent, "The Essence of Constructivism", Journal of International Relations and 
Development, 7, no. 3  (2004), 319-36. 
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What are the patterns of arguments in the self-legitimation process of 
regional security organization’s policies of crisis management? 
Hence, this thesis’ main goal in relation to the research question is to 
identify the arguments of self-legitimation and to group them in larger patterns 
that are coherent, intelligible, and exhaustive to a larger extent. These larger 
patterns are then called ‘images of security regionalism’. The conceptual 
framework of self-legitimation, which derives from the research question, and 
the identification of the images are both relevant contributions for at least five 
reasons. 
First of all, the justification of power, as Martin Wight put it, is the 
“fundamental problem of politics” 42  and consequently of political science. 
Secondly, to look at what is claimed to underpin unequal power relations is at the 
heart of the discipline because, following Rodney Barker 43 , that is what 
institutions, rulers, and governments constantly work on, spending time and 
resources. Thirdly, the case of regional security organizations is crucial not only 
because it is insufficiently researched, but also because these institutions, as 
expressed by Philippe Schimitter44, are potential transnational polities in a world 
stage and they would still be intrusive in the lives of many even if most certainly 
not following the same path nor possessing the same attributes of nation-states. 
Fourthly, a research on the arguments of legitimation, which are provided by the 
regional organizations themselves, ‘speaks the normative context’ in which the 
                                                
42 Wight, Martin, International Theory: The Three Traditions, 99. 
43 Barker, Rodney, Legitimating Identities: the self-presentations of rulers and subjects. 
44 Schimitter, Philippe C., "Foreword." 
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political institutions build their standing in security governance. As Martha 
Finnemore has shown: 
When states justify their interventions, they draw 
on the articulated shared values and expectation that 
other decision makers and other publics in other states 
hold. Justification is literally an attempt to connect one’s 
actions with standards of justice or […] with standards 
of appropriate behaviour. Thus, through an examination 
of justifications, we can begin to piece together what 
those internationally held standards are and how they 
change over time.45 
And her reasoning is certainly relevant for the justification – and self-
legitimation – of regional organizations’ security policies as much as for that of 
national states’ interventions. Therefore, images of security regionalism are, at 
the very least, part of a larger and changing normative context of shared 
‘standards of appropriate behaviour’. Finally, by looking at arguments of 
legitimation and at how organizations claim legitimacy it is possible to identify 
contradictions that are internal to the organizations discourses – independent 
from what is ‘really’ happening on the ground – along with the ‘discursive tools’ 
that might be used to address these contradictions. 
The answer to the research question is provided by the empirical analysis 
of two case studies of self-legitimation of regional organization’s policies of 
crisis management. Arguably, the cases that would most adequately fit the 
purposes set by the puzzle are the, largely simultaneous, responses of the 
European Union and the African Union to the violent crisis in the Sudanese 
region of Darfur and adjacent areas in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR) 
from 2003 onwards. More than providing a context in which two of the most 
                                                
45 Finnemore, Martha, The Purpose of Intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force, 15. 
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institutionalized regional organizations in terms of crisis management act 
simultaneously, various additional reasons justify the choice for the context in 
Sudan. Firstly, Darfur illustrates a case of ‘bottom-up regionalization of security 
and insecurity since the conflict gradually become ‘regionalized’ to other areas, 
including ramifications across national borders to Chad and CAR. Secondly, 
Darfur illustrates a ‘top-down’ regionalization in which regional organizations 
grow intrusive and are constantly intervening in response to security issues and 
sometimes taking the leading role. Thirdly, the response to the crisis in Darfur 
reveals constant ‘vertical’ interplay between global and regional institutions, 
which is highly visible in the AU-UN hybrid mission UNAMID or in the transfer 
of responsibilities from the EU to the UN the Chad. Fourthly, there is also a more 
‘horizontal’ interaction between regional organizations themselves as in the so-
called partnership between the EU and the AU. Lastly, taken together, the case of 
Darfur allows for the analysis of self-legitimation of one organization from the 
region itself, the African Union, and another organization external to the African 
continent, the European Union, which is acting beyond its ‘borders’. On this last 
note, is should be mentioned that, even if the EU has security policies and 
regulations that are internal to the bloc, it is the legitimation of the external 
dimension that is analysed, meaning the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and its ramifications. 
In addition, it should be noted by now that while the current literature on 
the legitimation of regional and international organizations remains largely 
focused on the legitimation of ‘entities’, organizations, rules of the game, 
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regimes, or regional projects, 46  this research focuses on the legitimation of 
specific policies – or a set of policies in response to the crisis in Darfur. This is 
not to say that there is no reference to the stand of the organization as a whole or 
that the legitimation of policies and organizations are independent from each 
other, but only that the emphasis is put into the legitimation of policies – the 
response to Darfur, in this case – and that the data are then collected and 
analysed accordingly. Finally, while the literature tends to focus on the 
legitimacy and the legitimation of controversial missions such as those that are 
not authorized by the hosting states or by the UNSC, this research looks at 
policies and missions that received the green light from both the Security 
Council and the hosting nation and were consequently seen as legal. Hence, there 
has not been a large controversy in regard to the missions in Darfur other than 
the fact that they were usually considered to add up to too little action on the part 
of the international community that should be doing more to solve or at least 
stabilise the conflict. 
The empirical analysis of the self-legitimation of the case studies 
identified four larger patterns of legitimation, the images of legitimation, which 
are capable of justifying both the policies being implemented and the position 
                                                
46 See, for instance, the following edited volumes in which chapter correspond to organizations: 
Zaum, Dominik, Legitimating International Organizations; Hoffmann, Andrea Ribeiro 
and Anna Van Der Vleuten, Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy 
in Regional Integration Organisations. See also Sternberg, Claudia S., The Struggle for 
EU Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 1950–2005 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013); Foret, François, Légitimer l'Europe : Pouvoir et symbolique à l'ère de la 
gouvernance (Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2008); Biegoń, Dominika, "Specifying 
the Arena of Possibilities: Post-structuralist Narrative Analysis and the European 
Commission's Legitimation Strategies"; Delcourt, Barbara, "Usages du droit 
international dans le processus de legitimation de la politique exterieure europeenne", 
Droit et Société, 49, no. 3  (2001), 769-90. for emphasis on the European Union and the 
integration project, the European Commission, and the European Security and Foreign 
Policy. 
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occupied by the regional organizations within security governance. The first 
image, which highlights the positive outcome of the regional organizations’ 
policies to a given community, is called beneficial regionalism. Arguably, most 
if not all institutions claim to rule for the benefit of a group and regional 
organizations are no different. This is a consequentialist image that puts 
emphasis on how effective is the ruling for the people47. The second group of 
patterns is here called necessary regionalism. This image portrays the actions of 
the regional organizations, and by consequence their roles as security actors, as a 
sine qua non condition to address a ‘dramatic situation’. Hence, two distinct and 
sometimes overlapping arguments are put forward: the characterization of the 
context as violent and chaotic, on the one hand, and the depiction of the 
organization’s actions as crucial to restore order and peace. 
The third image is the one of inevitable regionalism, meaning that the 
policies and the existence of regional organizations are taken for granted and 
portrayed as the ‘natural course of things’. Hence, the organizations are depicted 
as simply ‘following the law’ and as disinterested and neutral bureaucratic bodies 
that don’t have a saying and are ‘following orders’. Finally, the fourth and last 
image is called multilateral regionalism and refers to the general narrative that 
‘doing things together’ is preferable to unilateral actions. Thus, this pattern is 
underpinned by the horizontal relations among regional organizations and their 
emphasis, on the one hand, on their partnership and cooperation and, on the 
other, mutual support for each other’s policies and positions within the response 
to the crisis. 
                                                
47 Scharpf, Fritz W., "Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU", 
MPIfG Working Paper, 03/1 (2003). 
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Building on a more detailed analysis and combination of these fours 
images, as presented in the empirical chapters, and on the state of the art 
literatures on regionalism, security and legitimacy, it is possible to make at least 
five main claims regarding the nature of legitimation of security regionalism and 
the normative position of regional organization within security governance. 
1. Perceived inaction, or insufficient action, is and must be legitimated as 
much as actions. 
For every action that is taken by the regional organizations there are 
numerous courses of action that are not taken, be it for lack of willingness, lack 
of capacity, or any other factor. While most studies of legitimacy look at the 
legitimation of organizations, projects, and, usually highly controversial, 
policies, it can be argued that the legitimation of inaction is at least as crucial, 
especially in cases were policies are widely expected by the public. Such is the 
case of the crisis management of Darfur in which actions by the ‘international 
community’ were not only seen as legal and uncontroversial, but also deemed 
necessary. 
Hence, the European Union and the African Union appeal to various 
‘tools’ in order to justify the possible gap between what is expected and what is 
actually being done. The image of beneficial regionalism, for example, highlights 
the permanent struggle of both organizations to ‘remain relevant’ and constantly 
inform and publicize what they are doing in response to the crisis as well as the 
positive outcome of their policies. If policies do not produce the desired results, 
then it is the ‘hard work’ of the personnel that is emphasised. In the image of 
inevitable regionalism, the blame for the inaction is transferred to ‘unavoidable 
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factors’ such as following the law, the lack of authorization from the Sudanese 
government, or the hardship and isolation of the terrain in Darfur – geographic 
challenges beyond the organization’s control. 
Legitimation of actions is inherently linked to the legitimation of 
inactions. Whenever an organization justifies something it is doing, did or will 
do, it is also justifying everything else it is not doing. Action and inaction go 
hand in hand. Hence, regional organizations have to justify the inaction in order 
to legitimate their position and existence: if an institution does not act when it is 
expected, for instance in response to of what many considered genocide in 
Darfur, then why do we need yet another hierarchical relation, yet another ruler? 
2. The legitimation processes of the organizations, of their standing 
within security governance, and of their policies are, all three, 
indissociable. 
This thesis’ focus on the legitimation of actions is but a methodological 
choice, which implies the collection of data that relate to the policies of crisis 
management in particular. But in the process of legitimation, and the results it 
produces, the justification of actions cannot be separated from that of the 
organization and the position it occupies. Hence, the legitimation of policies 
presents a double nature. While some actions must be legitimated on their own, 
other actions and policies serve mainly as arguments that might legitimate the 
organization behind them as well as the position it takes within security 
governance. When the African Union is justifying its position as ‘leader’ and its 
role as a security actor, it appeals to, among other narratives, the actions it is 
taking that are helping to ‘solve the crisis’ in Darfur. 
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Moreover, the legitimation of regional organizations arguably happens in 
deeper levels48 in comparison to states. National states, on the one hand, are 
established polities. This means that what is usually legitimated is the leader in 
position of authority, the government and the political party in power, or at most 
the rules of the game, the laws and the state’s constitution. The existence of 
states or their role as security actors is not contested. Regional organizations, on 
the other hand, are a novelty in comparison to states, and it is their existences, or 
at least their role of security providers, that are ultimately legitimated. 
3. The regional identities and regional ‘comparative advantages’ are 
diminished in front of legal-bureaucratic features of ‘impersonal and 
neutral’ regional organizations. 
The images of inevitable and beneficial regionalism also show that the 
arguments of legitimation highlighting the regional features of regional 
organizations such as identity, on the one side, or comparative advantages, on the 
other, are much less frequent than the legal-bureaucratic arguments of 
impartiality. While both the European Union and the African Union touch on 
identity and their nature as regional organization when mentioning respectively 
the ‘European tradition of helping people in need’ of the ‘African solution for 
African problems’, it is clear from the empirical analysis, which is presented in 
the image of inevitable regionalism, that these arguments are secondary when 
compared to the emphasis put on the ‘impersonal’, the legal, and the neutral 
characters of their policies. 
                                                
48 On levels of legitimation, refer to Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation." 
  23 
Other than regional identity, the literature of security regionalism often 
highlights the comparative advantages offered by regional organizations in 
relations to national states and the United Nations when it comes to policies of 
crisis management. 49  These possible ‘advantages’ are, for example, lower 
financial costs, better knowledge of the terrain and local population, proximity to 
the conflict and greater interest in solving it, and greater consensus and speed of 
reaction, all adding up to a larger efficiency. Nonetheless, the image of beneficial 
regionalism shows that these advantages are rarely, if ever, mentioned and that 
the positive outcome of the organization’s policy is not linked to the idea that 
they can ‘do better’ than states or the UN, but rather that they act in 
complementarity. 
4. Security-related arguments of legitimation based on dramatization are 
potentially ‘double-edged swords’ that might create responsibilities the 
organization cannot meet. 
Security-related legitimation functions as a double-edged sword: while 
part of a legitimation process of policies and organizations that is capable of 
constructing actions as necessary, they also establish a particular set of 
responsibilities to actors in dealing with the problems. An opposition between 
two contrasting, mostly hypothetical, narratives articulates the image of 
necessary regionalism. Firstly, the depiction of a chaotic and violent scenario that 
needs to be addressed – this first phase it here called ‘dramatization’. Secondly, 
                                                
49  See, for example: Tavares, Rodrigo, Regional Security: The Capacity of Regional 
Organizations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); Kirchner, Emil J. and Roberto Domínguez, 
eds., The Security Governance of Regional Organizations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
  24 
the depiction of the regional organization and its policies a key factor to bring 
stability and peace.  
However, the risk lies with constructing a dramatic situation that ‘gets out 
of hand’ and that, for any number of reasons, cannot be addressed by the 
organization as would be then expected. Hence, there is a gap between the 
necessity and the actual policies and the results, a gap that might endanger the 
organization’s standing as security provider. In other words, if an organization 
cannot fulfil its responsibilities – those that are attribute to it by, among other 
things, the very same dramatization of the context – then again, why should we 
have yet another political institution? RSOs then appeal to a legitimation 
argument in which the situation is said to get better (beneficial regionalism), but 
not so much to the point in which it ceases to be needed (necessary regionalism). 
5. Multilateralism ‘diffuses’ the responsibility for acting while also 
underpinning ‘reciprocal legitimation’ among regional organizations that, 
in turn, do not expressly challenge the UN primary responsibility. 
According to its basic assumption, the image of multilateral regionalism 
establishes that ‘doing things together’ is preferable to unilateral actions. 
However, the references to multilateralism – the narrative of cooperation and 
coordination among ‘partners’ working together in the same international 
response to a crisis – are also ‘tools’ to both diffuse the responsibility and 
support the organizations’ claim to a specific position within security 
governance. For the former, a regional organization refer to their partners and to 
the cooperation among them to argue that while it is not doing everything that 
was expected to fulfil its perceived responsibilities, it is nonetheless part of a 
  25 
larger and ‘comprehensive’ multilateral engagement in which expectation are 
met by the actions of many of its so-called partners. For the latter, regional 
organizations turn to the support and cooperation of their peers to justify and 
sustain the position they take within security governance and as security actors. 
Hence, the African Union highlights the support from the international 
community to its position as leader while the European Union, an organization 
from outside the region, highlights the fact the AU supports its position in the 
Africa. More generally, the image of multilateral regionalism also reveals a trend 
of ‘reciprocal legitimation’ among regional organizations that is somehow 
analogue to the mutual recognition among sovereign states. 
 
In order to support these and other claims, the theoretical part of the 
thesis builds on the three bodies of literature that are brought together in this 
research. Hence, the first three chapters coincide with the literatures on security, 
regionalism, and legitimacy. Chapter 1 explores the concepts of security, of 
security regionalism as a project, and of security governance as a system of rule. 
It also defines what is meant by regional security organization (RSO). Chapter 2 
presents the empirical and normative dimensions of security regionalism and 
details this thesis’ main puzzle that is the rise of security regionalism in-between 
the ‘national constellation’ of sovereign states and the global institutions. 
Moreover, it provides a historical perspective on the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, and 
above all a retrospective of the international community’s responses to the 
conflict, which includes of course the policies and the missions of regional 
organizations. Finally, chapter 3 revises the literature on political legitimacy, 
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mainly in the discipline of international relations. It argues for the use of 
legitimation instead of legitimacy as object of study and presents the research 
field that follows this trend, focusing on a broad constructivist tradition in IR. 
Following the revision of all three literatures, chapter 4 proposes, as an 
ideal-type, a conceptual and methodological framework to analyse the self-
legitimation of policies of regional security organizations. It then clearly defines, 
in relations to the case studies of the policies of crises management of the 
European Union and the African Union in Darfur from 2003 onwards, the objects 
of legitimation, the legitimating actors, the legitimating audiences, and, above 
all, the arguments of legitimation. The chapter also explores the methods that 
were used to collect and analyse the data and offers an example of document 
analysis. 
The last fours chapters present and analyse the arguments of legitimation 
that are grouped into four main ‘images of security regionalism’. Hence, chapter 
5 to 8 respectively present the images of beneficial regionalism, necessary 
regionalism, inevitable regionalism, and multilateral regionalism. More than the 
systematic presentation of the regional organization’s arguments of self-
legitimation, each of the four chapters also links these images to the relevant 
literature, details the legitimation of inaction and the special features of the 
legitimation of regional organizations in a comparative perspective between the 
European Union and the African Union, and finally points to the possible 
contradictions within the discourse and the ‘tools’ that are used to manage these 
contradictions. The general conclusion brings the fours images together, links 
them to the general puzzle of this thesis, and proposes other avenues for research.  
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Chapter 1 
SECURITY REGIONALISM: GOVERNANCE AND ITS 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
This first chapter narrows down the focus of this dissertation by 
addressing how security relates to concepts such as regionalism, governance, and 
regional organizations. It is argued that both regionalism – as a policy and a 
project – and governance – as a system of rule – present an element of 
intentionality and are subject to questions of rightfulness and political legitimacy. 
Moreover, the two concepts relate to the process of widening and deepening of 
security. In this regard, regional organizations constitute one of the most visible 
aspects of both policies of regionalism and governance’s heterarchy, with a 
bureaucratic actorness capable of relative autonomous discourse, and are part of 
the struggles of building regions and of defining and shaping security itself. 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. Each of the first fours 
sections – security, security regionalism, regional security governance and 
regional security organizations – presents the current literature and advances a 
definition to be used in the thesis that shall guarantee the conceptual coherence 
throughout the chapters that follow. A final section details the security 
components of the European Union and the African Union as regional security 
organizations, going further into the details of the case studies. 
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1) Security 
The definition of security must not be taken for granted, as it is bound to 
social context and can be studied from multiple intellectual perspectives. This 
section presents key elements that challenge a traditional context-independent 
view of security in order to advance an understanding of security as “discursive 
in nature [and] performative in character” 50. 
The current debates within international security studies are marked by a 
high degree of heterogeneity. Since the 1980s, the so-called traditional approach 
to security has been contested by different perspectives such as constructivism,51 
international political sociology, 52  critical theory, 53  poststructuralism, 54 
feminism,55 postcolonialism,56 and of course the discussions around the theory of 
securitization.57  Most of these scholarships would oppose a narrow, context-
                                                
50 George Christou et al., “European Union Security Governance: Putting the ‘security’ Back in,” 
European Security 19, no. 3 (September 2010): 343. 
51 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security : Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
52 Didier Bigo, Christian Olsson, and Thierry Balzacq, “Security Practices,” International Studies 
Encyclopedia Online (ISA, 2010); Didier Bigo, “International Political Sociology,” in 
Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 
2013), 120–34. 
53 Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
54  Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Lene Hansen, “A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist 
Conceptualization of Security,” Cooperation and Conflict 32, no. 4 (December 01, 
1997): 369–97; David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the 
Politics of Identity, Revised Ed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 
55 Annick Wibben, Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach (London: Routledge, 2011); 
Laura Sjoberg, ed., Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives (London: 
Routledge, 2010). 
56 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” Review of 
International Studies 32, no. 02 (May 24, 2006): 329. 
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independent, definition of security such as those proposed by Stephen Walt who 
limits security research to “the study of threat, use, and control of military force” 
58 , or even by Mohammed Ayoob who, despite proposing a ‘Third World’ 
perspective, restricts security to threats and potential threats that can “bring down 
or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and 
regimes”59. Both positions, while advancing universal and abstract definitions 
that are inherently state-centric, do not recognize the multiplicity of referent 
objects, actors, and threats. 
This view contrasts with a “new thinking” 60  in security studies. The 
intellectual developments of the sub-field in the last thirty years made clear the 
necessity of including other sectors beyond the traditional military one and 
taking into account other referent objects to security beyond the state. As Rob 
Walker argues, in the study of security, “[m]ere physical survival […] is not 
enough, and power comes not just or even primarily from the barrel of the 
gun”.61 In fact, the last three decades witnessed such widening and deepening of 
the concept, as well as the introduction of so different ontological and 
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epistemological perspectives, that security studies come to have no clear borders, 
but only frontier-zones62. 
The contours to these frontier-zones are established, as Barry Buzan and 
Lene Hansen explain, by ontological, epistemological and normative positions, 
which are taken by the researcher and “set crucial boundaries not only for how 
security is defined, but also for what kind of research projects and analyses are 
carried out”63. It is necessary, for instance, to reflect upon “whose security is at 
stake”64 (e.g. collectivities, environment, individuals, etc.), whether to consider 
only external or also internal threats and actors, or whether to expand security 
studies beyond the military sector. Finally, it is also important to delineate the 
position in relation to politics and change as well as the main epistemological 
assumptions underpinning the research. 
Traditional approaches to security, on the one hand, tend to answer these 
questions with a positivist methodology, with a realist view of politics in which 
political change is dependent on external impulse, and with a state-centric 
analysis of security restricted to the military sector and focused above all on 
external threats. Non-traditional approaches, on the other hand, have sought to 
rethink these questions with multiple, but also contrasting, perspectives. Ole 
Wæver, for example, popularized the division of critical security studies in three 
schools, Paris, Copenhagen and Aberystwyth65. A strict categorization, however, 
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might be misleading as the debates go beyond these groups to include others and 
intertwined contributions.66 
By navigating within the frontier-zones of international security studies 
(ISS), the social context becomes even more important. Given the 
epistemological and ontological incompatibilities already embedded in the sub-
field, a consensual, universal, and abstract definition of security is neither 
necessary nor desirable. In fact, claims about security are, “despite their 
rhetorical linkage with hardheaded claims about the way the world is […], at root 
primary normative both in their commitments and their effects.”67. As Didier 
Bigo puts it, “any academic definition which tries to stabilize the meaning of 
security, is either naïve or politically oriented”68. In this regard, the approach 
presented next, relying on a constructivist take on security, seems to corroborate 
these demands by focusing on context instead of abstract definitions, and on 
discourse as well as materiality. 
Any given approach to security is not only bound to its empirical context, 
but also to the assumptions of what matters, what security is and does, and how 
we come to know it. A critical constructivist approach to security also tries to 
answer to normative, ontological, and epistemological questions and comes with 
a specific focus on discourse. As Lene Hansen writes, “the point is that it is 
through discourse that the material – and the ideational – is represented for us 
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and by us”69. In this sense, the so-called borders of security are discursive and its 
concept has a deep political nature70. 
This discourse is not limited to words, but encompasses practices, 
representations, and inter-subjective relations. In addition, it is shaped and 
controlled by a number of social procedures of exclusion, which determinate 
what shall be said, who is in the position to do so and how it should be done.71 
Thus, it is possible to say that, in a so-called field of security, only certain groups 
and institutions “authorize themselves and […] are authorized to state what 
security is”72. The same reasoning applies for the definition of what constitutes a 
threat, for not everybody can do so and the characterization as such is seen as 
“part of a political and material struggle, rather than as corresponding to an 
immanent quality of the situation”73. Thus, even if constructivist scholars might 
remain statecentric, critical constructivism opens the way to analysis of referents 
other than the state. Regional organizations such as the European Union or the 
African Union 74 , as amalgamation of member states and transnational 
bureaucracies75, are part of this struggle when they assess a situation in their 
region or abroad, point out to threats or simply ‘express concern’ as means of 
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justifying their actions. In this regard, their security and foreign policies are 
legitimated by particular discursive constructions of security.76 
Some elements of a constructivist approach to security overlap with a 
poststructuralist perspective, especially by bringing a strong focus on the 
dichotomies of exclusion and inclusion77. Discourse is, therefore, understood as 
constructing an opposition, be it in the process of identity formation and the 
opposition between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, in the division between internal and 
external security and threats, or in the opposition between order and chaos. 
Hence, discourse sets the boundaries between a security issue that necessitates 
response – sometimes urgent and exceptional – and what remains outside 
security. Discourse also sets the borders of security sectors that might go beyond 
the military 78  and takes into account not only states, but also collectivities, 
economies, the environment, and individuals whose security is threatened. In 
fact, it is assumed that the distinction between state and individual security is 
very much blurry, as one comprises the other.79 Claims about individual security, 
on the one hand, presuppose a public and political engagement linked to 
collective security. State security, on the other, “implies a particular solution to 
the problem of individual security”80. Referent objects to security are, therefore, 
historically contingent. 
Finally, this view assumes that political change is possible, but that 
depends on how discourse is constructed and operates. Theorizing security might 
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also be an element of change since there is no clear boundary between it and the 
practice of security itself.81 Change is, however, limited by our ability to think 
other forms of political life: “[t]he security of states dominates our understanding 
of what security can be, and who it can be for, not because conflict between 
states is inevitable, but because other forms of political community have been 
rendered almost unthinkable.” 82  Theorizing the security struggles of other 
polities, such as regional organizations, is an experiment beyond traditional 
boundaries and it allows for questioning what is taken for granted – a process 
that is at the heart of constructivism. 
Thus, security comes to mean different things in different contexts and 
according to different approaches. For the purpose of this research, security 
claims refer to political urgency and special allocation of resources to deal with a 
constructed threat to an equally constructed referent object within a discursive 
framework. Both the threat and the referent object are constructed. It also refers 
to the empowerment of one or multiple actors to a position of authority capable – 
perceived as capable or even responsible – to deal with the security issue. 
Therefore, it is understood that for every security issue, there is a struggle among 
different actors for the ‘rightfulness’ of defining its contours and of dealing with 
it. Put simply, security discourses function as a double-edged sword: while part 
of a legitimation process of policies and organizations, they also establish a 
particular set of responsibilities to actors in dealing with the problem.83 This 
thesis shall look at exactly this process by which the actor’s ethos is built and 
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justified: the discursive strategies by which the right to speak and do security are 
constructed as well as how the responsibility to do so is managed by discursive 
tools. 
2) Security regionalism 
Security, being inseparably linked to its social and political context, also 
connects to different geographical, physical, spaces. These spaces might involve 
sub-national regions, one or multiple states, or even the entire planet. That is not 
to say that there is no interaction among actors in different spaces, but that some 
might acquire more relevance over others in specific discourses. This section 
explores the links between security and one of these ‘spaces’: the world regions, 
or simply regions henceforth. 
An ever-increasing number of works, from a variety of perspectives, 
points to the importance of security for regions and within the new wave of 
regionalism.84 Terms such as region, regionalism and regionalization are subject 
to multiple interpretations, the last two being frequently used interchangeably. In 
this regard, Louise Fawcett makes a useful distinction between regionalization 
and regionalism. While the latter refers to a policy or a project “whereby states 
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and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region”, 
the former is a process that might happen as result of spontaneous forces and that 
refers, broadly speaking, to a concentration of activity in the regional level.85 
Thus, one can say that regionalism, as opposed to regionalization, is intentionally 
promoted. 
For Fawcett,86 three elements help understand security regionalism: a. the 
experience of Western Europe; b. the normative frames it presents or draws upon 
can either support or oppose global order; c. and the multilateral/global 
institutions’ need to share the burden, especially in conflict resolution. In this last 
aspect, (new) regionalism can be seen as motivated by, among other factors, the 
UN incapacity to deal with security demands.87 
In many studies, however, ‘security regionalism’ refers not only to 
specific phenomena of regional projects, but also to the scholarship working on 
regions as a ‘space’ for security. Indeed, the literature is already very extensive, 
and the approaches vary considerably. When reviewing the security studies’ 
contributions to regionalism, Robert Kelly 88  shows that most approaches 
downscale – or deduct – the debates of international relations theory to the 
regional level, considered to be anywhere between the national level and a fully 
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global space, this last one being where IR theory traditionally focuses. Hence, 
considerably less effort has been put on building theories that are specific to 
regional security and to regional organizations, which also concerns the gap on 
the study of legitimacy of policies and projects of security regionalism that this 
research intends to fill. 
Perhaps the most popular approach to regional security to date, Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver’s regional security complex theory (RSCT)89, presents a 
mix of realist theory down-scaled to the study of regions (e.g. polarity, anarchy, 
state-centrism, state capacity, etc.) and some elements of constructivism as those 
brought by securitization theory. In their work, the authors divide the world into 
non-overlapping security complexes according to their account of processes and 
relations of securitization.90 Underpinning most of the study, however, is the 
assumption that regions take preponderance in the security realm because of both 
the move away from bipolarity that signifies the absence of systemic dispute 
between superpowers and the fact “that most threats travel more easily over short 
distances than over long ones”91. Thus, the limits of each security complex might 
change in time because they are constructed according to relations of 
securitization and threat among international actors, mainly states. 
Along with RSC theory, other scholarship pieces also propose their own 
definition of what a region is and how one can identify them. David Lake and 
Patrick Morgan look at actors around common security externalities, breaking 
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with the territorial cohesion of regions as proposed by Buzan and Wæver; 
Douglas Lemke bases his study on regional hierarchies and identifies at least 23 
different regions; looking at regions as products of hegemon’s actions, Peter 
Katzenstein presents six large regions corresponding to the American Military 
Commands. 92  Nonetheless, despite their different approaches, these studies 
would very rarely take into account the importance of institutions and formal 
organizations other than states within regions, let aside the normative question of 
rightfulness of these actors in playing a role in the regional realm. 
For the purposes of this thesis, regionalism is understood as a set of 
intentional political projects, acts, policies and discourses that originate and 
enhance regional institutions in a broader sense and in a contiguous space, which 
is in itself also constructed by regionalism. This includes not only formal 
organizations, but also shared procedures and norms in a regional level. Simply 
put, regionalism promotes a specific idea of region in terms of identity, shared 
goals, and geographical space. It participates in the construction the regions 
themselves by advancing the regional commonalities and setting their 
geographical and social limits.  
Overlapping regionalisms compete on building overlapping conceptions 
of regions and, by consequence, exclude and build other adjacent regions. 
Promoting a South American identity over a Latin American one, for example, 
would necessarily exclude, and therefore also help constructing, a Central 
American region. It could also the case of the Europe of the European Union in 
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contrast to the rest of European continent, or the Sub-Saharan Africa in 
opposition to a continental-wide African region as that of the African Union. By 
building a region, regionalism also ‘excludes’ other regional conceptions and 
discourses that overlap in time and space. This exclusion of the other is not 
necessarily radical and does not always mean a rivalry, but it certainly helps 
construct and set limits to regions. 
Behind regionalism, and both its construction and exclusion elements, are 
a variety of actors. Actors capable of promoting regional project are usually 
public, but there can also be private actors involved. Furthermore, regionalism as 
a project can also increase regional awareness and regional identity, promote 
common norms and behaviour, and of course create and further develop formal 
institutions such as regional organizations. 
If a constructivist approach to security means that it cannot be objectively 
defined, the same approach to security regionalism would mean that regions, in 
addition to security, could not be defined in abstract terms or detached from their 
context. Regions are socially constructed, and their limits and attributes vary 
according to the perspective adopted (e.g. economical, cultural, political, etc.) 
and the points of view of different actors involved. To say that regions are 
socially constructed means above all that they could be different – a counter-
factual that is at the heart of constructivism – and are constantly rebuilt or 
reaffirmed by different initiatives. 
But regions are not only built by intentional projects and policies of 
regionalism. They are also constructed by process of regionalization that can be 
non-intentional and spontaneous. Regionalization of security happens in two 
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opposing directions: by the geographical ‘spill-over’ of security issues previously 
restricted to national borders (e.g. an escalation of a civil war conflict) or the 
‘downscale’ of security from global to regional. In security studies particularly, 
regionalization commonly refers to the latter in relations to peace operations and 
conflict management, in a broader sense, that are managed not exclusively by the 
United Nations, but also by regional organizations when the they take over at 
least part of the responsibility.93  In both directions, regionalization comes to 
mean the rise in importance of the regional level in the construction of security. 
3) The governance of regional security 
Initially, before the 1980s, governance had a broad meaning similar to 
that of political regime.94 More recently, in the last couple of decades, it has 
acquired more specific definitions, being applied in multiple disciplines, from 
economics to environmental studies. Presented as a system of rule95, as a set of 
structures and process96, or as structures of authority97, governance commonly 
refers to the diffusion of political authority, to the decentralisation of governing, 
decision-making or policy implementation, and to the participation of multiple 
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actors, public and private as well as the interaction between formal and informal 
actors and ‘authorities’. 
Following this trend is the work of Elke Krahmann 98  who contrasts 
governance to government, placing both concepts in a spectrum of 
decentralisation/centralisation, which includes attributes such as decision-
making, policy implementation, distribution of resources, and geographic 
centralisation. Following a similar trend, Emil Kirchner defines governance as: 
[T]he structures and processes which enable a set of 
public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent 
needs and interests through the making and implementation 
of binding policy decisions in the absence of central political 
authority.99 
Hence, governance points to the decentralisation of governing, a move 
away from a unifying authority, which has, in modern history, been represented 
by state centrism. Both governance and government are ideal-typical poles, and 
political structures and process are often somewhere in the middle of this 
spectrum. Krahmann’s continuum, however, is not exhaustive when it comes to 
world politics. As Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve100 remind us: 
Whereas in domestic politics [governance] describes 
a movement ‘from government to governance’ – suggesting a 
process of fragmentation and ‘hollowing out of state’ – in 
international politics the term can be seen to have emerged 
describing the move from (realist) ‘anarchy’ to ‘governance’. 
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Accordingly, in world politics, governance refers to a degree of 
decentralized authority, but not always to the process of decentralization of 
authority. On the contrary, it might highlight a move towards at least some 
degree of hierarchy as opposed to the completely anarchical conception of 
international politics as defended by classical theories of IR. This ‘move’ from 
anarchy to governance, as shown in the chapters that follow, needs to be justified 
and legitimated. 
The security element in regional governance is still not sufficiently clear 
in the literature. It is usually assumed that security governance refers to the same 
phenomenon as governance, but with a specific focus on the “structures and 
processes that characterize national and international security”101. Kirchner, for 
example, defines security governance in very broad terms, lacking specific 
references to security itself or elements such as urgency, survival or threat: 
Security governance can be defined as an intentional 
system of rule that involves the coordination, management 
and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, 
interventions by both public and private actors, formal and 
informal arrangements, and purposefully directed towards 
particular policy outcomes.102 
Definitions proposed by Shaun Breslin and Stuart Croft103 as well as by 
Krahmann104 treat governance as a loose105 concept capable to grasp the reality 
of a new security environment. Facing new challenges and threats of this new 
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context, the state’s monopoly of the (legitimate) use of force seems to be eroded 
as it interacts with private actors and international organizations for reasons of 
effectiveness or cost-efficiency106. 
At the same time, most definitions of security governance seem to 
corroborate a wider and deeper understanding of security. George Christou and 
his co-authors. 107 , for example, work with the concept of securitization in 
relation to European security governance, an approach that would accept 
multiple sectors beyond the traditional military. Of course, the notion of security 
governance points to a process of erosion of the state’s monopoly of legitimate 
violence, and not to a complete extinction. 108  Even constructivist and 
poststructuralist approaches, which consider and give voice to other actors 
beyond the state, would acknowledge that security “still remains for the most 
part a prerogative of the state.”109 When looking at private security, for instance, 
Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams110 argue that states retain much of their 
prerogatives and resources in the intersection between governance and security 
and that governance comes into existence because national institutions enabled it. 
Indeed, power relations and domination become simultaneously national and 
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international and cannot be reduced to “questions of more or less state power”111: 
state authority is ‘regionalized’. 
But not every approach to governance necessarily corresponds to a wider 
approach to security. Heiner Hänggi, for instance, proposes that, from a state-
centric perspective, the focus of security governance would be on military and 
traditional security in the so-called security sector governance, which includes 
mainly “the protection of the state and its constituent communities” 112. Adler 
and Greve113 also try to insert a more distinctive, perhaps traditional, element of 
security by defining security governance as: 
[…] a system of rule by individual and corporate 
actors aiming at coordinating, managing, and regulating their 
collective existence in response to threats to their physical 
and ontological security. This system of rule relies primarily 
on the political authority of agreed-upon norms, practices, 
and institutions, as well as on the identities, rationalities, 
technologies, and spatial forms, around and across which 
international and transnational security activity takes place. 
Despite the differences, there is apparently a common trend in security 
governance literature to consider a certain number of key features, as presented 
by Mark Webber and his co-authors. Accordingly, security governance refers to a 
large number of actors of different nature (e.g. states, international organizations, 
and private actors) whose relations are marked by heterarchy, but also by formal 
and informal frameworks of institutionalization and a certain diffused authority. 
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Furthermore, their interactions are “ideational in character, structured by norms 
and understandings as much as by formal regulations”114. Finally, the relation is 
also characterised by a collective purpose. This last aspect marks an element of 
intentionality that is, as shown above, also common to policies of regionalism. 
Krahmann’s work also demonstrates that the understanding of 
governance at different levels – national, regional, and global – refers, broadly 
speaking, to the same phenomenon of diffused authority.115 The distinctiveness 
of the literature on regional governance, however, is its larger European footprint 
developed since the 1990s116, as it “almost exclusively refers to what has been 
termed multilevel decision-making within the European Union”117. This focus in 
the literature is mainly due to the so-called post-Westphalian attributes of EU 
policy-making and the very complex relation within the region as well as with its 
periphery and in the transatlantic space. 
As with regional governance in general, most of the literature on regional 
security governance was built upon the European and transatlantic experience.118 
Research on regions, however, has already been published since the 2000s119. 
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Much of the literature, in fact, overlaps with the subfield of comparative 
regionalism and, even if the concept of governance is not directly present, recent 
analyses aim at comparing the role of international organizations and other actors 
in regional security and the complex security environments, which is very much 
in line with governance’s heterarchy.  
Two comparative studies of regional security governance, including of 
course regions other than the European space, have recently been published. The 
first one is an edited volume by Emil Kirchner and Roberto Domínguez120. The 
authors provide a framework for comparison based on the possible contributions 
of regional organizations to security provision.121 The typology offers a broader 
interpretation of security that allows for comparison of 10 regional organizations, 
bringing into the analysis, for example, non-military elements of human security 
and development.122 Nonetheless, it does not go much far beyond traditional 
aspects of security as most of the studied attributes of these institutions actually 
gravitate around conflict prevention and conflict resolution. A second 
comparative study was proposed, in an edited volume, by Shaun Breslin and 
Stuart Croft123 who open up the concept of security in order to consider not only 
the organizations’ contribution, but also a more constructivist element of how 
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regions themselves come into being and how (shared) identities and discursive 
practices play a role in the process. Its introductory chapter does not offer 
common criteria for comparison in the same way as Kirchner and Domínguez do. 
Instead, the authors advance a definition of governance and an understanding of 
security. Most chapters, in this regard, tend to look at traditional aspects of 
security such as conflict prevention or public security. To put it in critical 
security terms, the understanding of security governance that is put forward by 
both studies seems to focus on the deepening of security rather than on the 
widening: the theoretical and conceptual frameworks allow for entities other than 
the state to play a role, but the analysis remain largely within the political-
military sector. 
These studies have shown that there is more to security governance then 
the European space and that the concept and what it entails can be applied in 
other regions. As Kirchner sustains, the many regions in the world present 
different degrees of cohesion, institutionalization, and effectiveness in addressing 
security issues, but the phenomena of regional security governance have, in its 
geographical variations, “become established features in the international 
system”. 124  Kirchner goes on to say that the focus on regional security 
governance sheds light on the “inherent territoriality of contemporary 
international security”125, a statement linked to a sort of territorial bound of 
security regionalism also put forward by Buzan and Wæver’s RSC theory. And 
this security governance can be, as the authors put it, self-standing within the 
region or, as in many cases, vertically linked to the global institutions, above all 
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the United Nations. Finally, there is also a horizontal relation between regional 
institutions themselves in what has come to be known as inter-organizationalism, 
such as between the EU and NATO, or interregionalism when multiple 
geographic spaces are concerned.126 
When bringing the concept outside Europe, there is a need to use a 
broader understanding of governance, encompassing different realities. 
Furthermore, a focus on regional governance does not mean that only regional 
actors can be considered. It is important to acknowledge that actors internal and 
external to the region are often playing a role. Hence, the concept of governance, 
if taken as a heuristic tool, can grasp the multitude of centres by which different 
actors, public and private, “organize their common and competing interests in 
international security”127. 
Two aspects favour the use of governance as a heuristic tool128 within our 
approach to security. Firstly, this study has no ambition of using the concept to 
understand how the decision-making takes place, how the system of governance 
originated and what drives it, or who is behind certain policies. Secondly, a 
heuristic and broader understanding of governance as decentralized system of 
rule would still take into account social power relations and its asymmetries 
between different actors. 129 As Frederik Mérand and his co-authors have shown, 
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“a governance system is also a vector of power in which some actors dominate 
others”. 130  As presented in chapters 3 and 4, it is this unequal relation of 
domination, which is inherent to security governance, that is being legitimated. 
This view is compatible with a broad constructivist approach according to 
which the move towards decentralization of governing could empower and give 
agency to more actors to participate in the construction of security beyond the 
unifying, and ideal-typical, authority of the state. Thus, governance includes not 
only cooperation, but also struggle among actors. In other words, within a 
security governance architecture there is a variety of interacting actors, 
cooperating and competing to promote, direct, shape, implement, and suppress 
security discourses and practices. State and non-state actors might, for example, 
have different perceptions on what constitutes a threat and how to deal with 
them. 
As the next chapter demonstrates, the security governance responding to 
the crisis in Darfur in Sudan and its adjacent areas from 2003 onwards has 
regional features mainly because of the positions occupied by regional 
organizations such as the European Union and the African Union. Put together 
along with roles and policies implemented by the United Nations, the national 
governments of the region, third-countries, and other member of the so-called 
‘international community’, one clearly sees the heterarchical nature of 
governance and the multiplicity of sites of authority related to the crisis. 
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Finally, it is also important to note that security regionalism does not 
necessarily lead to decentralization. As Mario Telò131 shows, a regional project 
might be pursued by a single state in authoritarian and non-negotiated fashion or 
it might be worked through a hegemonic project. However, in current days, the 
new wave of regionalism often does lead to diffusion of authority as it creates 
and enhances new institutions, gives voice to a variety of actors and develops 
new procedures of governing that must be justified and legitimated. 
4) Regional security organizations and their policies 
The most visible manifestation of security regionalism is the creation, or 
the empowerment, of formal institutions that can be regrouped by the label of 
regional security organizations (RSO). From confidence building measures to 
framing military operations, they also figure among the possible sites of 
authority within security governance. Since the number of such organizations has 
grown significantly in the first two decades following the Cold War, it is now 
possible to say, even if one considers only a narrow approach to security as 
military and defence, that virtually every region counts at least one security 
organization and that the vast majority of countries in the world are members of 
at least one, if not many different overlapping security arrangements, form 
alliances to larger bureaucracies. 
New and enhanced institutions add up to the group of older organizations 
from the Cold War period that have not disappeared such as NATO – which can 
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as well be considered a regional organization based on its membership in a North 
Atlantic region – and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE). Actually, despite criticism on their efficacy, very few RSOs have been 
dismantled in the last six decades.132 
As with security regionalism and regional governance, a large part of the 
literature about security organizations, from different theoretical backgrounds, 
refers to the European cases, be it NATO or the European Union and its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 133  An important body of 
literature, however, that can be branded comparative regionalism, has been 
considering and comparing organizations from other regions with the EU and 
among themselves.134 Rodrigo Tavares135, for instance, looks at goals, priorities, 
and mandates as well as institutional designs of eleven organizations in their 
regions or nearby spaces. Furthermore, the author also identifies 38 regional 
organizations with security dimensions.136 In parallel, other scholarship pieces 
have also been published with analysis of regional organizations’ role in regional 
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security, very often with a special focus on their interaction with the United 
Nations.137 
This literature shows that the regional organizations dealing with security 
issues differ in terms of professed goals and mandates, the available capacity, the 
actual implementation of policies as well as their understandings of security, 
from a traditional to wider and deeper perspectives. Yet, it is possible to say that 
they all play a role in the security architecture of their regions, be it as symbolic, 
discursive, and practical agents or just something on which to put the blame for 
the perceived inaction of states in the face of a security issue. 
This doctoral research proposes a definition of regional security 
organization (RSO), taking into account the works of Louise Fawcett and John 
Duffield,138 with three basic features that are presented below: high level of 
institutionalization, regional attachment, and a connection with security issues. 
Institutionalization level 
First of all, a RSO is an international organization, which was created 
with, or has acquired, a highly institutionalized character, be it intergovernmental 
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or supranational. More than juridical personality, the organization has at least 
one physical location, permanent bodies and secretariat, personnel, budget, and 
regular meetings. Here I adopt Robert Keohane’s position 139  and consider 
international organizations as one specific, more formal, kind of international 
institution.140 To use the UN vocabulary, more than an arrangement, a RSO is an 
agency141, or a set of agencies. 
Perhaps the most important difference regarding other institutions is that 
organizations behave as international bureaucracies with sufficient autonomy, 
despite their intergovernmental character and consensual decision-making for 
security and defence policies. Therefore, by analysing RSOs policies and 
discourses, it is not assumed that they simply “do what member states want”, but 
that they present a certain degree of actorness: 
[Even if they are] not typically able to act in ways 
that directly contravene the interests of the states that create 
them, especially the more powerful ones, their autonomy 
allows them to perform certain functions more effectively 
than individual or even groups of states.142 
Regional organizations are also able to adapt and react to change in their 
environment. Therefore, when facing a change in the normative environment, 
RSOs are expected to change the way they satisfy their stakeholders or, as 
chapter 3 will show, the way they legitimate their actions: 
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When conditions such as the security environment 
change, these organizations can react by changing their 
allocations of resources, the tasks they pursue, and the 
constituencies that they seek to satisfy. That is, they can 
adapt to change.143 
By following the popular approach to actorness by Joseph Jupille and 
James Caporaso144, we say that RSOs satisfy, to different degrees, four criteria, 
two of which are relatively straightforward while the last two require further 
clarification. First, actors interact and enjoy recognition by other entities, 
something that is clearly the case for RSOs when they are acknowledged by the 
United Nations, their peers and third-countries in international fora and cooperate 
with them145. Second, they have authority, a concept that the authors basically 
equate to legal competence or juridical personality. 
Third and fourth, RSOs enjoy autonomy to various degrees and present a 
level of cohesion in their policy preferences. This does not mean, however, that 
they are free from the influence of their member-states, which effectively created 
them, or other groups. On the contrary, international organizations are often 
spaces of struggle and competition among their own members in an analogous 
way to national-states being sites of struggle among and within, for example, 
political parties or the administrative units in their bureaucracies. When they act 
and shape the actions of others, international organizations “may encounter 
varying degrees of resistance or co-optation, just as we see in all relationships 
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among international actors”146. They also face the limits of their capacity and of 
the opportunities presented to them. Actorness does not mean or necessarily 
require effective influence, for the capacity to influence and shape others’ 
behaviour would be closer to power than actorness. Rather, an actor is able to act 
to various degrees of cohesion and various degrees of effectiveness to influence 
others. Furthermore, to say that regional and international organizations are 
autonomous, as Martha Finnemore argues, “does not, after all, make them 
omnipotent”147. Hence, it is important to bear in mind that no state, or any other 
entity in world politics for that matter, is omnipotent and it would be 
unreasonable to ask the same of regional organizations when considering their 
relative autonomy.  
Regional attachment 
The second feature refers to the regional character. A RSO is regionally 
attached in terms of membership and main goals (e.g. peace among neighbours, 
collective defence against external threats, etc.). In theory, it can be composed by 
a minimum of two member-states and go as far as any sub-global number. In 
practice, however, a RSOs’ geographical space and membership tend to 
correspond to intuitive, although overlapping, conceptions of regions and sub-
regions such as Western Europe, West Africa or Africa, North Atlantic, South 
Asia, and South America. This definition includes RSOs that overlap in space 
with others, and those that influence and act in extra-regional scenarios. 
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By focusing on membership and ultimate goals, this definition does not 
make a distinction regarding the geographical area of action and influence. 
Moreover, we do not distinguish, at least for defining a RSO, between 
organisations that are internal-oriented (e.g. collective security) and external-
oriented (e.g. military alliance). Very often an organization can aim at both 
internal and external spaces. The European Union, for instance, is a RSO even if 
it acts beyond the territory of its member-states. In an analogue way, states are 
‘national states’ even if their policies reach beyond their territory. 
Of course conceptions and boundaries of regions vary over time and 
accordingly to different issues such as security, economics, finance or trade, 
environment, culture, etc. In this sense, RSOs can be actual players in the 
‘construction of regions’. Moreover, the memberships of RSOs as well as the 
very creation of new organizations are facts that shape how the ‘borders’ of 
regions are ultimately perceived. 
The security element 
Finally, the third feature of a RSO refers to security itself. RSOs have 
security mandates to deal with security issues and they participate in the struggle 
that defines what are the security issues and threats and who or what should be 
protected.148 But one might also inquire what is considered to be a security 
mandate. As with the concept of security, different positions can be taken. In a 
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broader sense, as Fawcett points out, almost every regional institution has a 
security element such as democracy and human rights promotion or 
environmental, and economic security. A more narrow understanding is offered 
by Duffield 149  who, while analysing international security institutions (ISI), 
considers institutions that address or regulate a. threat and use of physical force 
and the responses to such threats (e.g. military intervention, peace keeping 
operations); b. production, possession, exchange and transfer of weapons (e.g. 
military budget transparency, International Atomic Energy Agency); and/or c. 
peacetime deployment of military forces (e.g. military exercises). Fawcett150 
offers a similar definition by focusing on regimes and formal institutions whose 
aim is the provision of security. 
Hence, organizations participate in the construction of regions and of 
security, being interested on advancing their own agenda. And this aspect refers 
not only to their policies, but also to particular understandings of what security is 
(what kind threats are relevant, who should be in charge of dealing with them) 
and related concepts such as human rights, humanitarian intervention, 
sovereignty, etc. With permanent representations and their own budgets, these 
organizations not only do things, but also say things. They issue policy 
statements and press releases after meetings, organize and fund conferences, and 
have their own institutes and think thanks producing working papers and training 
officials. Sometimes, they might be compelled to justify policies and actions, or 
the absence of them when the ‘public’ deems a policy necessary. In other 
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occasions, they might as well try to keep a low profile in face of unpopular or 
unjustifiable actions. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that regional security organizations are 
also part of the discursive struggle within – and sometimes outside – their 
regions about security issues and how to deal with them. Furthermore, these 
policies and discourses of regional organizations in general, and security 
organizations specifically, both include and exclude actors, being an element in 
the construction of world regions and the related identities. 
Most regional organizations, considered or self-proclaimed to have a 
security component, fall into a more classic definition of international security 
which refers to and tries to prevent “intentional, politically-motivated acts of 
physical violence directed by one political actor against another, typically – but 
not exclusively – states, that cross international boundaries.”151A smaller number 
of regional organizations are also capable of planning, coordinating and/or 
executing military and civil operations, be it in the geographical space of their 
members or beyond it. Examples of regional organizations with capabilities of 
sending ‘expeditionary’ forces under their institutional framework include the 
European Union, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council. By 2010, for example, around half of the 
peacekeeping operations were being conducted by regional organizations.152 
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When it comes to security operations, regional arrangements are one of 
the three actors beyond the United Nations that are currently conducting them, 
the other two being individual states and coalitions of the willing.153 In security 
studies in particular, the trend by which regional arrangements are taking over a 
number of peace operations is known as ‘regionalization of security’. These 
operations are not restricted to peacekeeping, civilian or police missions, and 
often include an element of use of physical force. As Coleman shows, states 
choose in many cases to launch peace enforcement operations through 
international institutions, among them what the author calls “sub-regional 
organizations”154.  
The policies and acts of different regional organizations vary 
considerably, from serving as facilitators in peace talks to the actual use of force 
in conflict situations, passing by judicial and police missions and post-conflict 
state building. They may work both towards securitization or desecuritization of 
an issue. These policies, as chapter 2 shall clarify, are subject to questions of 
efficiency and efficacy (e.g. what regional organizations do better than global 
institutions or individual states?), but also the related questions about rightfulness 
and accountability (e.g. what are the normative underpinnings of such policies?). 
In particular, this thesis seeks to analyse the claims of two regional 
organizations, the African Union and the European Union, which are presented 
in the next section.  
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5) The African Union and the European Union as examples of RSOs 
The African Union is a continent-wide organization that assembles more 
than 50 members-states. It replaced the Organization of the African Unity 
(OAU), itself founded in 1963, when its treaty entered into force in July 2002. 
Politically, this new organization captains the idea of ‘African solutions for 
African problems’155 and is said to represent a move from non-interference – 
which at the time of the OAU had become a euphemism for inaction156 – to non-
indifference in the face of violence and human rights’ violations happening in 
Africa. In this regard, the Constitutive Act of the AU gives it the right to 
intervene in a member-state when authorized by its supreme organ, the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government.  
The Assembly, however, only meets twice every year for ordinary 
sessions and it is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) that ensures the daily 
strategic and operational choices for conflict management in the continent. 
Created in 2003157, the PSC is a body of fifteen members, which are elected 
among the African countries, respecting regional proportionality, for period of 
two or three years. The chairmanship of the PSC is held in turn by each member 
for one month. While unanimous decisions are to be sought, the Council can 
decide on procedural matters by simple majority and on every other decision by 
qualified majority of two thirds of a minimum quorum of 10 members. 
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The Council is advised by its Military Staff Committee, a subsidiary body 
composed by senior military of its current members. The Committee’s creation 
was accelerated in the face of the crisis in Sudan in the early 2000s and its report 
was crucial to the enhancement of the AU’s mission in the country. Overall, the 
PSC has been subject to three sets of criticism. One relates to its membership, 
which often includes countries run by authoritarian regimes that commit the 
atrocities the Council is supposed to address. It is also accused of being a 
reactive body, acting on the short run to extinguish the crisis instead of tackling 
the deeper causes of violence and insecurity in Africa. Finally, as the rest of the 
AU, the Council suffers from lack of capacity and especially a lack of reliable 
funds that, more often than not, come from external donors. 158 
Despite these problems, the African Union initiated security operations – 
peacekeeping and monitoring missions – in countries such as Burundi (2003-04), 
Comoros (2006), Sudan (2003-07), and Somalia (2007-), the last two involving 
more than 7 thousands troops each. In these cases, it has provided a faster 
response in comparison to other regional or global organizations. That being 
said, the AU has never authorized intervention without the host government’s 
consent, a move that would be possible according to article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act in the case of Darfur for example, but that has proven to be 
politically untenable to most of the member-states. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that only a handful of members frequently contributes with troops. Thus, 
countries such as Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia, Uganda, and South Africa 
have a larger say in the choices made by the 50-members organization. Beyond 
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military operations, the AU has also acted in political mediation, conflict 
prevention, and peacebuilding as well as helped to consolidate colonial borders 
for African states via the principle of uti possidetis and a continental-wide anti-
imperialist stand. 
The set of institutions and instruments of conflict management gravitating 
around the AU is commonly referred to as the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) 159 . Apart from the already mentioned Assembly and 
Council, the AU counts with an African Standby Force for peace operations and 
an Early Warning System, both of which are still largely in the making, as well 
as with the Panel of the Wise, a group of political figures who made 
‘outstanding’ contributions to peace in the continent. The primary function of the 
Panel, which first met in 2009, is to use its moral authority and the experience of 
its members to contribute to efforts of mediation and preventive diplomacy, and 
to facilitate communication in general.160  
Finally, a key role of coordination and monitoring of AU’s activities in 
peace and security is played by the AU Commission, especially in the persons of 
the Chairperson of the Commission and the Commissioner of Peace and 
Security. In general terms, the AU Commission functions as a secretariat.161 In a 
very similar fashion to the UN’s Secretary-General, the Chairperson can bring an 
issue to the attention of the PSC and put his good offices at the disposal of the 
Council to carry out tasks of mediation, ensure the implementation of decisions – 
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which includes the deployment of missions – and report on the activities of peace 
and security. 
The European Union is a regional entity whose nature, which mixes both 
supranational and inter-governmental decision-making and policy 
implementation, is still being debated. As a matter of fact, the conclusions of the 
current scholarship on the nature of the EU range from a new polity 162  or 
international actor163 in the making to a set of international and mainly economic 
regimes164, passing by a kind of political federation or a “domestic regime”165. In 
this regard, EU’s security policies remain largely inter-governmental. On the one 
hand, this means that its members-states ultimately retain the ability to bloc the 
policies (e.g. CSDP missions) that are against their interests and it also means 
that there is a process of consensus-building within the Council of Ministers that 
often reduces in size and the spectrum of the initiatives and leads to a 
‘consensus-expectation gap’166. On the other hand, however, due to the growing 
size of the EU’s bureaucracy as well as the participation of other institutions such 
as the European Commission in some aspects of policies like development and 
humanitarian aid, one could say that the foreign and security policies of the EU 
are products not only of the interaction of the members states but also of the 
institutional and bureaucratic framework of the Union. 
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The process of European integration, at the origins of the present-day EU, 
dates back to the aftermath of the Second World War and, despite having 
successfully contributed to peace on the continent – at least in the space of its 
membership and accordingly to commonly held perceptions – quickly acquired a 
focus on economic cooperation and common market development. The failure of 
the establishment of the European Defence Community in 1954 reaffirmed the 
leading role of NATO vis-à-vis the defence of the continent. It was not until the 
late 1980s, in a process that culminated in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, that 
the EU member-states would pave the way to a more institutionalized European 
security policy, which started by the incorporation of the European Political 
Cooperation into the Communities’ treaties and included the express ambition to 
a common defence policy in the future.167  
The crisis in the Balkans during the 1990s revealed the weakness of the 
mechanisms in place, which failed to timely react to the violence in the region as 
it was expected, and pushed the member-states to further develop the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The European Councils of Cologne and 
Helsinki in 1999 aimed at giving enhanced crisis management capacity to the EU 
that would eventually engulfed the Western European Union (WEU). In this 
regard, the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated in 1997 the WEU’s Petersberg 
Tasks of 1992, which included humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, 
and combat forces for crisis management to the Treaty on the EU. The Treaty of 
Lisbon of 2007 added missions of military advice and assistance, of conflict 
prevention and disarmament, and of post-conflict stabilization to what is now 
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called Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), an integral part of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  
While the European Council might give general guidelines for the EU’s 
policies, the decision-making process of the CSDP takes place in the Council of 
the EU, also referred as the Council of Ministers, and its subsidiary bodies such 
as the Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, a Military staff as 
well as other preparatory and preliminary structures. Unlike the PSC of the AU, 
all member-states of the European Union have permanent representatives in the 
Council and membership is not subject to election. Despite recent advancements 
of the community method in different policy areas of the Union, decisions related 
to security and foreign policy still require consensus among members of the 
Council of the EU in its Foreign Affairs configuration (FAC) that assembles the 
foreign ministers, their representatives, and eventually defence ministers for 
ordinary and extraordinary meetings. 168  As in the case of AU’s crisis 
management, a few EU member-states tend to engage proactively and push 
forward the agenda of peace and security while simultaneously contributing 
more troops and funds. In this regard, countries like Germany, which 
traditionally weights heavily in other policy areas, leave room to France in 
construction of EU’s foreign policy towards Africa, for example. 
Since 1999, EU’s foreign and security policy is carried out by the 
Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. And since 
the Treaty of Lisbon’s entry into force in 2009, the HR is ex officio vice-
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president of the European Commission where the person leads the Service for 
Foreign Policy Instruments and coordinates the variety of EU’s foreign policy 
tools. This includes above all the EC’s financial resources such as the Instrument 
for Peace and Stability (IPS) and the funding of CSDP civilian operations. The 
High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) is appointed by the European 
heads of state and government within the European Council by qualified majority 
for a five-year term. As a member of the EC, the appointment of the HR/VP has 
to be accepted by its president and confirmed by the European Parliament. In 
addition to these functions, the HR/VP chairs the monthly meetings of the FAC 
within the Council of Ministers, heads the Union’s External Action Service 
(EEAS) and its delegations, and is responsible for the EU’s especial 
representatives. 
Since 2003, the EU has launched more than 30 CSDP missions in three 
continents – Europe, Africa, and Asia – but never within the territory of its 
member-states as it happens in the case of the AU. And although it does not 
scape criticism of inaction, delay or incoherence, the CSDP has been able to 
sustain medium-size military, civilian and police operations, of more than a 
thousand troops, in countries such as Congo, Bosnia, and Kosovo as well as in 
Chad and Central African Republic as detailed in the next chapter. Since 2007, 
the EU also disposes of a rotating structure of battlegroups for rapid reaction, 
under the authority of the Council. Even if these troops have not been deployed 
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as such and forces have been convened in a case-by-case fashion, CSDP 
operations frequently draw from the reaction forces capacities169. 
Two main differences between the EU and the AU are crucial to this 
thesis’ goals. Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that the EU is currently the 
summit of a process of regional integration and institutionalization that is much 
deeper than that of African Union.170 By consequence, there are considerable 
differences in terms of the size of the regional bureaucracies, their budgets and 
capabilities that will have an impact not only on how their policies play out on 
the ground but also on how much material (e.g. speeches, papers, communiqués) 
is actually produced by these organizations’ organs when they present and 
explain their policies. 
A second difference, which is even more relevant to this thesis, is that 
contrarily to the African Union, the EU systematically acts in response to 
security issues beyond the territory of its member-states, be it in its Balkan or 
Mediterranean neighbourhood or in far away places such as Congo or 
Afghanistan. Such is the case, for instance, of the EU’s responses to the crisis in 
Darfur. This is a scenario that is usually taken for granted, but such relation 
would be unthinkable in the other direction with the AU involved in European 
security affairs. This one-way street has certainly consequences in the 
legitimation process that is presented in the coming chapters. Furthermore, while 
in the process of European integration the main threat has always been the 
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revival of realpolitik and war to the continent171 and, in this sense, EU’s crisis 
management missions are but secondary to European security, the AU’s missions 
address  the most crucial threats in the African continent and are, at least in these 
terms, the institution’s strongest raison d’être. 
Despite these two crucial differences in terms of institutionalization and 
area of operation, both AU and EU present a very important similarity. Actually, 
it is not a similarity of the organizations themselves, but rather of the 
environment of which they are part. Both AU and EU are not the only 
organizations with security-related features and capacity of crisis management in 
their regions. On its side, the EU coexists in the European space with at least 
NATO, OSCE, and the Council of Europe. At the same time, the AU shares the 
African continent with sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC, 
and IGAD that, despite being formally part of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture, are still independent organizations often analysed in their own 
right. In the context of Sudan, one might also add the Arab League, which has 
members in the Middle East and North Africa region (commonly referred as 
MENA region). This coexistence does not mean that different regional 
organizations are in permanent competition of rivalry, but it does shed light on 
the regional security governance in place and on the level of heterarchy of each 
region.  
The emergence of a new actor [of crises 
management] compels other institutions to reposition 
(competition for resources, inter-institutional cooperation, the 
use of comparative advantages), modifies the national politics 
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vis-à-vis these institutions (state preference for an institution, 
sharing of national resources among a large number of 
institutions, etc.), and finally changes certain practices 
(development of specific institutional cultures and 
practices).172 
In this sense, AU and EU are constantly building their own standing and 
legitimating their policies in front of other possible sites of authority, which 
traditionally includes the nation-states, but also other organizations with similar, 
perhaps opposing, claims that fight for social resources and acceptance. 
Conclusion 
The literatures on the security-related elements of governance, 
regionalism and regional organizations obviously overlap. Thus, the purpose of 
the division in sections in this chapter is not to argue for strict distinction 
between them as if they were distinct bodies of literature. Rather, the aim is to 
advance these important concepts along with the debates over how they relate to 
security. 
The main conclusion is threefold. First, it is now possible to argue, with a 
discursive understanding of security, that regionalism is a set of intentional 
projects and policies aiming at the regional level and that, in parallel, it is also 
possible to present security governance as an intentional and decentralized 
system of rule, when ruling is coordination, management and regulation as well 
as the production of biding acts and decisions. Secondly, this element of 
intentionality is crucial for the purpose of this thesis, for it is meaningless to 
analyse the political legitimacy of spontaneous or unintended phenomena. 
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Finally, with the definition of regional security organization here 
proposed, one can argue that there is sufficient autonomy in their discourses and 
practices so that RSOs – their member-states and bureaucracies – discursively 
promote their ethos by participating in the ever-going struggle of defining and 
maintaining what security is, where we find it, and how can we address security 
issues and manage crisis. Hence, RSOs also assert the rightfulness of their 
policies, decisions and acts performed in relation to constructed security issues, 
the special allocation of resources when facing ‘urgent and dramatic issues’, and 
their own existence as actor within security governance. 
This right to rule within a security governance’s system of rule and 
within regionalism’s policies and projects is constructed and maintained by a 
process of political legitimation. When successful, if at all, this process leads to a 
general willingness to accept decisions emanating from individual organizations, 
informal institutions, and/or the system of governance as a whole. The most 
important point to conclude, in this sense, is that regionalism and governance, its 
policies and institutions, are objects of (de)legitimation and that RSOs can 
actively participate in this process. 
As chapter 2 will demonstrate, regions, its formal and informal 
institutions, are very often perceived as more legitimate in dealing with security 
issues 173  when compared to global institutions, mainly the United Nations. 
Nonetheless, the process by which this virtue arises seems to be overlooked. The 
literature on regional security and its institutions has advanced considerably in 
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the last two decades both in terms of theoretical approaches and conceptual tools. 
The three main ways of looking at regional security that were described this 
chapter – namely, as security regionalism, as security governance and by 
focusing on regional organizations – touch upon the issue of legitimacy in one 
way or another, especially when the theoretical approach goes beyond 
realistic/traditional understanding of security. And yet, this aspect lacks deeper 
analysis or is touched upon in more static fashion, in terms of establishing 
normative criteria for legitimacy of a given group of organizations or in terms of 
the people’s belief on the legitimacy of the organization at a specific moment in 
time. In the next chapter, we intend to fill this gap.  
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Chapter 2 
SECURITY REGIONALISM: EMPIRICAL AND 
NORMATIVE CONNECTIONS 
 
Security regionalism has both normative and empirical dimensions174. 
The goal of this chapter is to present the trends of each of these dimensions in 
international politics, which are explored in the first two sections. Given the 
general focus of the thesis and the object of analysis as presented in chapter 4, 
the emphasis is in establishing a common understanding of regionalization in the 
literature on international security, which accordingly to the case studies means 
the processes by which regional organizations take on roles of conflict 
management and peace operations.175 Most of the process happens in relation – 
of complementarity, opposition or duplication – to the universal nature of the 
United Nations (UN) and its task of maintenance of international peace and 
security. Thus, regionalization in a normative sense ultimately refers to the ideas 
that regions should, to a certain extent, ‘take care of their problems’ and that they 
might be more legitimate than global institutions in doing so. The third and last 
section illustrates this trend by presenting the international response the crisis 
Darfur in the wake of the 21st century. This case serves not only as an example of 
regionalization of security, but also contextualizes the security policies 
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implemented by regional organizations, which are in turn analysed in the coming 
chapters. 
1) A normative dimension 
Gradually since the “normative trajectory” 176  set by the Peace of 
Westphalia, national-states claimed to have the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force within their borders and war had been a foreign policy instrument among 
others to solve international disputes. The rise of global institutions in the first 
half of the 20th century added new elements to this normative structure. Article 2 
of the UN Charter signed in 1945 established, with virtual universal validity, that 
member-states should “refrain from threat and use of force in their international 
relations.”177 Following the Charter, the use of force would only be acceptable 
when authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) or in cases of self-defence. 
The individual right of states to defence “was expanded to include the 
international community’s right to prevent war”178. The UNSC can also define 
what constitutes a breach of peace, from terrorism to unconstitutional changes of 
regime. 
Currently, the number of intra-state conflicts is by far larger than the 
number of inter-state conflicts and article 2 also prohibited UN’s intervention 
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into states domestic affairs. Yet, conflicts and crisis within states came to be 
gradually considered breaches of international peace not only because of their 
regional and sometimes global implications but also because of shared norms 
such as non-indifference towards human rights’ violations. On the one hand, 
principles of non-intervention and sovereignty are still evoked in opposition to 
policies coming from outsiders, organizations and states alike. On the other, 
principles such as responsibility to protect (R2P) take international institutions 
deep into what was previously considered exclusive domestic affairs. 
Globalism and regionalism in the governance of security 
Regional organizations (ROs) are also part of the existing system of 
governance that frames, to use the UN’s jargon, the “maintenance of 
international peace and security”. As newcomers, the standing179 of ROs both in 
relation to national-states and to the United Nations remains fluid and ultimately 
raises the issue of desirability of regionalization of security. The latest and 
current wave of regionalism reverberates the question of who, after all, is to 
rightfully address the so-called breaches of peace: which institution(s) ought to 
be responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, and who 
is entitled to intervene militarily and in which circumstances?180 These issues are 
not only debated in academic literature, but are part of the everyday political 
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discussions in the face of human rights violation, inter and intra-state conflicts 
and the like. 
The current legal and normative frameworks defining the global-regional 
interplay in security provision were debated and institutionalized during the 
negotiations for the creation of the United Nations at the final stages of the 
Second World War.181 By then, Winston Churchill famously advocated for the 
global security and peace architecture to be underpinned by pillars of regional 
councils. 182  A globalist alternative ultimately prevailed and the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) has, since then and according to the Charter, the primary 
responsibility to ensure world peace and the decision of the UNSC are legally 
binding to all member states.183 
By definition, when the UNSC authorizes an action such as peace 
enforcement or crises management, it attempts to give authority to an institution 
to perform such action – which might actually be one of its own agencies such as 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the Secretariat. Simply put, this is 
the central argument that Inis Claude developed already in 1966 as the 
“collective legitimization function”184 of international political institutions. The 
UN, the argument goes, is authoritative because member-states have conferred 
this function to the organization as the closest thing there is to the ‘voice of 
mankind’ and the cosmopolitan ideal, or the Parliament of Men that is the core of 
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the “global security system” 185 . This idea finds resonance today when, for 
example, Ian Hurd and Bruce Cronin show that the public in most countries 
prefer “to see international interventions approved by the Security Council” 186 
and Katharina Coleman argues that IOs “remain crucial gatekeepers to 
international legitimacy for interstate military deployments” 187 . Security 
institutions might constrain state’s sovereignty and, at the same time, “provide it 
with legitimacy”188. 
At the time of writing, Claude did not restrict this function to the United 
Nations, but pointed to its prominence. 189  During the half-century since the 
original publication of his article, many institutions actually joined the 
international scene to the point where the UN’s prominence is occasionally 
challenged. Because the UN coexists with regional organizations that possess a 
certain degree of authority in their geographic areas,190 although not the formal 
authorization to use force, scholars now refer to a process of ‘forum shopping’ in 
which states look for the most appropriate institution to both achieve the desired 
outcome and justify their actions. Regional powers, for instance, are able to set 
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local agendas within what is perceived as a legitimate institutional framework.191 
Hence, RSOs can be sources of legitimacy as much as the UN or, as chapter 3 
will clarify, their approval is an argument in the dynamics of legitimation. 
In parallel, the UN Charter does provide space for regionalism and 
regional initiatives. First and foremost, article 51 asserts the right of collective 
self-defence, which logically includes regional alliances and organizations. 
Moreover, ROs were given a role under Chapter VIII in which its three articles 
establish that pacific settlements of local disputes should first pass by regional 
arrangements acting under the principles of the Charter 192  (article 52), that 
enforcement actions by ROs would be subject to UNSC authorization (article 
53), and that the Council should be kept informed of all their actions related to 
peace and security (article 54). Hence, Chapter VIII as well as article 33193 
established a principle known as ‘subsidiarity’, meaning that the closest 
organization to the crisis shall act in response to it before the issue is brought to 
the UNSC, and that only if necessary.194  
Thus, when looking at today’s normative environment for international 
security, one could talk of a “pyramid of legitimacy”195 in which the UN and its 
Security Council are on top and are followed by other regional and even sub-
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regional organizations towards the bottom. As Coleman suggests, this means that 
states have the option of obtaining the approval of smaller and regional 
organizations before moving up the pyramid to gain a ‘green light’ at the UNSC 
for their security operations. Once a RO or other international institution has 
granted the approval, it is argued, the issue might become politically sensitive in 
a way that it is hard for the UNSC not to approve a mission or policy. 
International institutions, to different degrees, are gatekeepers of international 
legitimacy. 
In practice, however, most issues are discussed directly in the Council 
and few resolutions during the Cold War period would make any reference to 
regional organizations, let alone encourage any sort of regional-global 
cooperation. Furthermore, crisis can be simultaneously discussed at multiple 
fora, going back and forward from regional organizations to the UN without a 
particular order. Finally, even if the UNSC can delegate its authority and 
competencies to ROs, it cannot transfer the authority to determine what 
constitutes a breach of peace and an “unrestricted command and control of 
enforcement” when the organization acts under its authority.196 Once more, these 
two exceptions are not always respected.  
Additionally, the ideas of subsidiarity and security governance as a 
pyramid present at least three limitations. First, from a legal point of view there 
is little doubt that the UNSC stands at the top of the system. But as Coleman 
herself argues, legality alone is not the only source of legitimacy, especially 
because the Security Council is above all a political, and not juridical, body. 
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Certainly, it has an especial feature of ‘inspiring’ international law in some 
occasions, but it remains political and unequal above all. Second, in many cases 
not only what is done – such as a state sponsored peace enforcement operation – 
needs to be legitimated but also what is not and was not done. Little or no action 
in the face of crises and human catastrophes challenges the standing of 
organizations in the eyes of those expecting them to act. Constant inaction, 
therefore, puts in check the very existence of a system of governance – the 
organizations that are part of it – and raises questions about its legitimacy. 
Finally, there is the issue of regionalism. The metaphor of a legitimacy 
pyramid is most certainly illustrative from a statecentric point of view, but this 
covers at most half of what is today’s global security governance. By looking at 
ways states can justify their peace enforcement operations, the approach 
overlooks the need that international institutions and bureaucracies have to 
justify their existence and their policies. Even if these policies are ultimately 
inspired and carried out by states, they are also policies of international 
organizations and, as the previous chapters argues, of their relatively autonomous 
bureaucracies. And IOs seek legitimacy for themselves as much as they 
constitute gatekeepers to legitimacy of a state’s intervention. Security 
governance is therefore much messier than forum shopping in a Kelsian-like 
pyramid might imply. It includes for instance the fact that the UN as much as 
RSOs and other institutions need, seek and make references to each other’s 
approval and support for their actions. Such decentralized system raises 
questions of public accountability (who answers to whom?) and coordination 
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among actors (who coordinates the various simultaneous actions of the 
international community?).197 
Security regionalism as ‘harbinger of change’ 
Security regionalism highlights and arguably brings about change in the 
normative structure of international security and peace operations. On the one 
hand, regionalism points to the possibility of the erosion of state’s sovereignty198 
and of the state’s claim to the monopoly of violence. This includes notably the 
decline of the longstanding privilege of the SNS as the sole object of security 
whose existence is valued in international politics199 and the inevitable decline of 
“state-centred balance of power”200. On the other hand, regionalism can be said 
to fill the gap in the provision of security left by global institutions, which in turn 
face a crisis of legitimacy. By doing so, it casts doubt on the prominence and the 
primacy of the UNSC. To put it differently, how can the UN system be the sole 
source of legitimation if it is perceived to be facing a crisis of legitimacy 
itself?201 
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First of all, global institutions are plagued by lack of consensus when 
facing international crisis and by lack of commitment and capacity when 
implementing responses. When a government of the P5 group is determined to 
do so, for example, it “can paralyze Security Council action”202. And inaction, as 
much as action, influences how (international) organizations are perceived. This 
is not to say that there weren’t positive achievements of the United Nations in 
peace and security, but that the expectations were much higher both at the time 
of creation as well as at the end of the Cold War. A similar expectation was 
constructed by the time when the principles of R2P were endorsed early in the 
21st century. Once again as the case of Darfur will illustrate, those hopes were 
shattered by lack of commitment and consensus. It is ultimately the gap between 
expected solutions to the multiple security issues around the globe and the reality 
of inappropriate responses that undermines the UN and the global stand in the 
provision of security.  
Secondly, there is the challenge of unilateralism. By acting alone without 
prior authorization and by not complying with the UNSC decisions, states end up 
undermining the perception of the Council’s authority. Such was the case, for 
instance, of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Finally, there is the issue of 
inherent inequality in a system created around the superpowers in the aftermath 
of World War 2. This inequality touches the UNSC, which is the centrepiece of a 
globalist peace and security in the universal community of sovereign states: 
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[…] to any reasonable person nowadays, it is 
outrageous that a mere 5 of 191 sovereign states that make up 
the United Nations have special power and privileges.203 
Paul Kennedy is obviously making a reference to the veto power of the 
Permanent 5, which leads those outside the privileged group to question its 
rightfulness. This is arguably the main argument for the reform of the UN 
system, and it has not been solved so far. These issues persist despite initiatives 
to address them in the last two and a half decades.204 One of these initiatives is 
exactly the interaction with regional organizations. Thus, it seems appropriate to 
understand how exactly RSOs and security regionalism fit into this context of 
‘legitimacy crisis’ as well as how and if they actually challenge the primacy and 
prominence of globalism and the UNSC.  
The last two decades witnessed a growing interaction between the UN 
system and RSOs in opposition to the rare exchanges during the Cold War. 
Indeed, both the UNSC and the UN Secretariat have launched a series of 
gatherings with regional organizations dating back to 1994.205Before that, the 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali already highlighted the principles that should 
guide the relationship. 
Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will 
continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining 
international peace and security, but regional action as matter 
of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the 
United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of 
the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of 
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participation, consensus and democratization of international 
affairs.206 
Following the Secretary’s outline, the UN-RSOs cooperation would 
bestow legitimacy on RSOs actions while ensuring broader participation in the 
international decision-making.207 In 2005, in the concluding document of the 
World Summit, which marked the UN’s 60th anniversary, member states called 
for a larger role for regional organizations in peacekeeping, stressed their 
contribution to peace and security with a particular emphasis on the African 
Union, and highlighted their importance in relation to the rising idea of 
responsibility to protect.208 In the same year, the Security Council urged member 
states to increase the capacity of RSOs following Resolution 1631, the first ever 
to address the topic of the UN-RSOs cooperation.209 Once more, the focus was 
on the African continent and the African Union. These documents mark the 
‘honeymoon period’ in the relationship between the global and the regional as 
well as the willingness to ‘share the burden’ of maintenance of peace and 
security with regional bodies based on principles of delegation and 
decentralization.  
But RSOs can also challenge UN’s primacy.210 A notable example is the 
founding text of the African Union, its Constitutive Act of 2000. Its Article 4(h) 
famously gives the Union, through a decision of its Assembly, the right to 
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intervene in a member state “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”211, predating the global initiative 
of responsibility to protect212 . In 2003, the Protocol to the Constitutive Act 
broadened the scope of the article to include interventions to address serious 
threats “to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State”213. 
The article, as the whole Constitutive Act for that matter, makes no reference to 
the authorization of the United Nation to intervention or to a security policy 
implemented in accordance to the Charter. In addition to intervention, the AU 
can also adopt sanctions such as denial of transport or communication against a 
deviating state under Article 23(2). As Paul D. Williams notes, Article 4(h) has 
strong political and legal implications. Above all, the interpretation that the AU 
could authorize the use of military force for humanitarian purposes without the 
host government consent and without prior authorization of the UNSC stands in 
contradiction of Article 53 of the UN Charter.214 Article 4(h) “changed the tenor 
of debates about conflict management”215 in Africa. 
But not all regional projects are created equal in their normative relation 
to the UNSC. By contrast, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
is much less ‘independent’ when laying down the principles of the CFSP under 
the primacy and prominence of the UN system. It makes a clear reference to 
peacekeeping, conflict prevention and “streaking international security in 
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter”, and stresses the “primary 
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responsibility of the Security Council and of its member for the maintenance of 
international peace and security”.216 
So far Article 4(h) of the AU has never been invoked against the wishes 
of a recognized government, not because it lacks a reference to the UNSC 
authorization, but because it proved to be “politically toxic”217 given the strict 
interpretation of sovereignty that is commonly accepted by African states. In 
addition, the article’s impacts were somehow softened in 2005 when, amongst 
mixed messages218, it was agreed that the AU would “seek UN Security Council 
authorization of its enforcement actions”219. And it has effectively done so not 
only for enforcement actions but also to security policies in general. Nevertheless 
it is the possibility of enforcement without UN backup, on the one hand, and the 
authority that the AU claims to have independently from the UNSC, on the other, 
that potentially challenge the system. It highlights amongst other issues the 
disappointment of regional actors towards the deficits of the international 
institutions that oftentimes refuse to address issues that are seen to require urgent 
action or that are perceived as outsiders and intruders. 
But regionalism does more than undermining “UN’s moral authority as 
custodian of universal principles”.220 It can also complement or influence the 
‘global level’. Regional institutions such as the EU or the AU, as IR 
constructivists argue,  
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[…] are repositories and factories of norms. The 
notion of European, Asian or African style of crisis 
management is of increasing significance in a more 
multipolar world in which concepts of security and society 
are contested.221 
One example of such regional influence as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ is the 
idea of responsibility to protect. A non-neglectable part of it seems to be inspired 
by the African experience since the early 1990s and its regional transition from 
‘non-interference’ to ‘non-indifference’ in front of violence, genocide and the 
like. 
Nevertheless, even if effectively filling the normative gap left by 
globalism, regionalism doesn’t necessarily challenge the normative structure of 
peace and security or the UNSC primacy and prominence. Alternatively, one can 
make the argument that by stepping into the system, RSOs actually complement 
the efforts of the UN and its member states and enhances the security governance 
as a whole, including its legitimacy as it would, for example, give voice to states 
that rarely appear at the global level. It is precisely this distinction that, from a 
global order point of view, can be assessed in the discourse of RSOs. Do RSOs 
see themselves as filling this gap created by the relative failure of both global 
and national levels? Ultimately, are RSOs actually challenging the current 
system and proposing an alternative to it or are they fitting into the existence 
normative structure? 
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2) An empirical dimension 
As the previous section has shown, regional projects might – intentionally 
or not – challenge and influence the current normative structure that ultimately 
refers to prominence and primacy of the UNSC and globalism. But can we go a 
step further and argue that regional organizations might constitute poles on their 
own right in the international system? 
When security regionalism meets global order 
In fact, due to the variety of regionalisms and regional projects around the 
world, sometimes even in the same geographical space, it only makes sense to 
discuss regionalisms in plural when in relation to their impact on global order. 
While regionalism is certainly not the only factor in the changing nature of 
global order, it cannot be ignored in “any meaningful discussion of the future of 
world politics”222. Regionalism has both internal implications to the region itself 
and external implications to global order.  
An institution that exercises legitimated power is in a 
position of authority. In international relations, this means 
that a legitimated international organization possesses 
sovereign authority. Sovereignty, understood as the ‘right to 
exercise final authority’, is distributed among various types 
of actors in the international system223 
Hence a RSO comes to be – if and when legitimated – one of various 
entities in the international system among which sovereignty is ‘distributed’ 
according to various issues. They can become poles not only of power, but also 
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of authority. Regional organizations, as Philip Schimitter 224  argues, might 
constitute “transnational regional polities” (TRP). The argument is not that 
regional institutions would evolve in a similar fashion to national states and it is 
in fact likely that they never acquire the distinctive features of a state – most of 
their authoritative claims actually derive from their intergovernmental policies 
and the state’s rights. However, neither are they understood exclusively as 
reflections of states’ power and purposes. Rather, regional institutions would 
come to constitute relatively autonomous sites of authority and a type of stable 
and significant political actor in their own right. 
Some regional institutions in relation to some issues already have 
authoritative claims in a similar fashion to global institutions, and to be sure this 
is not a novelty. For regional organizations acting as security providers, however, 
this authoritative step is more ambitious because it touches the centre of the 
sovereign prerogative over violence and use of force. As seen, a RSO’s toolkit 
may include conflict prevention, confidence building and disarmament measures, 
political mediation, humanitarian assistance, cooperation for security sector 
reform, statebuilding, among others. Regionalism might also lead to a type norm 
convergence in regard to certain security issues. Regions such as South America, 
for example, agree to collectively and at least rhetorically ‘close the door’ to 
foreign interventions and condemn them when they happen. A number of 
regional organizations can also support or implement peace operations, going as 
far as military interventions in one of its member-states or even beyond their 
regions as the case of the EU. 
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This last aspect, the peace operations of regional organizations, is 
arguably the most sensitive policy. Independently of the state’s consent, the fact 
is that military crisis management and peace operations constitute a direct 
involvement of an external entity into a local security environment and, 
therefore, an intervention. But even highly institutionalized organizations such as 
the EU still base their security policies on consensual decision-making and have 
to draw on the assets of member-states or third parties to perform their security 
missions, which considerably reduces their capacity. At the same time, regional 
organizations are certainly larger than the sum of their member states at least as 
far their bureaucracies, practices and discourses are concerned and they can act 
with relative autonomy despite limited capacity. 
In parallel to the rise of regional institutions, one can also point to a 
general trend of regionalization of security in the international system once the 
overwhelming features of the Cold War’s bipolarity are part of the past. The 
underlining assumption is that security threats – at least in the way they are 
constructed – “travel faster shorter distances” 225  and therefore processes of 
(de)securitization are more often regional than global. Issues such weapons 
smuggling, transborder violence, and refugees fleeing violence are regional by 
default. Neighbouring states are, more often than not, affected by or part of an 
‘internal’ conflict. Hence violence outbreaks might get global attention, but they 
are still regional in their immediate consequences. 
                                                
225 Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, 
12. 
  91 
At the same time, proximity and geopolitics remain of essence. It is said 
that in a multiplex226 or decentred227 world few countries are able to project 
power and force much beyond their region without the backup of regional 
partners and institutions.228 From a state-centric perspective, even powerful states 
should be anchored in their regions. As Louise Fawcett says: 
[S]ecurity is undergoing a process of regionalization, 
producing changes in the old multilateral system. Strong 
states will find increasingly useful roles for regional 
institutions; and weak states will be pulled into their orbits.229 
Both this regionalization of security and the growing authoritative claims 
and roles played by regional organizations lead prominent authors to point to a 
global order marked by “regional worlds” 230  and “regiopolarity” 231 , a 
“regionalized international order”232 or a context of “multiregionalism”233. All 
these concepts vary in the details, but they all point to a growing importance of 
regionalism for the distribution of power and authority in the world stage, which 
is also a question of international security. However, the processes here 
highlighted are trends at the very best and, above all, they constitute but 
predictions based on certain indicators. What matters to this research is to 
understand that there is a background of regionalization and, once more, how the 
regional organizations see themselves in relation to this trend. Ultimately, as 
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chapter 3 and 4 will show, it is the legitimation of these efforts that might have 
an impact on how global order perpetuates or changes. 
Regionalization of security and crisis management? 
As mentioned above the UNSC can authorize – therefore delegate 
authority – to other bodies in the pursuit of peace and security. This is the logic 
behind the UNSC’s practice of subcontracting. Be it by lack of commitment or 
lack of capacity to (re)act to crises, the UN has multiple times resorted to 
individual states, coalitions of the willing, formal alliances and of course regional 
organizations to perform operations of peacekeeping or peace enforcement that 
would a priori fall into its reach. It is the UN’s lack of capacity in relation to its 
task of addressing threats and breaches of peace and security that, in part, leads 
the organization to ‘outsource’ the responses. 
The number of peace operations by RSOs, for example, has risen 
considerably following the end of the Cold War.234 Between 1989 and 2005, Paul 
Diehl and Young-Im Cho235 count more than 30 missions initiated by a variety of 
regional organizations in Africa, Asia, and Europe. This number contrasts with 
only eight missions from 1945 to 1988. However, one cannot say that this 
process of regionalization replaces operations led by the United Nations because 
the UN has also implemented more than 40 operations from 1989 until 2005 
while only 16 in the previous decades. The increase in the number of missions is 
therefore both global and regional. The same trend is observed in mediation 
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where the number of both UN and RSO initiatives, as well as joint mediation 
efforts, rises considerably in the Post-Cold War period.236  
Regional organizations certainly present comparative advantages when it 
comes to conflict prevention and resolution, 237  but they are far from being 
unflawed. Like the UN, they lack standing armed forces of their own and have to 
rely on member states for assets and for most part of the budget for military 
operations. Like the UN, they are also constantly plagued by lack of consensus 
and lack of commitment of key member states. Furthermore, their reduced 
membership and natural proximity to the crises might lead to biased assessment 
as well as jeopardize the RSO’s perceived neutrality and impartiality, especially 
if it is said to be instrumentalized by regional powers. Local rivalries and 
interests also play a role in blocking the decision-making process o institutions, 
and the same is true for high incidence of interstate threats.238 In comparison to 
the UN – and perhaps with exception of the EU and NATO – RSOs rely on 
smaller bureaucracies and have less expertise in conducting peace operations.239  
Regionalization of security, in general, and peace operations, in 
particular, is also an uneven phenomenon in time and space. This means that the 
level of institutionalization, authority claims, and capacity of RSOs to implement 
security missions, impose sanctions, or act in conflict prevention and mediation 
varies considerably across different regions. Some regions, such as South Asia, 
completely lack a regional organization with such tools while others are in the 
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vanguard. Two of the most institutionalized cases are the European Union and 
the African Union, whose discourses are analysed in the following chapters. In 
addition, more peace operations are conducted in Africa and by African 
organizations than in any other continent.240  
And then there is the issue of geographical scope. As of now, only the EU 
and NATO are capable of projecting force beyond their continents and 
implementing ‘out-of-area’ security missions, and they have done so in multiple 
occasions. This is important because RSOs acting in their regions and 
intervening in a member state accordingly to their constitutive treaties enjoy 
different normative standings in comparison to regional organizations acting 
outside the territory of their members. Some scholars would go as far as to argue 
that RSOs enforcing treaty provisions in their member states do not require prior 
UNSC authorization, even when it involves enforcement actions.241 When acting 
out of their membership area, RSOs such as NATO and the EU cannot count on 
this interpretation. 
 
If legally the UN “delegates its Chapter VII authority to others”242, in 
practice the authorization might come after the fact, during the responses, or not 
at all. Interventions such as the ones in Somalia or Libya in 2011 testify that the 
UN is not always in control nor is kept actively informed by organizations taking 
over the responsibility for peace and security maintenance. Once more, the 
                                                
240 Ibid.: 309. 
241 Paliwal, Suyash, "The Primacy of Regional Organizations in International Peacekeeping: The 
African Example", Virginia Journal of International Law Association, 51, no. 185-230  
(2010), 193-4. 
242 Weiss, Thomas G. et al., The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 38. 
  95 
conclusion is that the UN might present an important function of legitimation, 
but it is certainly not the only source of legitimacy for peace operations and 
security policies broadly. Oftentimes, it is the approval of a regional organization 
that offers the strongest argument for a mission’s legitimacy, even if fragile in 
the absence of an UN mandate. At the same time, regional organizations are not 
without issues of their own and it would be unwise to see them as the sole 
solution for the problems of security governance. 
At least when regionalization of actions such as peacekeeping and 
mediation is concerned, it goes along with the increase in the number of UN 
initiatives. As seen above, the UN Charter actually gives the primacy of peaceful 
solutions to regional organizations under a principle of subsidiarity. Regional 
organizations involvement in security affairs is, therefore, neither illegal nor a 
completely new process that necessarily replaces UN’s activities in the long run. 
It is the UN’s primacy over peacekeeping, the use of force, and within security 
governance in general that might erode following a more assertive role of RSOs. 
Ultimately, it is the legitimation process of their practices of intervention and of 
their policies of crisis management – which in occasions take place without 
UNSC prior authorization or without the UNSC been kept actively informed – 
that potentially redefine the place of regional organizations within the current 
framework.243 
                                                
243 Paliwal, Suyash, "The Primacy of Regional Organizations in International Peacekeeping: The 
African Example". 
  96 
3) Darfur: a regional-global interplay in security governance 
The violent context in the Sudanese region of Darfur and in its adjacent 
areas of eastern Chad and northeast Central African Republic (CAR) provides an 
empirical example for at least five points previously mentioned above in this 
chapter. Firstly, the case illustrates the ‘bottom-up’ regionalization of (in)security 
where the porous national-state borders of Sudan are largely ignored by local 
actors and do not hold in front of humanitarian crisis and escalation of violence – 
internal conflicts are ‘regionalized’. Secondly, the case reveals a more 
‘institutional’, or top-down, regionalization of security in which regional 
organizations such as the African Union have an authoritative claim as well as a 
role to play when addressing the security issues. Thirdly, there is a global-
regional interplay, in both normative and empirical realms, between the United 
Nations and regional bodies, mainly the EU and the AU, as in the case of the 
AU-UN hybrid mission UNAMID or the transfer of responsibilities over a 
mission from the EU to the UN (EUFOR to MINURCAT). Fourthly, there is an 
interaction among regional organization as in the case of EU-AU relations and 
mainly the EU’s support mission to AU’s AMIS. Finally, EU’s mission in Chad 
and CAR as well as its support mission in Sudan is an example of a regional 
organization acting beyond the territory of its member-states and beyond its 
region or ‘neighbourhood’. 
For these reasons, the crisis in Darfur, Chad and CAR starting in 2003, 
and more specifically the security policies and operations implemented as 
response to this security issue provide a useful case study for this research on the 
legitimation of regionalism. Thus, the final part of this chapter highlights the 
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main features of this ‘triangle of instability’ as well as the global-regional 
reactions as both an illustration for the previous session and an introduction to 
our case studies. 
Darfur in the 20th century 
Darfur244 is located in one of the remotest areas in Africa, being far away 
from oceans and major urban centres alike. It is also vast – with almost 500,000 
square kilometres, its area is similar to that of Spain – and sparsely populated 
with around 6 million people according to numbers of 2004. The vast majority of 
Darfur’s population is Sunni Muslim and, although the division is certainly 
blurry, it can be divided into farmers who are self-identified as African and self-
identified Arab pastoral tribes usually defined as nomads. 
Historically, Darfur lay between the French and British imperial 
ambitions in Africa in the late 19th century. When British troops defeated the pre-
colonial Fur Sultanate in 1916, the region was incorporated into what is the 
current territory of Sudan. Initially, Darfur became part of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium and, after 1956, of the independent state of Sudan centred in 
capital Khartoum and the Nile River to the east. Colonial and independent rulers 
alike have neglected the region. Choosing to govern “on the cheap”245, they 
established little administrative structures and social services in Darfur. Yet, this 
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external ruling did disturb the historical social-economic arrangements between 
farmers and nomadic tribes by granting the native administration – the 
paramount chiefs – the right to allocate land to its residents. Thus, territorial 
divisions as those seen on maps are but a matter of convention with the 
delimitation has been largely imposed by external actors. 
Figure 2. Political Map of Darfur, Sudan, in 2011 
 
The climate in the region stretches from hot desert in the north to semi-
arid in the south with little or no rain. A semi-arid plain makes most of Darfur, 
the exception being the Jebel Marra, a volcanic mountain range with fertile 
lands, which is located roughly in the centre of Darfur. Despite the external 
encouragement for land allocation by the native administration, it was not until 
drought and famine hit the region in 1984-85 that land distribution became an 
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issue fostering rivalry between local groups. As Alex de Waal summarizes, “the 
pastoral groups were pitted against the farmers in what had become a bitter 
struggle for diminishing resources.” 246  Climate change and the process of 
desertification only aggravate the struggle.247 
Darfur borders Libya in the North, other Sudanese regions to the east, 
South Sudan (as part of Sudan until 2011) to the South, Central African Republic 
(CAR) to the southwest and finally Chad to the west. Darfur’s seasonal rivers run 
westwards, towards Lake Chad. In reality, the whole region is physically turned 
west and its links to Khartoum and the Nile Basin in the east are more historical 
than geographical248. This regional dimension is also part of the ‘recipe’ for the 
series of rebellions. By sharing borders with Chad and Libya, Darfur felt the 
impact of Colonel Gaddafi’s policies of pan-Arabism by which Tripoli aimed at 
consolidating a zone of influence in Chad. During the late 1980s, Chadian 
factions supported by Libya would profit from the porous borders and seek safe 
haven in Darfur in the context of the Chadian Civil War.249 Gaddafi also armed 
and trained Arabs from Western Darfur to fight in Chad as part of his Islamic 
Legion. When the Libyan incursions eventually failed, the weapons remained 
along with a “virulent Arab supremacism”250. 
In this regard, the cross-border relations between Chad and Sudan are 
also crucial for the regional dimension of the Darfur rebellion. Khartoum and 
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N’Djamena would constantly support rebel factions fighting in the neighbour 
country. In 1989, when Idriss Déby’s Patriotic Salvation Movement was growing 
stronger in Darfur to eventually seize power in Chad, it received help from 
Sudanese and Libyan governments. This support empowered Arab groups and 
further marginalized non-Arabs who were losing control of land and resources.251 
Thus, before the regionalization of the Darfur conflict in the 2000s, it was the 
series of conflicts in Chad that spread beyond national borders in the 1980s. 
When Omar al-Bashir and Idriss Déby took power in Sudan and Chad 
respectively in 1989 and 1990, they agreed that each other’s countries would not 
sponsor rebels across borders. The two leaders are still in power, but the truce 
would hold for little more than a decade until the rebellion in Darfur started in 
2003. 
The key event prior to the rebellion was the publication of The Black 
Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan in 2000. Popularly known 
simply as Black Book, it presented in detail how positions in the national 
government were filled, who occupied them and to which region the elected and 
non-elected officials belonged. By doing so, the book highlighted the 
overwhelming and systematic prevalence of ‘river people’, the Arab elite 
originally from the Nile River banks in the North region, in positions of authority 
since Sudan’s independence in 1956. In essence, the Black Book put on paper 
what most already felt and knew: the general and systematic exclusion of 
peripheric regions, Darfur included, from the politics of the Government of 
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Sudan (GoS). 252  In itself, the publication was a rebellious act. It also 
demonstrated that previous policies supposedly aiming at inclusion, such as those 
sponsored the Prime Minister Hassan al-Turabi and his National Islamic Front 
(NIF) in the 1990s, were no more than rhetoric.253 Therefore, and combined with 
other ingredients, it is the social, religious, and economic marginalization of the 
region that motivated Darfurians to join arms and rebel. 
A regional crisis in the wake of the 21st century254 
The commonly accepted starting point of the current crisis in the 
Sudanese region of Darfur, the ‘Third Darfur Rebellion’, is April 2003 when 
local rebel groups rose against the GoS and orchestrated a surprise attack against 
the military airport in El Fasher 255 . Two groups have since constituted the 
backbone of the rebellion with unavoidable fractions within them: the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM), founded in 2001 by Khalil Ibrahim and whose 
members are among the authors of the Black Book, and the Sudanese Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A), originally called Darfur Liberation Front created by 
Abdul Wahid Al Nur in 2002. Members of all three largest self-identified 
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African ethnic groups in Darfur – Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa – joined the 
rebellion.256 
The conflict in Darfur has multiple underlying causes and alone they are 
insufficient explanations.257 These causes include desertification and reduction of 
available land at a time of population growth, a growing rivalry between Arab 
nomads and non-Arab tribes in the region at times encouraged by external 
players, and the cross-border regional instabilities such as Libyan pan-Arabism 
and the crisis in Chad as presented above. But arguably the overwhelming factor 
behind the rebellion is political: how power is shared, or not, in the country. As 
portrayed in the Black Book, there has been a constant neglect and exclusion of 
Darfur – of non-Arab Darfuri in particular – from the politics in the GoS. This 
inevitably led to the concentration of political power under Khartoum’s 
government of president Al-Bashir, the Nile riverines, and the Arab elite. 
Ultimately, the constant policies of centralization and arabization of Sudan258 lie 
at the origins of the crisis. 
The Sudanese army could not suppress the rebellion on its own and its 
capacity was already being tested during the long civil war in the country’s 
south. Instead, the GoS reacted by calling upon, arming and unleashing the Arab 
militias infamously known as Janjaweed. Many of its cadres had been among the 
troops trained and armed by Gaddafi back in the 1980s. The Janjaweed raid 
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villages across Darfur and spread violence in the countryside259  following a 
scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign in concert with the GoS air force 
bombings. In consequence, the death toll over the last decade amounts to 
hundreds of thousands as a result of not only violence but also famine and 
disease.260 The violence reached its peak in 2004 and 2005, but continued over 
the years with no end in sight. In May 2008, the rebels go as far as attacking 
Omdurman, Sudan’s largest city that neighbours the capital by the river banks, 
far beyond Darfur itself. 
The actions of counter-insurgency implemented by the government of 
Sudan and the Janjaweed militias in Darfur have been called ‘slow motion’ 
genocide261 and ethnic cleansing. Since June 2004 and during the first years, the 
GoS signed multiple agreements to disarm and demobilise the Janjaweed, but 
little or no action was taken.262 Apart from Khartoum’s rationale behind the lack 
of compliance to these agreements, one might even question the GoS’ ability to 
actually control the militia it previously unleashed. 
Furthermore, the situation in the borderlands has also deteriorated 
considerably not only due to the movement of refugees, but also due to cross-
border banditry and general mistruth among governments in Khartoum and 
N’Djamena. The number of displaced persons amounts to millions, including 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees who have massively crossed the 
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border with Chad and CAR trying to escape the conflict.263 To be clear, Chad has 
its own conflictual dynamics, but in certain moments the multiple regional crisis 
seem to merge in a unique system.264 
A context of proxy wars emerged from the uneasy bilateral relations.265 
The administrations of al-Bashir and Déby have constantly pointed fingers at 
each other for supporting rebel groups across the borders.266 In December 2005, 
Chad declared ‘state of belligerence’ against Sudan accusing al-Bashir of 
plotting to destabilize the country. On the one hand, Khartoum provided financial 
support and intelligence to Chadian dissidents fighting Déby’s rule, mainly to the 
United Front for Democratic Change. On the other, official and unofficial links 
between Chad and the Darfuri rebels, mainly JEM, had been established and 
Déby was accused of playing a double game from the beginning of the rebellion, 
allowing some rebels to establish rear bases in Chad. In 2006, the Darfurian rebel 
factions with transnational links signed an alliance in N’Djamena “under the 
auspices and support of President Déby”267. In crucial moments, the hardship of 
the bilateral relations led to a virtually complete halt of the humanitarian 
assistance to the local population. In 2010, after Déby’s visit to Sudan, both 
governments signed an agreement for the normalization of the relationship. They 
reached a compromise to halt mutual support to rebel factions and cooperate on 
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border patrolling. As much as a commitment to stop sponsoring dissidents, it was 
a confession on their on-going role as sponsors.268  
South Sudan’s independence in 2011 added another actor to the regional 
conflictual situation. Rebel movements in Darfur and in South Sudan had long 
flirted with each other. The relationship was institutionalized in November 2011 
with the creation of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) assembling the rebel 
movements from Darfur (Fur and Zaghawa SLM/A factions, and JEM) and the 
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), which is allegedly 
sponsored by the government of South Sudan. As a result, the borderlands 
between Darfur and South Sudan turned to be the site of much more frequent 
confrontations as of 2011. This picture of ‘bottom-up’ regionalization also 
includes Uganda’s ties to Darfuri rebels. In recent years, since the normalization 
of Sudan-Chad relations in 2010 and the regime change in Libya who previously 
supported the rebels, opposition movements such as JEM turned south and have 
been allowed military training near the capital Kampala. At the same time, 
Uganda accuses Al-Bashir’s government of supporting the Lord’s Resistance 
Army. 
The violence in Darfur and adjacent regions has constantly evolved as to 
include clashes between non-Arab tribes since 2010. Arab allies of the 
government grew increasingly unsatisfied over the years as Khartoum could not 
control them nor honour its financial commitments, and fight broke out between 
government-sponsored paramilitary as early as 2006. In the mean time, 
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opposition groups would split, realign and form new coalitions only to break up 
once more in front of another peace agreement. The foundation of the SRF led 
Darfur movements to operate beyond their original zone, mainly in South 
Kordofan. Despite divergences, however, most rebel movements still seek 
regime change and the end of the National Congress Party rule in Khartoum. 
Reacting to the crisis: global, regional, and third-countries’ responses 
Following April 2003, violence spread unopposed for almost a year until 
it called the attention of international players who would break the silence.269 
Despite the large death toll, the duration of the conflict, and an alarming 
consensus about ethnic cleansing and war crimes happening in Darfur270, the 
response of the international community has been ambivalent and feeble at 
best271. When conflict erupted in Darfur, a window of opportunity had appeared 
to resolve the Second Sudanese Civil War in the south of the country, which 
opposed the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) led by 
John Garang to the GoS since 1983. In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement would be signed with the sponsoring of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) and the general support of international and 
regional organizations. The agreement ultimately led to South Sudan’s 
independence in 2011. Nevertheless, the ‘success’ of the peace process was not 
taken for granted back in 2003 and the international actors feared that a more 
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assertive position in relation to Darfur would undermine the process in the 
south.272 
Nevertheless, there were reactions to the crisis and the escalation of 
violence in Darfur. Sudan is member of the United Nations and of multiple and 
overlapping regional organizations that have a security component such as The 
League of Arab States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
and the African Union. The reactions originated in multiple fora, from bilateral 
mediation promoted by countries such as Gaddafi’s Libya and the United States, 
to regional and global arrangements. The international responses included words 
of condemnation, sponsored agreements, criminal prosecutions, sanction regimes 
and arms embargoes, and monitoring and peacekeeping missions. All these 
aspects are described below.  
The humanitarian action started only in early 2004 but suffered from lack 
of commitment and from obstacles imposed by the parties in conflict. 
Humanitarian aid workers were frequently denied access to areas controlled by 
the GoS and by the rebel movements. Furthermore, the humanitarian workers, 
their infrastructure and the refugee camps, both in Chad and in Sudan, were also 
constantly attacked. 
In spring 2004, UN officials and advocacy groups were pointing to a 
systematic killing of civilians in Darfur.273 Media coverage of the violence also 
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increased in the same period. In September 2004, US Secretary of State Collin 
Powel declared before the US Senate that the crisis in Darfur amounted to 
genocide. Six months earlier, the US Congress had already positioned itself 
declaring that the atrocities committed against non-Arabs in Darfur constituted 
genocide. Others joined Powell and the US Congress in labelling the events in 
Darfur as genocide. The European Parliament came close by declaring the 
situation in Darfur a ‘tantamount to genocide’. In January 2005, however, the 
UN-sponsored International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (S/RES/1564) 
reported that policies of the GoS did not constitute genocide, but counter-
insurgency. 274  The matter remains debatable, and most conclusions and 
declarations are political rather than technical.275 But the discussions alone stress 
the indiscriminate violence in Darfur and bordering regions. 
In March 2005, the UN Security Council (S/RES/1593), acting under 
Chapter VII, referred the Darfur crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Three months later the Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, decides to open 
investigation. After the legal process of the following years, arrest warrants have 
been issued against key members of the GoS and the leadership of the Janjaweed 
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militia, including president Omar Al-Bashir, to answer for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Leaders of the Darfuri rebel groups were also summoned to 
court for hearings.276 Al-Bashir remains the head of the GoS at the time of 
writing and other indicted people are still at large and holding positions in the 
government. 
Throughout the crisis, international institutions and third-countries 
sponsored settlements and negotiations, of which three are of notice. In April 
2004, the GoS, JEM and SLM/A agreed on the N’Djamena Humanitarian 
Ceasefire, which was mediated by Chad and the African Union. The composition 
of the Joint Commission and of the Ceasefire Commission, as decided a month 
later in Addis-Ababa highlights the main actors involved in the peace process. 
Interestingly, beyond the parties (GoS and the rebels), also the United States, 
Chad, the African Union and the European Union would appoint representatives 
in these commissions. The agreement was short-lived – violence continued, rebel 
groups split over the validity of the agreement and fought each other – but 
provided the legal framework to the first AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) charged 
with the supervision of the ceasefire. 
A series of talks in Abuja, Nigeria, led to a peace agreement mediated by 
United States’ diplomats and the African Union that aimed at establishing power 
and wealth sharing in Sudan and enhancing the presence of Darfuri in national 
politics. Signed in May 2006 by the GoS and the Zaghawa faction of the SLM/A 
led by Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), the Abuja Agreement was not, however, 
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supported by JEM and the Fur members of the SLM around Abdul Wahid al Nur 
(SLA-AW). Little time was given for consultations between the representatives 
and their constituencies, which meant that the agreement was not welcomed by 
Darfur’s population and the displaced people. Violence actually rose after its 
signature, including intra-opposition clashes.277 The peace talks – the parties and 
the mediators – failed by largely ignoring the rising regional dimension of the 
conflict that at the time had already spread to Chad.278 During the first years of 
the Darfur rebellion, the international community seemed to look at it as an 
isolated intra-state conflict.279 Thus, UNSC Resolution 1778 of September 2007, 
which authorized the deployment European forces in Chad and CAR, is among 
the few to recognize the regional – transnational – nature of the issue and react 
accordingly.280 
The years following the debacle of the Abuja Agreement saw Libya 
leading the mediation in 2007 and 2008. Later, the UN, the AU and Qatar took a 
central diplomatic role from mid-2008 onwards. 281  Eventually, a second 
agreement, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), was finalized in 
2011. It serves as the current framework for power sharing and cessation of 
violence. The document is the culmination of negotiations involving the parties 
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in the conflict as mediated by the international community such as the UN, the 
AU, the EU, and others.282 A limited number of groups adhered to the DDPD 
along with the GoS. Above all, it was signed in July 2011 by the Liberation and 
Justice Movement whose creation as an umbrella movement a year before was 
encouraged by the international mediation to avoid fragmentation of the rebel 
opposition. At the time of writing, the DDPD is open to non-signatory 
movements.283 
Once more, not all rebel factions signed the agreement and the parties did 
not fulfil most of the engagements. Mainstream components of JEM, SLA-MM, 
and SLA-AW that are assembled in the Revolutionary Front have constantly 
refused to join the Doha Document. Generally, the SRF groups claim that the 
DDPD addresses only the issue of Darfur and lacks a holistic approach to the 
multiple crises in Sudan, which would be indissociable. On the one hand, various 
groups continued the fight, including attacks against peacekeepers and 
humanitarian staff. On the other, the GoS failed to control the paramilitary and 
insure a more comprehensive participation of Darfurians in national politics as 
pursued by the opposition. 
The gradual introduction of sanctions and embargoes represents another 
set of responses to the crisis. Already in July 2004, in the first resolution on the 
situation in Darfur (S/RES/1556), the UNSC demanded the disarmament of the 
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militia, decided for an arms’ embargo on non-state actors in Darfur, and 
expressed intention to consider further sanctions. The next resolution 
(S/RES/1564) threatened the GoS with sanctions on the country’s oil industry if 
it did not comply with the document, in particular the acceptance of an enhanced 
AU mission. In March 2005, a Security Council Committee was established 
(S/RES/1591) to oversee targeting measures such as assets freezes and travel 
restrictions for individuals and groups involved in the conflict. 
The United States and the European Union have also established sanction 
regimes in relation to the conflict in Sudan aiming notably at individuals’ assets 
and the country’s oil industry – its main source of revenue. These regimes added 
to the already existing restrictions of the 1990s that addressed the North-South 
Civil War. In paper, the sanctions appeared as hard measures, but in reality they 
were almost unenforceable. The arms embargo, for example, would still allow 
Sudan to import weapons, but not send them to Darfur, a detail that proved 
difficult to monitor. 
Above all, international organizations and third countries all relied 
heavily on the approval by the GoS of any kind of military and humanitarian 
action. The international community remained reluctant to enforce actions 
against Khartoum’s will, fearing that harsher language and actions could 
undermine the North-South peace process or even endanger the humanitarian 
effort.284 The UNSC Resolution 1706 of August 2006 infamously illustrates this 
aspect. Under Chapter VII, it extended UNMIS’ mandate, which was already 
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active in the South, to Darfur ‘with all necessary means’ to protect the 
humanitarian effort, to assist the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, 
and to disarm the parties in conflict. Even if evoking Chapter VII, the UNSC still 
‘invited’ the GoS’ consent for this extended deployment, which was ultimately 
not granted. It was the first ever UN mission authorized, but not deployed. 
It is fair to say that humanitarian assistance and diplomacy did save 
thousands of lives that would have been lost without such efforts285, but the 
international community was not able to avoid further violence or ultimately 
bring peace in a reasonable time. Arguably, the rising idea of responsibility to 
protect, which had been developed at the dawn of the 21st century and would 
allow for circumvention of sovereignty in extreme cases of violation of human 
rights, failed in its first major challenge286. In general, the various international 
mediation efforts appear to be competitive instead of complementary, putting 
much more weight on relief than on conflict resolution. 287  As a former US 
practitioner involved in mediation in Darfur stressed: “the real failure was in how 
long it took for outside help to arrive in Darfur”288. 
In the absence of a stricto sensu humanitarian intervention – without the 
local government’s approval – security organizations have deployed a set of 
missions to address the crisis and avoid further escalation of violence in Darfur, 
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Chad, and CAR. Among the organizations, the African Union, the European 
Union, NATO, and finally the United Nations are the most notable cases. Table 1 
presents the different missions of these three organizations, which are then 
detailed afterwards. 
Table 1. Missions in Response to the Crisis in Darfur 
Mission Organization(s) Launching End 
AMIS / AMIS-II African Union 18.06.2004 31.12.2007 
Support to AMIS European Union 18.07.2005 31.12.2007 
UNAMID African Union, United 
Nations 
01.01.2008 On-going 
EUFOR Tchad/CAR European Union 15.03.2008 15.03.2009 
MINURCAT II United Nations 05.03.2009 31.12.2010 
 
AU mission in Sudan 
The African Union took a central role in the mediation efforts from the 
beginning of the international response to the crisis in Darfur. It was closely 
involved in the talks preceding the two main documents presented above (Abuja 
and Doha) and others. It engagement in the conflict, however, cannot be taken 
for granted as it contrasts, for example, with the peace talks addressing the 
North-South Civil War when another regional organization, this time IGAD, had 
a greater responsibility.289 
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To supervise the N’Djamena ceasefire, the AU launched the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which became operational in June 2004. A 
monitoring mission, AMIS was supported by a few hundred soldiers from 
Rwanda and Nigeria charged with protecting the monitors (MilOb Protection 
Force). Very soon it became clear that AMIS was actually monitoring the lack of 
a ceasefire. Thus, the mission quickly evolved into a more robust military 
component in October 2004 as the United Nations urged its enhancement 
(S/RES/1564) and the AU Assembly determined that AMIS would also be 
responsible for the protection of civilians within its reach.290 
This multidimensional, armed peace operation was then called AMIS II 
and evolved to include monitors, a protection force, police officers as well as 
civilian and humanitarian assets. Under this revised mandate, AMIS would be in 
charge, among other roles, of protecting civilians, assisting in the process of 
confidence building, and securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In 
September 2006, AMIS291 amounted to almost 5 thousands troops, 1,4 thousand 
civilian police officers, and around 800 military observers and staff officers for a 
total of 7,2 thousands personnel.292 The deployment of such force, modest for the 
size of Darfur and for the scale of the conflict, was made possible with the 
logistical help of NATO and EU member-states. Moreover, the UN and the EU, 
with its African Peace Facility funds, provided much of the necessary funding. In 
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sum, the large majority of states and international organizations supported 
AMIS, including the UNSC, the UN Secretary-General, the EU, and the Arab 
League. Most of the criticism came from nongovernmental organizations293 and 
most of it actually referred to the perceived lack of action from the international 
community. 
Along with the mission in Burundi (AMIB), AMIS was an important test 
to the organization, which had taken over from the Organisation of the African 
Unity (OAU) back in 2002, this time with more ambitious goals. At the time, 
both AMIS and AMIB were perceived as signs of a new sustainable trend in 
which the regional organizations would be in charge of responding to such 
crises.294  The UN not only supported AMIS, but also implicitly charged the 
regional organization with the main responsibility in addressing the issue in 
Sudan. By accepting to deploy a nearly hopeless force in a difficult crisis 
situation295, AU revealed its commitment to this regional trend. However, facing 
the scarcity of means and funding, the AU decided to accept planning and 
expertise from outside, which included the United States, the United Nations, 
and the European Union, from early 2005. AMIS came to an end in December 
2007 when its responsibilities were transferred to the new hybrid AU-UN 
mission. 
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Hybrid AU-UN mission in Darfur 
Since May 2004 the Security Council had endorsed the multiple efforts 
by the African Union. Along with other UN bodies such as the General 
Assembly and the defunct Commission on Human Rights, it was also hiding its 
own inaction behind this endorsement.296 Hence, as Paul Williams put it, the 
UNSC “decided that respecting Sudanese sovereignty was more important than 
conducting a military response capable of protecting the civilian population.”297 
Nonetheless, the UNSC did introduce sanctions and referred the case to the ICC. 
The sanction regimes were, however, undermined by Sudan’s major trading 
partners, above all China,298 and the accused remain at large – their impact was 
much more symbolic than practical. 
Given AMIS’ struggles with unpredictable and insufficient funding and 
with logistical challenges, UN’s original intention was for the organization to 
take over the mission already in January 2007. A previous resolution had already 
authorized such move in 2006 (S/RES/1706) and the new roles determined by 
the DPA signed in May were clearly beyond the capacity of the African Union. 
At first, AU member-states were inclined towards an African-only mission as a 
showcase of the Union’s new role in the region, but its limited capacity 
eventually led to the acceptance that the burden should be shared.299 It was only 
in January 2008, however, that African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation 
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in Darfur (UNAMID) officially took over from AMIS (S/RES/1769) and only 
after a reluctant approval from the GoS that followed multiple refusals.300  
UNAMID was the first hybrid mission to be implemented by the United 
Nations with a regional organization. Symbolically, it was the coronation of the 
ideas of global-regional partnership, which were being constructed in the 
previous years. According to the resolution, UNAMID should have “a 
predominantly African character and the troops should, as much as possible, be 
sourced from African countries”301. This African character was indeed one of the 
conditions for the consent of the GoS.302 Effectively, the overwhelming majority 
of peacekeepers come from African countries. 
The operation would be responsible for protecting humanitarian workers, 
protect civilians, monitor the arms embargo, and support early and effective 
implementation of the 2006 Abuja Agreement by, above all, preventing 
disruption by armed attacks. The resolution authorized a force of around 20 
thousands military personnel and almost 6,5 thousands-strong civilian 
component, mainly police unities. Previous documents (S/RES/1679) had 
foreseen a much larger force, but that proved impossible to assemble due to lack 
of commitment of member states and rejection by the GoS. By then, however, it 
was the largest active UN mission and in time it also became the deadliest for 
peacekeepers and the third in UN’s history. UNAMID is an on-going mission 
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and the current authorization dates back to August 2014 when it was renewed for 
ten months. 
UNAMID now faces harsher than normal criticism mainly because of its 
inability to react in front of violence against both civilians and aid workers as 
well as attacks on their assets by the various sides in the conflict. Moreover, the 
mission has not adequately monitored and reported on the situation on the 
ground that links the GoS to the violent attacks against civilians and 
peacekeepers 303  to the point when the ICC asked for an independent 
investigation.304 Accordingly to a Foreign Policy article based on leaked mission 
documents, the rebels and the GoS “have effectively neutered the UN[-AU] 
peacekeeping mission, undermining its capacity to fulfil its primary duty to 
protect […] civilians.”305 On the one hand, lack of military hardware and proper 
UN-AU coordination and, on the other, a problematic relationship with the host 
government hampered the mission’s overall capacity. By the end of the period 
analysed in this research (2003-2012), the crises in Darfur was far from over and 
violence, including aerial bombing, was actually intensifying. 
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EU missions 
At the beginning, and following the reluctance of France and UK to 
intervene in the isolated region of Darfur, EU’s initial involvement in the conflict 
was largely rhetorical, with condemnations by the Union’s High Representative, 
by member countries and by the EU Parliament, which passed a motion calling 
the situation in Darfur a ‘tantamount to genocide’. In 2004, the EU facilitated the 
talks that led to N’Djamena Ceasefire, sent monitors to Darfur along with the 
AU, and assisted the financing of AMIS with the funds of the African Peace 
Facility.  
It was not until May 2005 that the EU institutionalized its links with the 
African Union’s AMIS II with a support mission that would last until July 2007 
when both the AMIS mission and the EU’s assistance would be replaced by 
UNAMID. It is important to note that this mission was initiated after the AU 
requested both the EU and NATO for technical support. While the Alliance was 
above all responsible for airlifting AMIS peacekeepers and civilian police, the 
EU focused on military planning and technical assistance as well as training of 
police units. Eventually, it was up to member states to choose whether to act 
within the framework of NATO or the EU.306 
In sum, EU’s involvement in the Sudanese region of Darfur included 
financial, technical, humanitarian and diplomatic support, most of it under the 
framework of the CSDP support mission to AMIS. But while the EU mission 
was by no means a peacekeeping operation, it did highlight two trends of EU’s 
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foreign policy towards Africa dating back to the Cotonou Agreement. First, the 
gradual introduction of political and security conditionalities along with more 
traditional development and aid policies. Second, the willingness to insure 
‘African ownership’ to crisis management in the continent. Broadly speaking, the 
support to AMIS was the result of both EU’s willingness to address crises in 
Africa and its lack of will and/or capacity to actually send troops.307 
At the same time, Chad and in CAR have witnessed a more robust 
military involvement from the European Union. In the areas bordering Darfur, 
the EU launched in January 2008 the operation EUFOR Tchad/CAR, which 
would last for over 14 months until March 2009. In this military operation, the 
EU claimed to respond to Darfur “as part of its regional approach to the crisis”. 
As a matter of fact, the mission aimed at contributing to the protection of 
refugees fleeing from neighbour Sudan, the protection of humanitarian workers, 
and the delivery of humanitarian aid. At its highest point, 3200 armed troops 
were deployed, with France, Poland, and Ireland as main contributors.  
As it is often the case with EU mission in Africa, EUFOR Tchad/CAR 
was established after initiative of the French government,308 also interested in 
preserving Déby’s rule in Chad.309 The same armed groups who were said to be 
threatening refugees were also rebelling against the central government, above 
all the United Front for Democratic Change who had declared war on foreign 
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troops even before EUFOR deployment.310 Paris original intention was also to 
provide a ‘rear force’ to UNAMID with a force of around 10 thousand troops, 
but this didn’t materialize.311 The risk was the EUFOR mission being perceived 
as an extension of the traditional, sometimes secret, military arrangements 
between France and Chad (e.g. Opération Épervier)312. EUFOR, the critics would 
say, not only derives from French geostrategic interest, but actually contributed 
to the escalation of violence in Darfur by prompting further resistance by local 
groups.313  
United Nations Mission in Chad 
Finally, the regional-global interplay in security provision was once more 
present in the conflictual context of Darfur when the UN took over the European 
mission in Chad and CAR by launching the United Nations Mission in Central 
African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT in French). Already before this 
transition, the UN had established in 2007 a “multidimensional presence” in 
Chad and CAR, which included civilian and police components (S/RES/1778). It 
was the military component that was added following the transfer of authority 
from EUFOR (S/RES/1861) and from this moment the mission is often called 
MINURCAT II. Thus, for more than a year, the UN civilian and police 
                                                
310 Hancock, Stephanie, "Chad rebels declare war on French and foreign forces," Reuters 2007,  
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/11/30/uk-chad-rebels-idUKL308226520071130. 14 
August 2014. 
311 Bono, Giovanna, "The EU's Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An 
Operation to Save Lives?". 
312 Ibid.: 29. 
313 Ibid.: 30. 
  123 
component and the EUFOR military mission had to coordinate their efforts in a 
global-regional interplay.314 
The transition happened in March 2009 and the mission lasted until 
December 2010 when the Chad government declared it was able to protect the 
displaced population and asked MINURCAT to leave the country (S/RES/1923). 
This passing over from EUFOR to MINURCAT was not simply a change of 
badges for troops already on the ground as only around 2 thousand soldiers, 
mainly French, remained engaged under UN mission. Most of the refugees by 
the time the mission left Chad, had not returned to Darfur as expected and with 
the resurge of the conflict in 2012, their number actually increased. MINURCAT 
is often portrayed as apolitical since its mandate included almost exclusively the 
protection of civilians 315 , a ‘neutrality’ that is difficult to maintain in such 
circumstances. 
MINURCAT and EUFOR were seen as complementary to UNAMID, 
which was being launched at the same period. Throughout 2008, the international 
responses in the region required the coordination – not always easy – between 
the military component of EUFOR, the police and civilian component of 
MINURCAT, and the hybrid mission UNAMID. Thus, there was at least an 
implicit link between all these responses, which clearly highlighted an ‘axis’ of 
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crisis management of EU-UN-AU underpinning the regional security 
governance.316 
Arguably, most of these missions, operations, and policies of crisis 
management came too late and contributed too little to improve the situation on 
the ground and to avoid the escalation of conflict, especially in the initial years of 
the crisis when violence peaked, from 2003 to 2005. Despite this criticism, and 
perhaps also because of it, the organizations responding to the conflict are 
engaged in legitimating their policies in the field and justifying their presence in 
the regional security governance. 
Conclusion 
Security regionalism usually appears as a mid-level alternative in both 
normative and empirical terms. For the former, regionalism offers a bridge in the 
ethical divide between universalism and statism: “it is still a statist project, but 
avoids conflict and, instead, leads to a global social, economic and ethical 
trend”317. To be clear, regionalism is not globalism and it does not solve the 
problems of global justice. Rather, it has the potential to reconcile the divide in 
practice, especially the cosmopolitan/communitarian divide vis-à-vis 
intervention, peace operations, and the governance of security. In empirical 
terms, regionalism offers an alternative to, on the one hand, the lack of capacity 
and consensus in global institutions in charge of maintenance of peace and 
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security318 and, on the other, the fact that today’s conflicts and security issues 
tend to spread beyond national border, overlap, and require deeper solutions that 
are beyond most states’ reach. Security institutions appear “as vehicles for 
coping with a security predicament, for alleviating state weakness in a 
competitive international environment” 319  but also, as shown above, the 
weaknesses of global institutions. 
In a context of crisis such as in Darfur, when the international community 
appears as hyperactive as much as powerless320, multiple responses are prima 
facie acceptable and different actors might play a role to address the insecurities. 
The same logic applies to regional organizations such as the European Union and 
the African Union that also build responses of their own in frequent interaction 
with national-states and with the United Nations. 
To be clear, the missions presented above are by no means peace 
enforcement operations and they have always enjoyed the consent – reluctant or 
not – of the hosting sovereign state. As a matter of fact, the EU and the AU have 
never deployed enforcement operations. UNAMID, AMIS, EUFOR, and others 
are nonetheless security missions because they keep elements such as urgency, 
threat to a valued object, special allocation of resources, and the possibility of 
use of force even if only in self-defence. As such, they constitute interventions in 
the basic assumption of the word: an outsider’s involvement aiming at altering an 
existing situation and ‘stabilize the conflict’ or ‘bring peace’. 
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Hence, this chapter contextualized the thesis’ main puzzle, which is to 
understand how regional security organizations emerge, through discourse and 
practice, as ‘mid-level’ security actors and security providers between states and 
global institutions, to intervene in crises such as the one in Darfur and its 
vicinity. In other words, how they construct their Self, maintain their standing as 
international security institutions, and legitimate their policies and actions. To 
use rhetoric vocabulary: how RSOs build their ethos as security actors within 
regional governance. Hence, the next two chapters build a conceptual and 
methodological framework that allows for the study of legitimacy claims of 
regional organizations and more generally the legitimation process of security 
regionalism, proposing the AU and the EU policies in Darfur as case studies.  
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Chapter 3 
LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
 
The principle is the same whether we are dealing with those 
who want the is to be recognized as the ought or with those 
who are setting out to convert their ought into newly 
established is. Politics is not merely a struggle for power but 
also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in which the 
conferment or denial, the confirmation or revocation, of 
legitimacy is an important stake.321 
 
What makes institutions and their decisions legitimate? What are the 
founding principles of their legitimacy322? Is it democracy, general will, consent, 
efficiency, respect of moral values, or the general belief that the institution is 
indeed legitimate? When someone points to the lack of legitimacy of global 
governance, for example, are they questioning the democratic representation of 
different actors within the decision-making processes, the transparency and 
accountability of the international organizations, their capacity to deliver results 
and solve global problems, or if people actually believe in global governance as 
potentially inherently legitimate? More specifically, what (de)legitimates a 
military or humanitarian intervention, or policies or crisis management? Is it the 
countries or leaders involved, the consensus or approval by international 
organizations, the (dis)respect of international law, the intervention’s nature and 
(in)efficiency in dealing with portrayed threat to international peace and human 
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rights, or all of the above? Finally, is the international realm a site where we can 
actually apply the very concept of legitimacy to governance, organizations, and 
their policies?  
In this chapter, it is argued that (a) questions about legitimacy are as 
relevant at global and regional levels as they are at the national level of politics 
as it is made clear by the large body of literature dedicated to the topic across 
multiple epistemic traditions, and (b) legitimation should be the object of study 
instead of legitimacy. Every political institution, every system of domination, 
attempts to legitimate itself 323 , including international organizations, which 
attempt to legitimate their existence and their policies. To clarify these two 
claims, this chapter presents a revision of the literature on legitimacy and 
legitimation, especially focusing on the IR literature, and develops a conceptual 
framework for self-legitimation based mainly on the IR constructivist literature. 
1) Legitimacy in the literature 
The topics of political legitimacy inspired many scholars in disciplines 
such as Political Philosophy, Sociology, Economics and Management, Law, and 
Political Science. Authors such as Max Weber, Seymour Lipset, Niklas 
Luhmann, Rodney Barker, and Mark Suchman produced classic and frequently 
referenced contributions on this issue.324 What characterizes these works, beyond 
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the facts that they share a common ‘exemplar’ (common sources and common 
questions)325, is the contested character of the concept.326 Across disciplines, 
there is a similar and general understanding that legitimacy is “a virtue of 
political institutions”327. However, even within disciplines, there are different 
ideas about what it means to say that an organization, a policy or a system of rule 
is legitimate. This first section explores the two most common approaches to 
these questions in social sciences as well as their appropriation by IR theories. 
Traditionally, questions about legitimacy have been framed within two 
distinct approaches. Firstly, a normative approach, more closely linked to 
political philosophy, sets parameters for the immanent acceptability of political 
power, of its decisions and acts, and of the existence of institutions themselves. It 
refers to some “benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or 
authority and – possibly – obligation” 328 . According to its normative 
understanding, legitimacy is a ‘quality’ that is inherent to political institutions 
that meet the criteria. These claims are obviously normative because the criteria 
are established according to normative preferences and affiliations, and are 
followed by an assessment of political regimes being analysed by the scholar. 
Nevertheless, normative assessments of legitimacy are not limited to academics: 
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they are exactly what social actors constantly do when pining their statement on 
shared normative assumptions about the rightfulness of institutions and their 
policies. 329  Finally, a legitimacy crisis according to a normative approach 
originates from the gap between the social reality of domination of policies and 
within institutions, on the one side, and the benchmarks previously established 
that should frame the relationship of rulers and ruled-overs, on the other side. 
A second way of framing the question of legitimacy is the sociological 
approach. Accounts of such kind, known also as empirical or descriptive 
approaches to legitimacy, usually trace their origins back to Max Weber’s 
scholarship. Accordingly, those following Weber assume that what makes a 
political system legitimate is the belief or the faith its members have in its 
legitimacy. Thus, a sociological approach is about the belief that an institution 
has the right to rule whereas a normative approach relates to the right to rule 
itself.330 In a sociological approach, a system of rule is considered binding by the 
fact that people belief on its oughtness. Furthermore, in Weberian terms, 
legitimacy is a variable capable of explaining a regime’s stability beyond self-
interest or fear331. A legitimacy crisis, in this sense, refers to the fact that a given 
community does not see an institution as having the right to rule. 
Both approaches have shortcomings and could be complementary in 
many ways.332 On the one hand, a sociological approach, by focusing on beliefs, 
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tends to neglect people’s second order beliefs, which are normative: the belief of 
what is necessary for an institution to be legitimate. This changes over time and 
it is certainly necessary to access the norms underpinning these beliefs. In 
addition, the sociological approach tends offers a static picture of the beliefs by 
interpreting opinion polls and people’s behaviour and discourse. 333  These 
elements are treated as mere indicators instead of being part of a social process 
and contributing to the legitimation of rulers and actions. On the other hand, a 
normative approach lacks historical and contextual analysis because of their 
focus on general and universal conditions or criteria. It is, therefore, of little help 
to understand historical processes of justification and legitimation. 
Legitimacy as a concept and as a question of inquiry was seldom present 
in IR scholarship in its early days. The first developments in the discipline were 
marked by works of authors such as Martin Wight, Henry Kissinger, and Inis 
Claude. 334  All three scholars anchored legitimacy in a communitarian, 
statecentric, argument related to acceptance among peers for membership in a 
group of SNS and for international stability in a society of states.335 Nowadays, it 
is possible to build on a much larger scholarship that appropriates the concept of 
legitimacy to various goals and within various theoretical affiliations. Below, I 
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present a review of the main theoretical traditions in IR with regard to the use, or 
neglect of the concept of legitimacy, and how they might be useful to this 
research.336 
Realism 
Realists rarely evoke legitimacy. Because anarchy, according to realists, 
is an undeniable feature of international politics, authoritative relationships are 
inexistent and so is legitimacy. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, when developing his 
structural Theory of International Politics, abstracted every aspect of states, 
including their legitimacy, with the exception of their capabilities.337 Hence, the 
realist scholarship traditionally argues for a clear distinction between national 
and international politics in which the legitimate use of force is restricted to the 
realm of national politics and this legitimacy aspect is exactly the main 
difference between national and international338. The latter is the realm where 
‘might is right’, meaning that legitimacy intimately linked to force. 
Even when realists use term at the international level, as in the work of 
Henry Kissinger, it only means an agreement, among the most powerful states, 
about the methods of foreign policy and what is permissible: 
It implies the acceptance of the framework of the 
international order by all major powers, at least to the extent 
                                                
336 There is undoubtedly a high level of variation within the theoretical approaches to legitimacy 
presented below. Moreover, there is clear overlap of authors and theoretical 
underpinnings that would fit in multiple theories. However, the main goal of the 
following review is to assess the general lines of each approach, pointing out to classic 
works and scholars, in order to evaluate the usefulness of each theory to question 
relating to legitimacy (and legitimation) of international institutions and their policies of 
use of force.  
337Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1979), 99. “ 
338 Ibid.: 103-4. 
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that no state is so dissatisfied that, […] A legitimate order 
does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. 
339 
Thus, when not completely ignoring legitimacy, realist scholars limit the 
uses of the concept to the great game that is played by major powers. 
Furthermore, aspects regarding the rightfulness of international institutions are 
largely overlooked, especially because one of the theory’s main elements is to 
deny these institutions any relevance in a world dominated by states. 340 
International organizations are, the arguments goes, mere reflections of states’ 
will. In sum, realism has only minor contributions to offer in view of this 
research’s goals.  
Liberalism and new interventionism 
In general, neoliberal theory of International Relations shares with 
realism the same materialist and anarchical view of international politics, paying 
larger attention to aspects such as state’s economic interests in rational choice 
theory.341 Legitimacy, as other ideational aspects, comes hardly into play when 
liberal theories seek to explain, for example, how interstate cooperation is 
possible under anarchy.342 
At the same time, there is a focus on the rightfulness of ruling within 
states based on liberal principles that appeal, mainly, to democratic legitimacy. 
                                                
339 Kissinger, Henry A., "A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and the Problem of Peace, 
1812-22", 1. 
340 See, for example, Mearsheimer, John J., "The False Promise of International Institutions", 
International Security, 19 (1996), 5-49. 
341 Examples of rational choice and non-ideational approaches in the liberal IR tradition include 
the work of Andrew Moravcsik ["Taking Preferences Seriously : A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics", International Organization, 51 (1997), 513-53.] and the early 
scholarship of Robert Keohane. 
342 Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies 
and Institutions", World Politics, 38 (1985), 226-54. 
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Francis Fukuyama, for example, famously sustained that liberal democracy is, 
following the end of the Cold War, the only possible argument capable of 
morally justifying power.343 Translated to the international realm, this internal 
legitimacy of moral individuals is essential to liberal theories of democratic 
peace, as states would tend to replicate abroad the politics of within.344 This 
aspect also exemplifies a popular trend of liberalism in IR, which is the return to 
the source of liberal though of political theory. Another appropriation of 
Liberalism in IR, very closely related to legitimacy, is the late scholarship of 
Robert Keohane along with political philosopher Allen Buchanan. Both authors 
have based their work on principles of liberal traditions such as the autonomy of 
the individual and proposed criteria for legitimacy of global institutions. In this 
sense, their work falls clearly within the normative tradition of legitimacy and 
present stronger claims of liberal universalism. 345 Keohane and Ruth Grant, for 
instance, argue that “[f]or international organizations to whom authority is 
formally delegated, legitimacy depends on some combination of conformity to 
shared norms and to established law.”346 
                                                
343 Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). 
344 A reference to the moral aspects of liberal peace is Doyle, Michael W., "Ways of war and 
peace: Realism, liberalism, and socialism",  (1997); Doyle, Michael W., "Kant, liberal 
legacies, and foreign affairs: Part 1", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (1983), 205-34; 
Doyle, Michael W., "Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs: Part 2", Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 12 (1983), 323-53; For a non-ideational perspective, see: Lake, David A., 
"Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War", American Political Science Review, 
86 (1992), 24-37. 
345 A list of such work includes: Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. Keohane, "Precommitment 
Regimes for Intervention: Supplementing the Security Council", Ethics and 
International Affairs, 25 (2011), 41-63; Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. Keohane, "The 
Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions"; Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. 
Keohane, "The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal", Ethics 
and International Affairs, 18 (2004), 1-22; Keohane, Robert O., "Global governance and 
legitimacy", Review of International Political Economy, 18 (2011), 99-109.  
346 Grant, Ruth W. and Robert O. Keohane, "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics", American Political, 99 (2005), 29-43: 35. 
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Finally, with regards to the use of force, IR liberalism also relies on 
political and moral philosophies 347   for the development of liberal 
interventionism. 348  According to this view, governments should imperatively 
protect individual rights. It is argued that states lacking internal legitimacy – 
those that do not abide to liberal democratic principles and violate human rights 
– are in constant conflict with their populations and are subject to justifiable 
foreign intervention. Moreover, in this situation, an intervention would not only 
be legitimate, but also a duty of liberal states.349 Lastly, legitimacy of military 
interventions, following a liberal perspective, is usually tied up to rules of 
democratic procedure instead of consequentialist evaluations of the output of 
these policies. 
Due to the liberal political tradition in which it is inspired, liberal claims 
tend to be universal in scope and treat legitimacy as a virtue that is exclusive to 
polities and policies meeting liberal criteria. Liberal theory of IR remains highly 
normative when considering legitimacy of actors, institutions, and policies of 
crisis management and foreign interventions. Hence, most of the debate of liberal 
tradition that concerns legitimacy actually escapes positivist, ‘non-utopian, non-
                                                
347 Classical references of Liberalism in IR are notably Immanuel Kant (Perpetual Peace) and 
more recently John Rawls (The Law of Peoples). These works are also present in 
Normative Theory of International Relations, Liberal Constructivism, and International 
Law. 
348 For an analysis of liberal argument for the use of force, see: Freedman, Lawrence, "The age of 
liberal wars", Review of International Studies, 31 (2006), 93-107. 
349 For proponents of liberal interventionism see: Feinstein, Lee and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A 
Duty to Prevent", Foreign Affairs, 83 (2004), 136-50; Held, David, Democracy and the 
Global Order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995). For critiques, see: Chandler, David, Empire in Denial: THe 
Politics of State-building (London: Pluto Press, 2006); ibid.; Chandler, David, 
"Resilience and human security: The post-interventionist paradigm", Security Dialogue, 
43 (2012), 213-29; Chandler, David, "The responsibility to protect? Imposing the 
‘Liberal Peace’", International Peacekeeping, 11 (2004), 59-81; Mac Ginty, R., 
"Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace", Cooperation and Conflict, 43 
(2008), 139-63; Reus-Smit, Christian, "Liberal hierarchy and the licence to use force", 
Review of International Studies, 31 (2006), 71. 
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ideational’ approaches that neoliberals might advocate and becomes part of a 
larger normative discussion within International Ethics and Normative Theory of 
International Relations. 
International Ethics: cosmopolitans and communitarians  
The last three to four decades witnessed the publication of many works 
concerning justice and morality in international politics in general, but also 
relating to questions of legitimacy of international organizations and of 
humanitarian interventions particular.350 This debate falls within an inescapable 
philosophical division. On one side, cosmopolitans share a view of justice 
centred on the primacy of human beings; a primacy that can be extended globally 
to mankind as a whole, bypassing borders. On the other side, communitarians see 
conceptions of good, justice and right as strongly attached to the communities. 
For them, at best, there is only a minimalist consensus on ethical issues among 
different groups. 351 The reflections of this divide into the research of normative 
underpinnings of security regionalism are remarkable because both normative 
                                                
350 Examples of early publications include: Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4 ed.(New York: Basic Books, 1977); Walzer, 
Michael, "The Moral Standing of States : A Response to Four Critics", Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 9 (1980), 209-29; Vincent, R. J., Human Rights and International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Brown, Chris, International 
Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992); Nardin, Terry, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Frost, Mervyn, Towards a Normative 
Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
Frost, Mervyn, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
351 It is important to note that both cosmopolitan and communitarian claims are what may be 
called foundationalist – they seek their foundation on human beings or communities – 
drawing strong assumptions from weak foundations. However, the third way of anti-
foundationalism, the pragmatic approach, lacks the instruments to deal with the ethics of 
use of force. Since once life is taken it cannot be given back, and since there are no 
assurances that violence will secure a solution, “the absoluteness assumed within a 
decision to use violence cannot be arrived from a normative structure of pragmatic 
critique.” Cochran, Molly, Normative Theory of International Relations: A Pragmatic 
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 252-3.  
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views are frequently raised, as arguments, in academic and political debates. A 
‘communitarian’, for instance, would remind us of the necessity to look for 
sources of legitimacy in the values and norms of the communities where 
interventions take place. A ‘cosmopolitan’ argument would defend more general 
applications of human rights and responsibility to protect. 
Cosmopolitans, on the one hand, tend to consider individual rights to be 
the sole source of legitimacy, both nationally and internationally, in a moral 
community of humankind. In this sense, it would be possible to imagine 
institutions other than states to be globally legitimate if they were to base their 
legitimacy on individual rights. Thus, a common critique towards international 
organizations, made by the cosmopolitan tradition, concerns the distance 
between individuals and multilateral bodies. The distance, it is said, is generally 
too large and is aggravated by lack of transparency and accountability of the 
organizations vis-à-vis the people. If IOs do not open-up and get closer to 
individuals – who would constitute sole source of legitimacy according to 
cosmopolitans – they eventually fail in their quest for legitimacy.352 Simply put, 
cosmopolitanism postulates that “universal moral constraints apply to 
institutional designs”, such as IOs, and see these agents “as responsible for 
realizing cosmopolitan principles”353. 
Communitarians, on the other hand, reject a (thick) universal morality 
and look instead for communities as foundations of their philosophical reasoning. 
                                                
352  Held, David, "The Changing Structure of International Law," in Global Transformation 
Reader: An Introduction to Globalization Debate (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); See 
also: Archibugi, Daniele and David Held, "Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and 
Agents", Ethics and International Affairs, 35 (2011), 433-61. 
353 Shapcott, Richard, International Ethics: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2010), 18. 
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The priority is given to the community because individual have been largely 
socialized in their ethical values. For this reason, communitarians argue that 
states have a moral standing 354  of their own as the most, and in some 
interpretations the only, prevalent communities in the global arena. Their 
legitimacy, of the government and its national policies, is defined between the 
rulers and ruled-over within national borders. 355  The legitimacy of IOs is 
underpinned not only by the values of a global civil society, but also and more 
importantly by the values of the society of sovereign states.356 This move would 
demand a common set of values and ethical commitments among the 
participants, both states and people. Finally, a global overarching authority such 
as a world state would be unjust, and also illegitimate, due to the variety of ways 
of life and conceptions of the good that are impossible to accommodate. But 
despite focusing on states as the most relevant community of values, 
communitarians tend to acknowledge the existence of authoritative practices 
beyond national borders. Thus, international and regional organizations are not 
mere instruments to achieve a goal, but also themselves subject to legitimacy.357 
Because communities and states have such a moral standing, enjoying 
norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, communitarians would only agree on 
intervention to preserve the most important human rights, when the crucial bond 
                                                
354 Walzer, Michael, "The Moral Standing of States : A Response to Four Critics". 
355 As Mervyn Frost defines, “social institutions consist of a set of peoples who interact with one 
another in terms of a set of commonly recognized social rules in order to realize certain 
values that are of importance to them”. He goes on to says that “[t]he Legitimacy 
question arises with regard to the whole structure of authority within an institution” 
legitimacy as a relation between government and governed.” Frost, Mervyn, 
"Legitimacy and International Organizations: The Changing Ethical Context," 28-9. 
356 Ibid.: 35-40. The key values for both the global civil society and the society of sovereign 
states are freedom and diversity. According to Frost, many international organizations 
(e.g. UN, AU, EU, OAS, ASEAN, etc.) aim at protecting the sovereignty of states. 
357 Ibid.: 31-2. A clear review of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism (anti-cosmopolitanism) 
is provided by Richard Shapcott, International Ethics: A Critical Introduction. 
  140 
between rulers their population is broken. Their criteria are so strict that 
interventions are made morally unjustifiable in most cases. Furthermore, 
communitarians see most duties and obligations limited to nationals and 
countrymen. 358 Opposed to communitarians, cosmopolitans 359  present a much 
more permissive interpretation of humanitarian intervention: 
[…] because all people experience these types of 
harm [genocide, starvation], it follows that there is a common 
interest, which is provisionally universal or universalizable, 
in protecting oneself and one’s community from harm. It also 
follows that this is a reasonable thing to reciprocate.360 
Positive obligations, requiring actions such as military interventions that 
aim at ending suffering, and violations of human right, are based on the 
assumption that all mankind is part of the same moral community with strong 
common beliefs and values, and that persons “are the ultimate unit of concern for 
everyone.”361 Both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, as shown in chapter 
4, underpin arguments of legitimation. 
English School  
English School is famous for trying to find a middle ground between 
Realism and Liberalism. While taking distance from the latter, the English 
                                                
358 Frost, Mervyn, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations; Nardin, Terry, Law, 
Morality, and the Relations of States; Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations. 
359  Linklater, Andrew, The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Shapcott, Richard, Justice, Community 
and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001); Brown, Chris, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches; 
Beitz, Charles R., "The Moral Standing of States Revisited", Ethics & International 
Affairs, 23 (2009), 325-47. 
360  Shapcott, Richard, International Ethics: A Critical Introduction, 48. See also Shapcott, 
Richard, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations. 
361  Pogge, Thomas W., "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," in Political Restructuring in 
Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. C. Brown (London: Routledge, 1994), 85. (emphasis 
in the original) 
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School takes seriously the implications of a world composed by states. Contrarily 
to the former, the English School consider society to exist beyond the borders of 
the state. Despite being anarchical, this international society makes room for 
inquiries about legitimacy in a way that realism cannot do. That being said, in the 
early stages of English School, legitimacy meant almost exclusively, as Martin 
Wight would put it, the acceptance of a member in the family of nations.362 
Moreover, the legitimacy of states in the international arena, John Vincent 
argues, is impossible to detach from the legitimacy of ruling inside.363 Recently, 
however, studies of International Society have been taken beyond this initial 
statecentric view and have expanded debates on legitimacy.364 
For this research, what stands out of the English School is the debate over 
the rightfulness of humanitarian interventions. As in International Ethics, the 
clash is between order and non-intervention, on the one side, and protection of 
human rights, on the other. In the school’s jargon, this divide is translated in 
differences between solidarists 365 , who favour collective security and 
cosmopolitan rights of individuals, and pluralists366, who value sovereignty of 
                                                
362 Mulligan, S. P., "The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations", 362; See also: Wight, 
Martin, "International Legitimacy". 
363 Vincent, R. J., Human Rights and International Relations. See also Welsh, Jennifer M., "A 
normative case for pluralism: reassessing Vincent's views on humanitarian 
intervention", International Affairs, 87 (2011), 1193-204. 
364  See, for example: Hurrell, Andrew, "Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be 
squared?"; Clark, Ian, International Legitimacy and World Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007); Clark, Ian, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
365 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society; Wheeler, Nicholas J., "Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
intervention in International Society",  (2000); Linklater, Andrew, The Problem of Harm 
in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations. For an English School take on how on 
how national interest are prevailing over human rights, especially since September 2001, 
see Dunne, Tim, "‘The Rules of the Game are Changing’: Fundamental Human Rights 
in Crisis After 9/11", International Politics, 44 (2007), 269-86. 
366 Jackson, Robert H., The Global Convenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Nardin, Terry, "The Moral Basis of Humanitarian 
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states and their cooperation and to whom intervention should be an exception 
applied in cases of “substantive and systematic violations of human rights”: 
If the legitimacy and sovereignty of states ‘derives 
ultimately from the rights of individuals’367, and if there is no 
precise way of determining a threshold beyond which 
legitimacy is lost, then it ought to follow that to the degree 
that a state violates human rights, it loses both its legitimacy 
and its sovereign rights, including the right to be protected by 
the principle of nonintervention: the grosser the violation, the 
weaker the claim to such protection.368 
These conceptions of legitimacy of states and of intervention – 
cosmopolitan and communitarian as well as solidarist and pluralist – are 
normative and static, offering little tools to grasp changes in the normative 
structure behind such institutions and actions. Of course, these approaches 
conceive a variation in the level of legitimacy institutions and policies might 
enjoy, but this variation is always related to the proximity to the criteria that are 
offered by different traditions. The ‘sources’ of legitimacy, in other words, are 
given by philosophical and normative postulates. Hence, actors and policies are 
legitimate or illegitimate, or something in between, always according to fixed 
criteria.369 
                                                                                                                               
Intervention", Ethics & International Affairs, 16 (2002), 57-70; Slater, Jerome and Terry 
Nardin, "Nonintervention and Human Rights", The Journal of Politics, 48 (1986), 86. 
367 Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 53. 
368 Slater, Jerome and Terry Nardin, "Nonintervention and Human Rights", 92. 
369 It is true that communitarians, in general, present legitimacy as resulting from the fit between 
community and its rulers, allowing for variation according to the community’s own 
tradition and morality. See Walzer, Michael, "The Moral Standing of States : A 
Response to Four Critics". However, legitimacy is still treated as a quality that might be 
possessed by institutions – in this case, states. There is variation across different 
communities, but a closer look should clarify context-specific criteria that are in most 
case non-contingent. 
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International Law 
In international law, the element of legitimacy usually follows two trends. 
First, an important part of the discipline, mainly positivist scholars, equates 
legitimacy to legality, using both terms interchangeably. Liberal and Kantian 
traditions frequently follow this equation. But although conceptions of legality 
and legitimacy constantly overlap, it would be misleading to reduce one to the 
other. Secondly, a branch of international law seeks to answer why nations obey 
rules, especially beyond realist self-interest and rational choice theory. For 
Thomas Franck,370 the answer for compliance lies in the legitimacy of rules, at 
least in the perception there of, because law itself or at least positive law can also 
be object of inquiries on its legitimacy371. In this approach, legitimacy is seen as 
“the capacity of a rule to pull those to whom it is addressed toward consensual 
compliance”.372 Franck’s book The Power of Legitimacy arguably inaugurates 
the current debate about legitimacy in the international level, at least in the 
English-speaking world.  The author then positions International Law and 
legitimacy in opposition to realism and theories that consider exclusively rational 
choice and self-interest. 
                                                
370 Franck, Thomas M., "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International 
Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium"; Franck, Thomas M., "Legitimacy in the 
International System"; Franck, Thomas M., The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
371 When it comes to agreeing on the legitimacy of rules and laws, Franck clearly prioritizes 
perception over facts: “Unfortunately, the facts of state behaviour are less important than 
the perceptions. It is the perception of habitual noncompliance that determines the toll 
unlawful behaviour actually takes on law's capacity to maintain social order.” Franck, 
Thomas M., "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law 
in an Age of Power Disequilibrium", 92. 
372 Ibid.: 93. For an alternative view of legitimacy as justification of authority, see Bodansky, 
Daniel, "The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law?", The American Journal of International Law, 93 
(1999). 
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More than pointing at Law as a source of legitimacy, as would be 
expected, international law also focuses on the legitimacy of rules in the 
international arena and its consequences for the compliance of, above all, states. 
The work of Franck and other schoalrs is relevant to counter the claims that state 
behaviour is the output of nothing but rational choice and interest. Moreover, the 
discipline also provides interesting insights on the legal aspects of 
“regionalization of humanitarian rescue”373 and on the legal aspects surrounding 
the use of force in international relations. 
EU studies, regionalism and regional integration 
While most of the debate around legitimacy in social sciences was 
restricted to the national level, the body of literature on EU studies appeared as 
an exception. The discipline early interest in legitimacy beyond borders is 
certainly due to the highly visible transfer of authority – from the member-states 
to the institutions composing the present day European Union – and to the 
discussions about the so-called legitimacy deficit of European integration. 
Legitimacy of the European Union, therefore, forms a body of literature on its 
own374 that is only recently being expanded, and compared to other organizations 
in other regions of the world. 
                                                
373 Franck, Thomas M., "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International 
Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium", 100; See also: Hickey, James E., "Challenges 
to Security Council Monopoly Power Over the Use of Force in Enforcement Actions: 
The Case of Regional Organizations", Ius Gentium, 10 (2004), 1-24. 
374 For a assessment of the of the EU based on normative criteria of democratic legitimacy, see 
Moravcsik, Andrew, "In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy 
in the European Union", Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (2002), 603-24. For an 
example of use of opinion pools in the descriptive approach, see: Ehin, Piret, 
"Competing Models of EU Legitimacy: the Test of Popular Expectations", Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 46 (2008), 619-40. For a study of symbolic practices of 
legitimation, see: Foret, François, Légitimer l'Europe : Pouvoir et symbolique à l'ère de 
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In EU studies375, Fritz Scharpf’s functional approach376 to legitimacy is 
probably the most popular scholarship. The author proposes a dichotomy 
between input and output ‘legitimizing functions’. Output refers to “effective 
governmental steering in the public interest”377. Hence, it focuses then on the 
results of said institutions, their effectiveness in providing goods and services to 
the population. Input legitimacy is “oriented at collective decision making and 
realizing the public will” 378 . Simply put, output legitimacy refers to the 
government for the people while input legitimacy refers to government by the 
people.379 This research shows in chapter 5 that while both elements in Scharpf’s 
dichotomy might serve as arguments in the legitimacy claims of regional 
organizations, there is a clear imbalance favouring output. 
Broad constructivism 
Arguably the most promising contribution to studies of legitimacy has 
been made by the broad constructivist scholarship in IR. First of all, 
constructivism makes room for inquiry on legitimacy by breaking with the 
                                                                                                                               
la gouvernance. For analyses of European Commission’s discourses and claims of 
legitimacy, refer to: Biegoń, Dominika, "Specifying the Arena of Possibilities: Post-
structuralist Narrative Analysis and the European Commission's Legitimation 
Strategies"; Tsakatika, Myrto, "Claims to Legitimacy: The European Commission 
between Continuity and Change", Journal of Common Market Studies, 43 (2005), 193-
220.  
375  Other important reflections on EU’s legitimacy include: Telò, Mario, "Surviving through 
Legitimacy Crises: What Political Integration for Europe?," in Regions and Crises: New 
Challenges for Contemporary Regionalism, ed. L. Fioramonti (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012); Hansen, Lene and Michael C. Williams, "THe Myths of Europe: 
Legitimacy Community and the 'Crisis' of the EU", Journal of Common Market Studies, 
37 (1999), 133-49. 
376  Scharpf, Fritz W., "Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy"; Scharpf, Fritz W., "Problem 
Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU". 
377 Tholen, Berry, "RIOs, Legitimacy and Democracy: A Conceptual Clarification," in Closing or 
Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations, 
ed. A.R. Hoffmann and A.v.d. Vleuten (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 26. 
378 Ibid.: 21. 
379 For a more recent account of the dichotomy and the inclusion of a third element throughput 
legitimacy, see: Schmidt, Vivien A., "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European 
Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’".  
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materialistic view of international politics that is championed by realists and 
neoliberals. Alexander Wendt, for instance, in his Social Theory of International 
Politics, points to legitimacy as one of the three reasons for state’s compliance to 
systemic norms, the other two being coercion and self-interest, a classic 
Weberian argument.380  In the same line, Jens Steffek argues that “given the 
strong voluntary element in rule creation and rule following in the international 
system, international domination is even more dependent on legitimacy beliefs 
on the part of the ruled over than in any other [system].” 381  Hence, for 
constructivists, the international system is exactly the place where legitimacy 
should be studied legitimacy because coercion and sanctions are not applicable in 
every case and, by consequence, cannot explain all cases of states following 
rules, norms or commitments.382 Legitimacy, Ian Hurd claims, “is inherent in the 
constructivist approach”383. More importantly, by following constructivism, it is 
also possible to apply the concept of legitimacy in relation to international 
organizations and beyond: 
The actions of organizationally developed 
institutions can be described as legitimate or illegitimate, but 
so can the norms, rules, and principles that undergird and 
license these actions. […] This is true of domestic and 
international institutions.384 
                                                
380 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, 61.  
381  Steffek, Jens, "The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach", 
European Journal of International Relations, 9 (2003), 249-75: 260. 
382 Hurd, Ian, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics", 381. Hurd defines legitimacy 
as the “normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed, [and he 
is] interested strictly in the subjective feeling by a particular actor or set of actors that 
some rule is legitimate”. Therefore, the author, as constructivists in general, presents a 
sociological approach to legitimacy.  
383 Hurd, Ian, "After Anarchy: Legitimacy & Power in the United Nations Security Council", 2. 
384 Reus-Smit, Christian, "International Crises of Legitimacy", International Politics, 44 (2007), 
157-74: 159. 
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A more critical branch of constructivism gives a step further and breaks 
with the static view of international politics. It acknowledges and tries to 
understand the dynamics of the social processes, and the very construction of 
social environments composed by values, beliefs, and identities. With an eye on 
change, critical constructivist scholars are interested in the emergence of norms 
as new standards of legitimacy. 385  When it comes to use of force and 
intervention, constructivism analyses legitimacy primarily through the lens of a 
sociological approach. However, it offers more dynamic tools to explore beliefs 
and the justification process.386 For Christian Reus-Smit, constructivists should 
“pay attention to the discursive mechanisms that link intersubjective ideas of 
legitimate and rightful state action to constitutional fundamental institutions” 387. 
Therefore, constructivism’s conception of international politics points to 
the existence of hierarchical relationships of authority above the nation-state, 
allowing for considerations about legitimacy of such relations of domination. 
Secondly, it presents general commitments to understanding socialization and 
change, as well as material and ideational factors. Thirdly, constructivist scholars 
have recently paid attention to the process of justification of power and 
institutions, linking values and norms and presenting them as ever-changing 
standards of legitimacy. Thus, for these reasons, constructivist scholarship is in 
line with the framework of legitimation proposed in this research as well as 
notions such as the social ‘construction’ of regions and of security, threats and 
                                                
385 See, for example, the scholarship of Christian Reus-Smit: ibid.; Reus-Smit, Christian, "The 
Moral Purpose of the State",  (1999); Reus-Smit, Christian, "Liberal hierarchy and the 
licence to use force". See also: Risse, Thomas, "'Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in 
World Politics", International Organization, 54 (2000), 1-39. 
386 Chapter 4 details this process in relation to crisis management.  
387 Reus-Smit, Christian, "The Moral Purpose of the State", 26. 
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referent objects. Building on these assumptions, the section below argues to the 
use of legitimation instead of legitimacy as a tool for grasping the dynamic 
ideational aspects of security regionalism. 
2) Legitimacy as resulting from a process of legitimation 
It should be clear by now that legitimacy is an essentially contested 
concept.388 It is, as a consequence, impossible to reach a common position or a 
consensual methodology to study this ‘virtue’. Rather than offering an additional 
approach or definition, this research joins many scholars in considering 
legitimation instead of legitimacy as the research object. 389  Many reasons 
underpin this choice. First, no institution or policy can be considered inherently 
legitimate.390 On the contrary, power relations – and especially new relations 
such as those of IOs – are constantly subject to process of justification. Second, 
the study of legitimation offers a much more dynamic understanding of the social 
process behind consolidation and justification of power. While it is impossible to 
observe legitimacy in relation to abstract values, it is perfectly feasible to analyse 
the elements composing the legitimation process (e.g. communication, practices, 
debates, norms, etc.).  
Thirdly, the choice for legitimation allows the research to grasp moral 
values that permeate both institutions and audiences instead of simply putting 
                                                
388 Hurrelmann, Achim, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek, "Conclusion: Legitimacy - Making 
Sense of an Essentially Contested Concept," in Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, 
ed. A. Hurrelmann, S. Schneider, and J. Steffek (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2007), 229-30. 
389 A complete moratorium on the term legitimacy is unfeasible. The distinction should not be 
exaggerated because legitimation is, at the end of the day, about ascribing legitimacy, or 
at least aiming at it. But the use of legitimation avoids any understanding of legitimacy 
as something the institutions might posses as a ‘property’.  
390 Olsson, Christian, ""Legitimate Violence" in the Prose of Counterinsurgency: An Impossible 
Necessity?". 
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forward the researcher’s own values (normative approach) or a static description 
of people’s support (sociological approach), which is in itself a normative choice 
that privileges people’s beliefs as the sole ‘criteria’ for legitimacy. A choice for 
legitimation, it should be noted, tends to grasp insights from both traditional 
approaches to legitimacy. As David Beetham argues, by adding a more dynamic 
and mixed approach, “power relationship is not legitimate because people 
believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their 
beliefs”391. In this sense, beliefs are still important, but they are also normative 
beliefs to the extent that they are linked to the audience’s values and norms. 
Finally, legitimation reconciles the double nature of the relationship between 
legitimacy and power: legitimacy enhances power as a strategic value that can be 
appropriated, “while power facilitates the adoption of certain notions of 
legitimacy”392 because the powerful frames the discourses. In sum, the idea of 
legitimation solves this apparent incompatibility by pointing to the same social 
process by which rulers in position of power seek to legitimate themselves and 
use legitimation to enhance their power. 
Current phenomena of world politics such as globalization and the 
growing intrusive and authoritative elements of regional and international 
organizations’ policies represent a new moment of ‘openness’ to the concept of 
legitimacy 393 , with revisions contesting how to think about it, what are its 
requirements and the forms of legitimation. In the last decade, the literature on 
legitimation – or at least a dynamic nature of legitimacy – in the international 
                                                
391 Beetham, David, The Legitimation of Power, 11. 
392 Clark, Ian, International Legitimacy and World Society, 19.  
393 Hurrelmann, Achim, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek, "Introduction: Legitimacy in an Age 
of Global Politics." 
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realm has grown considerably,394  travelling between different traditions. The 
following sections draw on this literature to construct a conceptual framework of 
legitimation. Chapter 4 will then present the methodology. 
The phases of legitimation: the justification 
Political legitimation of ruling is best understood as a double-step 
process. Firstly, there is the justification of the unequal power relation: a relation 
of domination that is common to all political institutions (social structures, 
systems of rule, etc.). As Jean-Marc Coicaud argues, political legitimacy “does 
not scape the violence inherent in the differentiation of power.”395 In the same 
line, Jacques Lagroye sustains that a process of legitimation is closely related to 
violence to the extent that there is a tentative, headed by the rulers, of imposing 
to the ruled-over an “essentially unequal relation”.396 
This justification of the right to rule is usually associated with legitimacy 
claims, not always conscious, made by the rulers in a discursive act. As in Max 
Weber scholarship, systems of domination do not appeal to material or affectual 
forces alone, but “every such system attempts to establish and cultivate the belief 
                                                
394  Among this literature, four edited volumes deserve mention for their relevance to this 
research: Hurrelmann, Achim, Steffen Schneider, and Jens Steffek, Legitimacy in an 
Age of Global Politics., probably the most comprehensive theoretical exploration of the 
concept of legitimacy, the changing of its standards in the international, and the 
communicative dimension ; Coicaud, Jean-Marc and Hilary Charlesworth, Fault Lines 
of International Legitimacy., with contributions influenced by International Law, has 
chapters on use of force and interventions; Zaum, Dominik, Legitimating International 
Organizations., A rich set of case studies on the legitimation of international 
organizations, including the UN, the AU, and the EU; Hoffmann, Andrea Ribeiro and 
Anna Van Der Vleuten, Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in 
Regional Integration Organisations., to date and to my knowledge, the only volume 
focusing on regional organizations and legitimacy 
395  Coicaud, Jean-Marc, "Legitimacy, Across Borders and Over Time," in Fault Lines of 
International Legitimacy, ed. H. Charlesworth and J.-M. Coicaud (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 19. 
396 Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation," 408. 
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in its legitimacy”397. Rodney Barker398 follows the same trend, by analysing the 
phenomenon of what can be called self-legitimation, serving as more than an 
instrument of social control:399 
“Far from being mere trappings or even mere instruments to 
deceiving the masses, legitimation appears to provide for 
rulers goods that are valued in themselves”400 
Weber also shows that legitimation can be as much a bottom-up as a top-
down process. In other words, this means that not only the rulers attempt to 
legitimate the system and their actions, but also those subject to the domination 
might engage in discourses and practices that serve this purpose. Examples of the 
former are of course speeches of political leaders or practices such as national 
parades. Examples of the latter include participation in elections or political 
rallies demanding regime change. Furthermore, it is now safe to say that 
legitimation claims can address, be generated or be considered by actors outside 
the hierarchical structure, especially in the international realm. A common 
example is the mutual recognition among states of their existence as sovereign 
entities. 
These legitimacy claims constitute normative assessments. They are the 
actor’s own assessments of the institution’s design, principles and values; of the 
policies objectives, desired and previous outcomes; of the identity and values 
                                                
397 Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An outline of an Interpretative Sociology, 213. 
398 The suffix ‘self’ added to legitimation does not mean that the ruler ascribes legitimacy to 
itself, in its own right, and outside any social interaction. Legitimation is inherently 
social, and self-legitimation in this sense would be an oxymoron. See Reus-Smit, 
Christian, "International Crises of Legitimacy", 159. Rather, self-legitimation means that 
the ruler attempts to legitimate itself by practices and claims, or eventually does it 
unintentionally. 
399 Symons, Jonathan, "The legitimation of international organisations: examining the identity of 
the communities that grant legitimacy", Review of International Studies, 37 (2011), 
2557-83. 
400 Barker, Rodney, Legitimating Identities: the self-presentations of rulers and subjects, 17. 
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that are common to government and governed; and of the social environment in 
which the power relation takes place. Hence, as Lagroye argues, legitimation is 
about portraying the violence inherent to the political structure as something 
“tolerable if not desirable, [conceived] as a social necessity, or as a 
benefaction”401. And that is what legitimacy claims do. 
Arguments of legitimation 
This first step is a stricto sensu legitimation. It refers to the linking of the 
social reality – at least the perception of it – to the values and second order 
beliefs402 that are hold by the communities. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
the establishment of a match is not limited to portraying and adapting what is 
being legitimated to the values and beliefs of a community. The process is often 
about shaping normative contexts, identities, values, and conception of the good. 
The argumentation might mean ‘this system of rule is legitimate because it is 
compatible with our values’ as much as ‘the system upholds the values that we 
should believe in because this is who we are’. 
Thus, legitimation creates a correspondence between the perceived reality 
of social relations and the normative context and shared moral standards of 
different communities. The ‘borders’ of these communities also vary according 
to the issue: individuals and other organizations might be part of overlapping 
communities. Hence, legitimation is anchored on a series of arguments that 
                                                
401 Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation," 402. (translation mine) 
402 In this reasoning, a second order belief is understood as a deeper belief about what is right and 
wrong. A primary order belief, which is usually referred by the sociological approach, is 
the more direct belief on the rightfulness of ruling. 
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‘communicate’ with the “system of representations”403 (norms, world views, and 
prioritized goals) of a given community. Following Dominik Zaum404, we can 
say that this link established by legitimation can follow broadly three trends: a. it 
confirms the desirably or necessity of the status quo, sometimes by ruling out 
competing claims of authority; b. it expands the authoritative relation; or c. it can 
re-focus the legitimacy claim of the power structure in the event of change of 
normative values.  
 Chapter 4 develops an account of possible arguments for regional 
organizations and their security policies. As for now, it is safe to say that these 
general argument invoked by legitimation discourse might include: a focus on 
the outcome of policies such as their efficacy in promoting common good, 
appeals to peace and human rights, references to bureaucratic impartiality and 
rational-legal justifications, etc. This list is not exhaustive, and the weight of 
each argument, of course, varies across time and space. This variation is perhaps 
the most relevant lesson of an analysis of legitimation. Currently, liberal and 
democratic values are often raised while it is said that human rights might weight 
more than arguments of state-sovereignty in the international level. 
These arguments might also be developed in a dialectical manner in order 
to show the desirability or the necessity of the unequal power relations. Lagroye 
offers a historic example of kings that regularly displayed scenes of chaos, 
destruction and violence, in national parades and public manifestations, in order 
to demonstrate the necessity of the hierarchy of their government. Thus, it is a 
                                                
403 Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation." 
404 Zaum, Dominik, "International Organizations, Legitimacy, and Legitimation," 12. 
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dichotomy opposing, on one hand, order and security guaranteed by the 
institutions and the hierarchy in place, and on the other hand the chaos and 
insecurity without the social structure. 405  A much more recent example of 
legitimation by an opposition of this kind is the official video published by the 
European Commission following the award of the Nobel Prize to the EU.406 As 
expected, the video’s central argument is the role of regional integration in 
achieving peace on the continent. The dialectical argument is expressed when 
Robert Schumann is quoted saying that “Europe was not created [before], that is 
why we had the [Second World] War”. This clearly turns the EU into a social 
necessity in opposition to chaos and war. 
Two phases of legitimation: the response 
The second phase of legitimation is included in a lato sensu 
understanding of the phenomena. It refers not only to the acts that link – or have 
the potential to link – social reality and shared beliefs by means of justification, 
but also to the response of the audiences to legitimacy claims. The response, in a 
successful process of legitimation, is the social ‘sanction’: 
Legitimacy is a social concept in the deepest sense 
— it describes a phenomenon that is inherently social. As 
soon as we say that an actor has a ‘right’ to act, ‘right’ to 
rule, or a ‘right’ to govern, we are saying more than they 
have the capacity to do so. Rights are socially ordained, and 
an actor has a right to act, rule, or govern only if it is socially 
sanctioned. Similarly, when we say that an institution is 
rightful, and hence legitimate, we are saying that its norms, 
rules, and principles are socially endorsed. Legitimization is 
thus a discursive process in which the struggle to reach 
                                                
405 Chapter 6 presents this idea in more details. 
406 European Commission, Europe, from War to Peace, (2012), YouTube video, 4 December 
2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wjL0nTyeR4o. 01.03.2013 
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reasonable consensus presupposes the recognition of a fair 
and just authority to implement such rules.407 
The response to legitimation comes in the forms of active consent by 
discourse and behaviour, dispute to the claims of legitimacy, further demands 
from the public, or simply silence. Even if one overlooks the possible issues with 
the first three ‘responses’, it is the last one that presents a problem that, to my 
knowledge, has not been solved: if active consent – free from interests or 
coercion – ascribes legitimacy in a process of legitimation, at least to a certain 
degree and only momentarily since legitimation is a quasi-permanent affair, what 
about silence or absence of response? Does it mean a passive or tacit consent? 
Does it mean acceptance of the status quo? How can we know if the legitimacy 
claims even reached the audience if there is no reaction? Finally, whose response 
matter, should we care about the reaction of communities that are apparently 
outside the hierarchical structure and not affected to the organization’s policies? 
There is little consent in the literature providing answer to these 
questions. Actually, there is not even agreement on what constitutes a successful 
legitimation process or a ‘sufficient’ active consent in the first place. The 
answers remain largely subjective. If an institution endures and survives over 
time, for instance, this does not mean that the organization benefits from 
successful processes of legitimation because there are other factors playing a role 
in its survival. In many cases, especially in the security field, organizations tend 
to keep a low profile, even vis-à-vis their constituencies, who ignore the 
existence of the majority of IOs. Certainly, it is possible to look at institutional 
reforms as reactions to negative responses in the process of legitimation or to 
                                                
407 Reus-Smit, Christian, "International Crises of Legitimacy", 159. 
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changes in the normative context. However, once more, any conclusion would be 
problematic because other factors also play a role in institutional changes and 
reforms. 
Legitimation is not complete without the audience’s feedback. However, 
it is important to recognize that the choice for the adequate response – what 
grants legitimacy – is essentially a normative choice of the researcher and so is 
the choice for the identity of audiences ascribing it. As for now, we can be sure 
about legitimation crises, since they tend to be visible ‘disputes’ over the right to 
rule of a certain institution or a system of governance. An absence of debate only 
means that institutions or acts are legitimate if one normatively chooses to 
conclude s. Otherwise, silence may signify exactly the opposite: that the power 
relation exists, but is illegitimate due to lack of approval.408 
Furthermore, the ‘compatibility’ between systems of representations and 
political orders is not entirely a product of intentional calculations, but also 
results from variables that are not controlled by the authority409. It might seem 
obvious, but it is important to say that claims of legitimacy do not always 
produce the desired effect. On the contrary, claims or strategies of legitimation 
might have different effects in different communities, even negative responses, 
and they constantly face rival claims and (de)legitimation. It happens very 
frequently in the case of international organizations that the discourse does not 
reach certain audiences, or that certain communities are not even aware of the 
                                                
408 Beetham, for example, chooses to include active consent as a requirement in a successful 
process of legitimation: “what is important for legitimacy is evidence of consent 
expressed through actions which are understood as demonstrating consent within the 
convention of the particular society. [These actions] confer legitimacy, they contribute 
to make power legitimate” Beetham, David, The Legitimation of Power, 12. 
409 Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation," 463. 
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existence of such institutions despite suffering (or enjoying) the impact of their 
policies. It also happens that different IOs compete for the legitimate authority of 
implementing a policy or subjecting people to their system of rule. 
Levels of legitimation  
Fundamentally, legitimation refers to the justification of power by 
idealization (desirable power) or by rationalization (necessary power). Yet, 
drawing on Jacques Lagroye’s work 410 , it is possible to distinguish fours 
different levels of political legitimation. The first one concerns the power 
relation itself, the necessity and the desirability of a distinction between rulers 
and subjects, government and governed. The second level is about the 
legitimation of the existence of a specialized body of domination that exercises 
the legitimate coercion and is distinct from other forms of domination (e.g. 
economic, religious, etc.). The third level concerns the procedures of domination: 
how the power is exerted, how rulers are nominated, and how the political 
relation is actually established within the society. Finally, the last level relates to 
the individual or the group that is exerting power in an authoritative relation. 
Thus, a process of political legitimation, or de-legitimation, may touch upon one 
or a combination of these four levels. For example, one can contest the leader 
and the institutional design in place while asserting the necessity of the very 
same specialized body. The figure below illustrates all the four levels. 
                                                
410 Ibid.: 398-9. 
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Figure 3. Levels of Political Legitimation 
 
It follows logically that different institutions face legitimation challenges 
in different combinations of the four levels. A closer look at international politics 
shows why this division is relevant. In this research, for example, it is claimed 
that while the legitimation of and in national communities concerns mainly the 
last two levels – the rulers and the procedures of domination – the legitimation of 
regional security organizations happens in deeper levels: the justification of the 
existence of an additional specialized body of domination (why should we have 
an additional institution?) and even the power relation itself (why should we be 
subject to a power relation outside borders?). In other words, the legitimation of 
states as specialized bodies of domination is taken for granted. Even during 
massive protests or revolutions, the existence and the moral standing of the state 
is seldom put in danger and separatist movements tend to aspire to a state of their 
own. International and regional organizations in turn still struggle for more solid 
grounds on which base their claims of authority. 
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And so what? What is self-legitimation after all? 
According to what has been proposed in the sub-sections (a) to (d) and to 
this research’s focus on the legitimacy claims that are made by the organizations 
themselves as detailed in the next chapter, it is now possible to propose a 
conceptual framework of self-legitimation of general applicability, which 
includes regional organizations. Thus, self-legitimation is here understood as an 
auto-referential discourse, intentional or unintentional, made by one or a set of 
actors in the position of authority within a system of political domination, that is 
capable of justifying one or more of the four elements of the unequal power 
relations by linking its social reality to an audience’s system of representation. 
The self-legitimation process, as legitimation in general, appeals to multiple 
arguments by rationalizing or idealizing the power relation. The figure below 
illustrates this proposal. 
Figure 4. The Process of Legitimation 
 
A look at figure 4 summarizes the two phases of legitimation and helps 
see it as a constant feedback between rules and different communities that serve 
as audiences, falling both within and outside the hierarchy. What is important to 
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this research is the fact that the legitimating discourse makes constant reference 
to institutional acts (policies, decisions, laws, etc.). Hence, one of the 
assumptions, following Steffek411, is that discourse helps to ‘make sense’ of 
institutional actions and therefore legitimates them, the organization and/or the 
system of governance. Finally, of the three main elements of the legitimation 
process shown in figure 4, legitimating discourse, symbolic practices, and the 
audiences’ responses, this research focuses on the first one. More specifically, on 
the public discourse of legitimation: its arguments and how it articulates and 
makes sense the institution’s actions of the lack thereof. 
And so what? What can we learn from legitimation? 
As it should be clear by now, this research is anchored on a threefold 
assumption: that “authority requires legitimacy, not mere influence or power,”412 
that power constantly seeks to legitimate itself, and that legitimation and self-
legitimation are “part of the activity of ruling, and as such contributes to both 
constituting and defining it”.413 
The lovers of naked power are far less typical than 
those who aspire to clothe themselves in the mantle of 
legitimate authority; emperors may be nude, but they do not 
like to be so, to think themselves so, or to be regarded as 
so.414 
                                                
411 Steffek, Jens, "Tales of Function and Form: The Discursive Legitimation of International 
Technocracy", Normative Orders Working Paper, 2 (2011); Steffek, Jens, "The 
Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach"; Steffek, Jens, 
"Discursive legitimation in environmental governance", Forest Policy and Economics, 
11 (2009), 313-18. 
412 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, 208. 
413 Barker, Rodney, Legitimating Identities: the self-presentations of rulers and subjects, 30; See 
also: Weber, Max, "Politics as Vocation."; Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation." 
414 Claude Jr., Inis L., "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations", 
368. 
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The rulers ‘clothe themselves in the mantle of legitimate authority’ by 
means of legitimation. But what can we learn from this and why should a 
research focus on this legitimation process of regional security organizations and 
their actions of crisis management? First, as Barker argues 415 , rulers and 
authorities spend much of their time and energy legitimating themselves and 
their peers. Because they are at the centre of political life and of political science 
research, what authorities and governments constantly do, and spend energy 
doing, is inherently relevant to the discipline. 
The second reason refers to the importance of grasping beliefs and the 
normative context in international politics. Beliefs about legitimate intervention, 
Martha Finnemore argues, “constitute certain behavioural possibilities and, in 
that sense, cause them.”416 Policies of crisis management, as in the case of other 
policies, must be justified in terms of standards shared by a given community. 
And this activity of moral persuasion helps explain the values that we hold and 
that constitute the institutions.417  Hence, it is possible to say that the set of 
justifications for actions reflect not only the actors’ own beliefs, but at least a 
part of the shared normative context.  
“It is true that justification does not equal motivation, [but] 
justification is important because it speaks directly to 
normative context. When states justify their interventions, they 
                                                
415 Barker, Rodney, Legitimating Identities: the self-presentations of rulers and subjects. Barker’s 
work focuses on the legitimation of rulers to themselves. In other words, the leaders 
constitute their own audiences of legitimation. Even though this aspect is also important, 
I choose to look at public legitimation addressing parts other than the leaders 
themselves.  
416 Finnemore, Martha, The Purpose of Intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force, 15. 
Finnemore clarifies that the causality expressed in the sentenced is not one of the “if X 
then Y” fashion in the sense that if beliefs exist then intervention must follow, but rather 
in the sense of making possible and conceivable. 
417 On this aspect, see: Reus-Smit, Christian, "International Crises of Legitimacy"; Reus-Smit, 
Christian, "The Moral Purpose of the State". 
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are drawing on and articulating shared values and expectations 
held by other decision makers and other publics in other states. 
It is literally an attempt to connect one's actions to standards of 
justice or, perhaps more generically, to standards of 
appropriate and acceptable behaviour.”418 
This research does not claim to offer a full account of the normative 
context only by looking at discourses of self-legitimation. Nonetheless, such a 
study might certainly help to grasp at least the normative elements in the eyes of 
the beholders. It is possible, at least in part, to “piece together what those 
internationally held standards are and how [and if] they change over time”419 and 
this in relation to security regionalism, regional organizations, security 
governance and crisis management.  
Conclusion 
The multiple universal definitions of legitimacy do not hold in front of 
different contexts, much less in different times and in regards to the multitude of 
political institutions impacting or concerning various political communities. 
What makes institutions, their acts and decisions, and eventually systems of 
governance legitimate are sets of successful processes of legitimation. The moral 
underpinnings of these processes – the arguments of legitimation – vary over 
time, but the process of legitimation is always present. Contrary to legitimacy, 
the study of legitimation is not an end in itself, but rather a tool to grasp the main 
moral and normative claims laid down in the assessment of an institution or its 
                                                
418 Finnemore, Martha, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. P.J. Katzenstein (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 159. Finnemore account of interventions is 
statecentric as she focuses almost exclusively on states’ interests on humanitarian 
intervention and only talks about IOs as necessary to legitimacy of states actions, but 
only as rational-legal bodies. Nevertheless, there is an important element of actorness of 
IOs in her account. 
419 Finnemore, Martha, The Purpose of Intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force, 15. 
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acts as well as the normative underpinnings of the international community and 
its multiple audiences. This chapter also shows that it is possible to build upon 
the recently developed literature on legitimation in the international level as well 
on the broad constructivist tradition, to explore the process behind the 
consolidation of regional security organizations as polities in their own right and 
the justification of their acts. 
Both legitimating arguments and legitimacy judgments reveal important 
aspects of normative underpinnings of a given society, from local to 
international. This work focuses on the former – the act of justification – and 
defines discursive self-legitimation accordingly as an auto-referential discourse, 
intentional or unintentional, constructed by one or a set of actors in the position 
of authority within a system of political domination, that is capable of justifying 
one or more of the four elements of the unequal power relations by linking its 
social reality to an audience’s system of representation. By analysing the 
discourse produced by regional organizations when they justify their responses 
of crisis management, the main goal is to grasp standards of legitimacy that are 
commonly held by the participants in the regional security governance. The next 
chapter focuses on the methodology of how to grasp these elements.  
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Chapter 4 
LEGITIMATION OF REGIONAL SECURITY 
ORGANIZATIONS’ POLICIES 
 
The fundamental problem of politics is the justification of 
power. Power represents a problem; it is frightening, and 
needs to be harnessed and directed. […] it must be justified 
by reference to some source outside or beyond itself, and thus 
be transformed into 'authority'. 420 
 
Political legitimacy “is both internal to actors and intersubjective […] it is 
not readily accessible to outside observer.”421 Therefore, an empirical inquiry on 
legitimacy has to be done indirectly. The concept of legitimation as presented in 
chapter 3 allows for this inquiry on the legitimating arguments. It underpins this 
research’s methodology and method. This chapter connects the conceptual and 
theoretical framework of legitimation with security regionalism by presenting 
how we can grasp the arguments raised by regional security organizations when 
they publicly legitimate their security policies. 
1) Legitimation: a framework for acts and policies of RSOs 
As presented in chapter 3, the process of legitimation can be broken down 
into different components among which the object of legitimation, the 
legitimating actors, and the audience of legitimation. The process of legitimation 
of security regionalism and its policies contains particular features worth 
                                                
420 Wight, Martin, International Theory: The Three Traditions, 99. 
421 Hurd, Ian, "After Anarchy: Legitimacy & Power in the United Nations Security Council", 8. 
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mentioning upfront. This first section aims at detailing these different elements 
in relation to the case studies and what to expect in the empirical analysis that 
follows in the next four chapters. 
The object of legitimation 
The same way legitimacy and illegitimacy are said to be collectively 
attributed to both “actions and status”422, there can be largely two objects for 
political legitimation if one is to break down the idea of ‘system of domination’: 
the organizations themselves as bureaucracies423  and their actions. A similar 
understanding, distinguish between the legitimation on the level of the 
specialized body of domination, on the one hand, and the procedures of 
domination, on the other424 . This translates roughly into the legitimation of 
regional organizations as specialized bodies and of their policies as procedures of 
domination, both of which constitute the system of domination. In this research, 
two reasons justify the choice of focusing on actions over status. 
Firstly, the current literature on regional and international organizations 
remains largely focused on the legitimation of ‘entities’, institutions, rules of the 
game, or regimes.425 But this is only part of the process. On the one hand, a 
                                                
422 Brewer, Thomas L., "Collective Legitimization in International Organizations: Concept and 
Practice", 78. 
423 Finnemore, Martha and Michael Barnett, Rules for the World, International organizations in 
global politics. 
424 Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation." See chapter 3. 
425  See for recent examples: Zaum, Dominik, Legitimating International Organizations; 
Hoffmann, Andrea Ribeiro and Anna Van Der Vleuten, Closing or Widening the Gap? 
Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organisations. for a collection on 
the legitimation – albeit with different approaches in relation to this thesis – of a variety 
of regional organizations; Sternberg, Claudia S., The Struggle for EU Legitimacy: 
Public Contestation, 1950–2005; Foret, François, Légitimer l'Europe : Pouvoir et 
symbolique à l'ère de la gouvernance; Biegoń, Dominika, "Specifying the Arena of 
Possibilities: Post-structuralist Narrative Analysis and the European Commission's 
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successful legitimation of actions should, ceteris paribus, enhance or serve as an 
argument in the legitimation of the organization and the ruling system as a 
whole. It is possible to argue, for example, that an organization might attempt to 
legitimate itself exactly by legitimating its actions. On the other, activities 
perceived as illegitimate risk to cast doubt on the legitimacy of an entity.426 
When it is said that NATO found a raison d’être in its intervention in the 
Balkans, or that the UN faced a crisis because it failed to respond to the genocide 
in Rwanda, it becomes clear that there is a connection between the legitimation 
of policies – or of the absence of policies – and the legitimation of organizations. 
And this interplay depends on the portrayed relevance of the issue in relation to 
the existence of the institution427 and the very interaction with other policies. 
Yet, the legitimation of actions “continues to be neglected”428. This focus limits 
the scholarship to only one aspect of legitimation and ignores the need to 
legitimate actions. Hence, this research might help to fill this gap.  
Secondly, the legitimation of security missions or at least the violence 
and the crises they are supposed to address are certainly among the most visible 
elements of security governance. A classic assumption would imply that force 
and coercion are legitimate when used by a legitimate government within its 
                                                                                                                               
Legitimation Strategies"; Delcourt, Barbara, "Usages du droit international dans le 
processus de legitimation de la politique exterieure europeenne". for a research on the 
legitimation of the European Union and the integration project, the European 
Commission, and the European Security and Foreign Policy respectively. 
426 Coleman, Katharina P., International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of 
International Legitimacy, 23-4. 
427 The term institution is here used as a replacement to organization to avoid repetition, but 
conceptually organizations are one type of institution (see chapter 1) as much as 
established patterns of activities are also considered institutions in many accounts. See, 
for example: Keohane, Robert O., "International Institutions: Two Approaches", 
International Studies Quarterly, 32 (1988), 379-96: 383. 
428 Coleman, Katharina P., International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of 
International Legitimacy, 21. 
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territory. But to say that is to ignore, on the one hand, the whole idea of 
legitimacy as a permanently constructed in a social interaction of legitimation 
and, on the other, the issue of force used beyond a government’s territory or 
framed by an institution other than the state. Arguments legitimating actions may 
refer to the perceived legitimacy of the organization behind them, but that is 
certainly not the full picture. An analysis of the legitimation of security missions 
is important not only because of its influence in the institution’s legitimation but 
also because these are security missions involving special allocation of resources, 
urgency and, last but not least, possible use of coercion and force. An analysis of 
legitimation of actions is also in line with the organizations’ own vocabulary, 
contesting and claiming legitimacy for their policies more often than for their 
status as political institutions. 
Thus, while in this thesis the object of research is the set of legitimating 
arguments put forward by RSOs, the objects of legitimation are the actions of 
RSOs that are related to the conflictual context in Darfur, Sudan. A practical 
consequence of the focus on actions of ‘crisis management’ is that both the 
legitimation discourses and the struggle for legitimacy tend to intensify in key 
moments of time such as the period when a crisis calls international attention by 
the escalation of violence, the period around the launching of the mission and 
around its conclusion as well as case-by-case situations such as the high number 
of casualties, accusations of corruption or even a mission’s anniversary. That’s 
why we pay especial attention to the arguments that relate to security missions 
initiated by regional organizations, as they constitute the most visible responses 
to the crisis in Darfur. 
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Security missions are actions (procedures of domination) of regional 
organizations (bodies of domination). The examples of the international response 
to the crises in Darfur, Chad, and CAR such as UNAMID, EUFOR, AMIS and 
MINURCAT can be considered peace operations, at least according to the 
following definition: 
Peace operations involve the dispatch of 
expeditionary forces, with or without a United Nations (UN) 
mandate, to implement an agreement between warring states 
or factions, which may (or may not) include enforcing that 
agreement in the face of wilful defiance.429 
These operations have an element of coercion since the ‘force’, even if 
symbolic, is present in various levels of military hardware and personnel and 
might in this sense be used. But the possibility or the actual use of force do not 
turn these missions into humanitarian interventions in its strict sense, meaning 
the punishment actions without the consent of the host state.430 
The implication is exactly that the consent of the host country can be, and 
usually is, invoked by the organization as to support its legitimacy claim. The 
consent serves as an argument of legitimation. While interventions without state 
consent are certainly more sensitive, especially in relation to issues of 
sovereignty and occasionally UN’s primacy, ‘ordinary’ missions must also be 
legitimated. They also cost social and financial resources to the detriment of 
other policies, mobilize troops and military assets, constitute an intervention 
from the outside, involve multiple stakeholders, and still include the possibility 
                                                
429 Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace?: Regionalization and 
Contemporary Peace Operations", 157. 
430  For the debates on the definition of humanitarian intervention, see Welsh, Jennifer, ed. 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004).  
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of the use of force in self-defence or to enforce measures according to the 
agreements between warring parties or between the host state and the 
interveners. 
These operations could fit, however, broader definitions of 
(humanitarian) intervention such as the deployment “of military force across 
borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from manmade 
violence”431. But it must be said that for a mission initiated and mandated by 
regional organizations, the ideas of protecting foreign nationals with a 
deployment of force across borders might make little sense. When the AU 
implements a mission in Darfur, for instance, it acts within the border of its 
member states and within its own ‘borders’ as an international organization. 
Moreover, it does not act to protect foreign nationals, but nationals of its member 
states. These terms make more sense in the case of the EU intervening in Africa 
and this is one of the reasons why studying the case of two regional 
organizations is important. 
Given this variety of actions by regional organizations, including the 
EU’s Support Mission to AMIS that could hardly be considered an operation, it 
is preferable to group them around the term of security missions.432 They are 
missions and not general policies since they constitute tasks assigned to a group 
sent for a period of time, and they are security missions because the task is to 
address perceived and constructed security issues and because of the already 
mentioned characters of urgency and prioritization, and especial allocation of 
                                                
431 Finnemore, Martha, The Purpose of Intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force, 53. 
432 The terms ‘intervention’, ‘military operation’ and ‘peace operation’ might still be used to 
avoid repetition.  
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resources433. But it is also important to look at the so-called policies of crisis 
management since the international response to Darfur, as seen in chapter 2, 
encompasses much more action than security missions of monitoring or 
protection. 
There is a crucial difference between, on the one side, the legitimation of 
security missions and policies and indirectly that of regional organizations and, 
on the other side, the traditional attempts by national states to legitimate their 
supposed monopoly over violence and use of force. In security governance, by 
its heterarchical nature, one does not speak of legitimation of monopoly of 
violence and force of the state. On the contrary, the legitimation of regional 
organizations acting in security governance, even if only their bureaucracies, 
potentially adds one more ‘layer’ of a perceived rightful use of force. RSOs do 
not claim to have such monopoly nor could they. What is being legitimated is the 
‘place’ of their missions and their acts in relation to a crisis as well as their own 
standing within a heterarchical system of security governance. 
Finally, it must be said that the focus on security missions is precisely 
only a focus because missions are the most visible, and possibly controversial, 
policies. But the focus does not exclude the other policies and acts by RSOs in 
relation to the conflicts in Darfur, Chad, and CAR. On the contrary, it is the 
whole set of responses to this context that is taken into account. In this regard, 
instead of organizations behind security operations, the AU appears for example 
as the ‘mediator’ while the EU acts as the ‘financer’. In many instances, it is 
actually impossible to separate the arguments that relate to specific missions or 
                                                
433 See chapter 1. 
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to the more general reaction to the crisis and the assessment of the situation. 
Furthermore, even if methodologically possible, to work exclusively with 
arguments on missions would be to miss much of the discourse that justifies the 
inaction of these organizations in front of what was expected from them: ‘if 
RSOs cannot act as expected, what else are they doing that justify their status, or 
their existence as specialized bodies of domination?’  
Legitimating actors 
The proposed approach to legitimation allows for multiple actors434 to 
engage in the struggle for justifying their existence but also that of other 
organizations and their actions. Different actors participate in the legitimation as 
well as in the delegitimation of an institution. In theory, even a discourse that is 
not intended as (de)legitimation might be taken and reproduced as such 
depending of the public’s reaction and acceptance. The idea of a system of 
governance implies that what is being justified is not only an institution and its 
acts, but also its place within the system and by consequence the place of others 
and the very architecture of, in this case, security governance. 
It is safe to say that when a RSO attempts to legitimate its place within 
the current system, it also contributes to set the boundaries of other entities, 
including its peers. A security mission of the African Union, for example, might 
be legitimated by arguments coming from its member-states’ governments, the 
local, regional and global media, scholars from within and outside the region, 
                                                
434 The word ‘actor’ is being used independently from theoretical debates within IR literature that 
relate the concept to an entity’s autonomy and sovereignty as well as the criteria for 
actorness in the international system. In this chapter, the term actor simply refers to 
those behind the utterances of legitimation. 
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various civil society groups, and many others. It might also be indirectly 
legitimated by the European Union attempting to legitimate one of its security 
missions anywhere else in the world that helped asserting the place of RSOs as 
security providers or by a previous UN declaration on the importance of regional 
organization in crisis management. 
This research, however, looks at the legitimation discourse produced by 
the organizations themselves in an exercise of self-legitimation. To consider self-
legitimation is to take legitimating actors and objects potentially legitimated as 
somehow overlapping elements in the process. The self-legitimating discourse is 
perhaps the only that, in one way or another, is constantly present as every 
system of domination attempts to justify itself but also does not act without 
justifying it and by doing so, as Gelson Fonseca argues, it “pays its tribute” to the 
values of certain historical epoch435. If, as Weber sustained, legitimation is a two 
way process, bottom-up and top-down legitimacy claims, we focus on the latter. 
The choice for the discourse produced by regional organizations usually 
raises two questions. The first one refers to how much of the discourse can be 
considered as being genuinely produced by organizations themselves and not just 
a reproduction of the member-states’ discourses. This question echoes the fact 
that in the security field the inter-governmental character is even more prevalent. 
But it misses the point because RSOs are constituted exactly by their 
bureaucracies and the member-states. The discourse is indeed negotiated by 
member-states and multiple bureaucrats according to institutional practices, and 
                                                
435  Fonseca Jr., Gelson, "Legitimidade Internacional: Uma Aproximação Didática," in 
Legitimidade e Outras Questões Internacionais (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1998), 148-9. 
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it might very well be proposed or modified by a number of key states involved in 
decision-making. Nevertheless, what eventually comes out as product of this the 
‘negotiation’ is the organization’s discourse, even if it is little more than a 
consensus between member-states and, to a certain degree, the bureaucracy. 
The second question refers to who ‘speaks for’ the RSOs that are being 
taken as self-legitimating actors – the European Union and the African Union. 
This question refers to the organizational structure of these institutions and the 
bodies that are responsible for foreign and security policies and therefore 
participate in justifying the missions. In the case of the EU, both the Council of 
the EU and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
are directly associated with the organization’s security missions. Thus, the 
rotating presidency of the Council has an important role to play, at least before 
the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Subordinated bodies such as the EU 
Military Staff also produce material of their own like the magazine Impetus. 
From 2010 onwards, one might also expect utterances from the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). Finally, the European Council might also offer 
glimpses on the general trends in term of foreign and security policies. 
For the African Union, there are two main bodies, which are somehow 
analogue to the EU’s Council and High Representative when it comes to foreign 
policy. First, there is the AU Commission and mainly the person of the 
Commissioner who periodically issues statements and reports on the missions of 
the organization. Second, the AU has a Peace and Security Council (PSC), which 
is composed by 15 members from Africa’s five larger regions, and issues 
additional press releases, reports, presidential statement and the like. In 
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comparison, the amount of public discourse from the African Union is much 
smaller than that of the European Union, but since the crisis in Darfur was 
naturally an ‘African problem’, the data collection provided a similar number of 
documents, as detailed later in this present chapter. 
Audiences and targets of legitimation 
Since legitimation is a social process, it is about trying to connect what is 
being legitimated to a social group, the audience. Audiences of legitimation are 
those in whose view the objects are being legitimated. For national states, for 
example, political theory literature traditionally points to citizens as audience at 
the same time as IR scholarship points to states’ peers as the audience within a 
kind of international society. But the picture is certainly more complex if one 
considers other entities and policies such as regional organizations and their 
missions. 
An interesting example of an attempt to identify the audiences for 
legitimacy is offered by Jonathan Symons436. His framework reflects a choice for 
audiences that are instrumentally relevant to the institution so that is a. ensures 
the subjects’ compliance, b. strategically interacts with its peers and other 
organizations, and c. satisfies the subjective needs of the rulers in place that also 
want to see themselves as legitimate. Yet, one could think of, for example, an 
audience that is not instrumentally relevant for the institution’s survival, but is 
still affected by its policies or even an audience that is not directly linked to the 
institution or to its policies but still ponders about its legitimacy. As the previous 
                                                
436 Symons, Jonathan, "The legitimation of international organisations: examining the identity of 
the communities that grant legitimacy". 
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chapter has shown, even this choice of audience is normative in the sense of an 
arbitrary prioritization. 
When analyzing self-legitimation, it could be useful to think about 
audiences in terms of targets of the legitimation437, meaning the social groups 
that are actively sought by the legitimating actor. Once more, examples of such 
targets include “not only domestic publics but also foreign publics. Government 
and segments of publics may also be considered as targets.” 438  Attempts to 
identify targets in relation to crisis management have also been done. Focusing 
on legitimation for peace enforcement operations launched by a state, Katharina 
Coleman439 presents at least fours audiences: the state’s domestic public, the 
public in the host country, the immediate neighbors, and the international 
community. With a similar focus on military intervention, Christian Olsson 
identifies at least a double layer of audiences: “the international legitimation vis-
à-vis other governments and the local legitimation vis-à-vis the population in the 
intervened state.”440 
These typologies, presenting different levels of detail, could be also used 
for any kind of international security policy including security missions by 
regional organizations. The example of the EU security mission EUFOR in Chad 
and CAR, illustrates how many audiences could be actually targeted if we 
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assume that legitimation was, at least in part, intentional: the European citizens; 
the EU member-states, their governments? The UN and other international or 
regional organizations? The population in Chad and CAR, the Sudanese refugees 
in their territory, and the African Union and its member-states? And what of 
countries such as China and the United States, which are also active in the 
region? We can go as far as saying that European officials would legitimate their 
action to themselves, so they see themselves as legitimate, which is another 
reading of the self in the self-legitimation. 441  The list could go on and the 
possibilities are virtually endless. A strict interpretation of ‘target’, however, 
would be at odds with the definition of legitimation as being intentional or 
unintentional. 
Drawing on a concept of the English School and on her empirical work, 
Coleman eventually suggests the international society of states is the main 
audience for peace operations.442 This conclusion raises a question specific to 
regionalism: if an intervener state is likely to perceive the society of states as its 
main audience, would RSOs also perceive their peers as their audiences in 
addition to states? Ultimately, of course, this distinction is hardly visible since 
RSOs are both bureaucracies and member states. Perhaps these bureaucracies are 
first and foremost interested in the small community of states that is their own, 
and this could be motivated by one of these member states that takes the lead 
within the bureaucracy and pushes for a particular mission. However, this 
legitimation is arguably more private than public in the sense that it happens 
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behind the doors of closed meeting at the Peace and Security Council and at the 
Political and Security Committee. 
Targeted audiences are actually hardly distinguishable at the RSOs’ 
public discourses. To point to specific targets would be no more than an educated 
guess, if ever there was a specific target these organizations are aiming at since 
legitimation might be, as defined in chapter 3, unintentional. On the contrary, 
discourses seem to be targeting a broad community most of the time. Thus, the 
idea of public legitimation, with discourses in the public domain rather than 
private443, seems to be the way around this question. In the terms of discursive 
institutionalism, we focus not on the “coordinative discourse” among policy 
actors, but rather on a top-down “communicative discourse” between political 
elites and the public “in which ideas developed in the coordinative sphere are 
conveyed by political entrepreneurs and ‘ideational leaders’”444. 
Although the actual audience that ‘listens’ to the legitimation discourse 
varies in case-by-case, it is arguably the international community – a vague term 
that includes, among other groups, states and governments, transnational and 
domestic civil society and international media – which can be considered the 
potential audience of RSOs. This thesis main goal is not to identify the audience, 
but to analyze the content of the discourses of legitimation. Thus, to take the 
international community as the audience of the public legitimation means that the 
discourse is not adapted to specific groups, but rather constructed in ways that 
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connect it to a large public. This does not mean that the language is more 
intelligible or that the discourse actually reaches many different groups that are 
not interested in security missions by regional organizations. Rather, it means 
that the arguments within the discourse are vague enough to fit different 
audiences and might as well point to a general normative context of security 
governance and peace operations. The arguments are not tailored to reflect only 
the perceived values of a unique audience. In other words, the analysis of the 
RSO self-legitimation of security-related actions to the international community 
‘speaks the normative context’ at least as far as this context is perceived by the 
RSOs themselves. 
2) Legitimation and self-legitimation of security policies 
Chapter 3 situates this research in the broad literature of IR 
constructivism for the simple reason, among others, that this scholarship allows 
for the study of non-material factors and dynamic social processes. The study of 
legitimacy, even if done indirectly, demands the assumption that ‘things’ like 
norms, ideas, and discourses are relevant in international politics. But to locate 
the research inside IR constructivist tradition only informs the research object, 
which is above all ideational instead of material. It does not however necessarily 
imply a methodology for the study of legitimation445 nor does it informs the 
epistemological stance, which could range from neo-positivist proposal of casual 
mechanisms to post-structuralist unveiling of power relations, for example. This 
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section fills this final gap by adhering to a methodology to the study of 
legitimation. 
First of all, one must note that the framework of self-legitimation here 
proposed is essentially an ideal-type, meaning that it is a set of 
oversimplifications of complex worldly situations. As such, it prioritizes certain 
elements in detriment of others: 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided 
accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less 
present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
phenomena which are arranged according to those one-
sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct 
cannot be found empirically anywhere lo reality. It is a 
utopia.446 
It is not a contemplation of the independent reality as series of casual 
mechanisms that can be falsified, but rather the proposition or the construction of 
a reality based on social facts and experiences. Hence, the purpose is to 
contribute to knowledge by increasing the comprehension of security regionalism 
from an intersubjective standpoint and it should be assessed according to its 
usefulness to do so and to generate insights into concrete cases.447 
On discourse, rhetoric, and narrative of legitimation 
Legitimation establishes a link between the perceived objective ‘reality’ 
and the values held by social groups in a process that boils down to justification, 
a process of ‘giving reasons’. As such, by examining these justifications, “we can 
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begin to piece together what those internationally held standards [the normative 
context] are and how they may change over time”448. Arguments invoke and 
relate to norms, understood in accordance to IR constructivist tradition as shared 
expectations of behaviour in a community of actors.449 At least three ‘concepts’ 
might link the institutional reality and the community’ values, but that we call it 
rhetoric450 , discourse451 , or narrative452  it is of marginal importance for the 
purposes of this research. Legitimation arguments most certainly travel through 
discourses because discourses constitute “ensembles of ideas […] through which 
meaning is given to social as well as physical phenomena” 453, in this case the 
phenomenon of security policies of RSOs. But because the focus is on verbal 
rather than on non-verbal practices, one can also claim that the focus is on 
rhetoric “that includes all speech acts — whether they are oral or written”454.  
The acquisition and maintenance of rule ultimately 
hinge as much on legitimacy as on physical coercion, and 
such legitimacy can be established only through rhetorical 
action.455 
Finally, as long as rhetoric and discourse ‘tell a story’ they also constitute 
narratives, which “must entail characters and a plot that evolves over time”456. 
Discourse, narrative, and rhetoric are best seen as ‘vehicles’ that propagate the 
content and meanings of legitimation arguments. By saying, in addition to doing 
                                                
448 Finnemore, Martha, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," 159. 
449 Coleman, Katharina P., International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of 
International Legitimacy, 27. 
450 Krebs, R. R. and Patrick T. Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of 
Political Rhetoric", European Journal of International Relations, 13 (2007), 35-66. 
451 Steffek, Jens, "Discursive legitimation in environmental governance". 
452  Biegoń, Dominika, "Specifying the Arena of Possibilities: Post-structuralist Narrative 
Analysis and the European Commission's Legitimation Strategies". 
453 Sternberg, Claudia S., The Struggle for EU Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 1950–2005, 2. 
454 Krebs, R. R. and Patrick T. Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of 
Political Rhetoric", 36. 
455 Ibid.: 38. Emphasis mine. 
456  Biegoń, Dominika, "Specifying the Arena of Possibilities: Post-structuralist Narrative 
Analysis and the European Commission's Legitimation Strategies", 198. 
  181 
something, organizations such as the EU and the AU might turn the acceptable 
ruling into the accepted ruling.457 
While some authors would focus exclusively on discourses constituting 
“deliberate attempts of legitimating”458 polities or policies, others acknowledge 
that “strategies of legitimation are not always conceived as such” 459  by the 
parties involved, especially in the case of meaningful practices – including 
violence itself – that end up being perceived as a justification. On the one hand, 
not all discourse of legitimation was intended as such by a given institution. On 
the other, it is hard to conceive that institutional tools such as press releases, 
magazines, official publications, and speeches are primarily intended as anything 
other than justifying actions, even if they are understood by the actors as 
something like ‘explaining the policy’s rationale and goals’, ‘pointing to the 
positive outcome of a mission’, ‘reassuring the operation’s legality’, 
‘highlighting the consensus and the democratic procedures behind the decision-
making process’, or simply ‘reporting on my job to my bureaucratic superior’. 
In sum, the intention of producing a legitimating discourse is but 
secondary to what social actors actually say. What underpins this reasoning is a 
quasi-postulate that what is said in the framework of legitimation inevitably 
sheds light at least part on the normative context and the beliefs about what 
constitute appropriate behaviour and legitimate ruling. Hence, discourse and the 
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arguments within it are always structured in and by the normative context 
independently of the intention or the calculation of actors. As an ideal-type, we 
prioritize the social process and the arguments. Instead of trying to find actor’s 
‘true motives’ behind their actions, their ‘true intentions’ behind their speeches, 
or their ‘actual’ actions on the ground, we look at what they are saying, in what 
context, and – to a certain extent – to what audiences.460 
These arguments within the framework of self-legitimation can be 
categorized into groups as to facilitate the understanding but also because they 
might appeal to different values or point to different periods as one overshadows 
the other. Max Weber has in multiple texts461 proposed three fundamental claims 
for the legitimacy of the Herrschaft, namely tradition, charisma or legal-rational. 
The latter would be a benchmark of modernity and the rise of national-state. 
Jacques Lagroye offers two contrasting ways of legitimating the “unequal 
relation of domination”, namely via arguments of idealization (the unequal 
relation, the leader and the system in place are good) or via arguments of 
rationalization (the relation, the leadership and the system in place are necessary) 
as already mentioned in previous chapters. In a similar fashion to Lagroye, but 
within his own framework called “discursive legitimation”462, Jens Steffek also 
divides arguments into both idealization and rationalization and argues that the 
latter would prevail in modern times. By taking stock of the categories proposed 
by Weber, Lagroye, and Steffek and by adding elements of contemporary 
                                                
460 Krebs, R. R. and Patrick T. Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of 
Political Rhetoric", 42. 
461 For an overview and critique, see: Beetham, David, "Max Weber and the Legitimacy of the 
Modern State", Analyse & Kritik, 13 (1991), 34-45.  
462  Steffek, Jens, "The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach"; 
Steffek, Jens, "Discursive legitimation in environmental governance". 
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literature on the legitimacy of regionalism the next sub-section anticipates 
patterns and larger groups of legitimation arguments adapted to security 
regionalism and its missions in particular that are here called ‘images’ of security 
regionalism, which are created and maintained by regional organizations.  
Arguments and patterns of legitimation 
For the study of political legitimacy of polities and policies, two 
methodologies are usually considered.463 Firstly, in the normative approach, the 
methodology consists in establishing criteria that are underpinned by 
philosophical and ethical foundations. These criteria for the rightfulness of an 
institution, policy, or system of governance are then compared to the institutions 
and the policies to which they apply. In various degrees, polities and policies are 
judged legitimate if they comply with the pre-established criteria. Secondly, in 
the sociological approach, methodological options constitute different ways to 
measure people’s belief on the legitimacy of one or a set of institutions. To 
operationalize this approach, the research has roughly three options: opinion-
polls directed to various set of populations that are deemed relevant, analysis of 
discourses in order to grasp people’s beliefs towards an institution or policy, and 
finally the observation of a group’s actions that might determine their acceptance 
or refusal vis-à-vis political institutions, their leader and actions. Legitimacy in 
this sociological sense, even more than in the normative approach, is not a 
dichotomous variable that exists or does not. Instead, it is a matter of degree and 
                                                
463 For a critique of both descriptive and normative methods, see: Gaus, Daniel, "Dynamics of 
Legitimation: Why the Study of Political Legitimacy Needs More Realism". 
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varies in a continuum according to the faith people put on the system where 
‘total’ and ‘zero’ faith are only extremes.  
However, the choice for the conceptual and theoretical framework of 
legitimation demands a different set of methods. Thus, a methodology for 
legitimation has to look at dynamics within the process of legitimation. 
Particularly, this research focuses on grasping the arguments put forward by 
regional organizations to justify their security policies and ultimately their own 
existence as security actors. These arguments are useful to the extent that they 
might reveal the normative underpinnings of such institutions and point to a 
broader normative context that evolves in the face of security regionalization. 
Therefore, the methodological choice consists into the analysis of public 
narratives of regional organizations vis-à-vis their security missions and policies 
of crisis management – the selected case studies of the crisis in Darfur, Chad, 
and CAR – over a period of almost nine years. 
These patterns of arguments are anticipated below both deductively by 
the reading of secondary literature on security regionalism and peace operations 
as well the broader literature on legitimation, and inductively by a sample 
coding. The paragraphs below briefly present these different patterns of 
arguments, assembled into four groups, for the legitimation of actions of regional 
security organizations that are henceforth called ‘images of security 
regionalism’. 
The first pattern, beneficial regionalism, presents a consequentialist 
image by grouping arguments that highlight the positive outcome of policies to a 
given community. This image is loosely inspired by Fritz Scharpf’s scholarship 
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and the debate within EU studies464; a distinction between output and input that 
follows roughly the divide between government for the people and government 
by and of the people. But the transposition of this dichotomy to outside the state 
and outside EU supranational “policies without politics” 465  necessitates two 
additional reformulations. Firstly, the term government has to be replaced by 
broader terms such as decentralized governance or the act of ruling itself. 
Secondly, ruling for and by the people in peace operations begs the question of 
which people: the one in the territory or countries where the mission takes place 
or the citizens in the member-states of regional organizations? 
But there is also another caveat. While Scharpf himself refers to output-
oriented and input-oriented claims as “legitimating arguments”466 , his input-
output distinction is often portrayed as two different benchmarks according to 
which legitimacy should be assessed. Such is the case, for instance, in the debate 
about EU legitimacy when social actors argue that the EU ‘lacks input 
legitimacy’ or ‘focused excessively on output legitimacy’. Contrarily to many 
uses of these concepts, and following our conceptual framework, output and 
input claims are seen as patterns of legitimation rather than as inherent sources of 
legitimacy. This means that rulers appeal to arguments such as positive outcome 
or democratic decision-making that justify their policies and not that one should 
assess the institutions according to these points. 
                                                
464  Scharpf, Fritz W., Governance in Europe: Effective and Democratic (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); See also: Schmidt, Vivien A., "Democracy and Legitimacy in 
the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’"; Tholen, Berry, "RIOs, 
Legitimacy and Democracy: A Conceptual Clarification." 
465 Schmidt, Vivien A., "The problems of identity and legitimacy in the European Union: Is more 
politics the answer?." 
466 Scharpf, Fritz W., "Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU".  
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The same caveat applies to the other three ‘images of regionalism’ as 
they also indicate patterns of arguments rather than criteria for legitimate ruling. 
The second group, that is here called necessary regionalism refers to the 
specificities of security policies and the (re)affirmation of the right to use force, 
sometimes in detriment of other’s rights to use it in a pattern of (de)legitimation. 
This image connects to the well-established concept of securitization467 as it is 
also about portraying a situation as urgent and dramatic, although not necessarily 
an existential threat. Simply put, while successful securitization establishes that 
‘something has to be done’ to address the threat and presents it as a security 
issue, legitimation refers to the follow-up question of what has to be done, when, 
how and, perhaps more important, by whom. To look at legitimation of the use of 
force of policies of regional organizations is relevant precisely because it 
connects to the monopoly of violence and sovereignty that rulers within states 
might claim. 
The third image is the inevitable regionalism and as in the first group on 
democratic legitimacy it also refers to an apparent dichotomy, this time between 
two classic Weberian 468  ideal-types of domination: the traditional and the 
rational-legal. The argument of tradition, on the one hand, appeals to the idea of 
a long-established political order that justifies the existence of current policies: 
the “authority of the eternal yesterday” 469 . The argument of rationality and 
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legality, on the other hand, refers to the impersonal, legal, and bureaucratic 
character of ruling. In most cases, the process boils down to a ‘legitimation by 
law’, in which law would be objective and impersonal in opposition to the 
subjective and arbitrary relations of power.470 Both traditional and rational-legal 
arguments might establish that the policy is ‘normal’ or ‘inevitable’ because ‘it 
has always been like this’471 or because RSOs are simply bureaucracies472 that 
didn’t have (or don’t have) a saying and are ‘following orders’ of, for example, 
member-states, which means that ‘the political’ lies elsewhere. 
The final image is the multilateral regionalism, which refers to the 
legitimation arguments arising from the horizontal relationship among 
organizations within regional and global – heterarchical – systems of 
governance. The key argument lies in the identification of a reflexive pattern of 
legitimation: by recognizing other organizations’ rights to rule, to exist, and to 
use force the RSO also legitimates itself and its endeavours because of the 
multilateral and collective nature of their policies. The most obvious example is 
the reference to the partnerships between different organizations – in this case 
the triangular relation between the EU, the AU, and the UN – and ad-hoc 
cooperation during the missions. If this trend is confirmed, it is possible to point 
to a process of mutual-recognition between RSOs, which would be analogue, 
although obviously not identical, to the mutual-recognition of nation-states in 
their narratives of sovereignty and monopoly of the use of force. 
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It is important to highlight that there can be an overlap between different 
sets of arguments. Most of the justifications of security and force such as 
promotion of human rights or maintenance of peace would, for example, fall into 
arguments of effective ruling. Nevertheless, in the case of regional security 
governance and policies of regional organizations, it seems relevant to 
distinguish between them and present four broad images instead of a simple 
output-input divide precisely to understand the specificities of arguments related 
to security, to the bureaucratic nature of international organizations, and to the 
‘horizontal’ – non-hierarchical – interplay between international and regional 
organizations. 
Finally, all four images are also evoked as to justify the inaction or, more 
importantly, the lack of sufficient responses by regional organizations when they 
are expected to act in front of crisis or are perceived as having a responsibility to 
do so. While most of the literature focuses on the discourses over high profile 
actions such as humanitarian interventions without host state approval, it is the 
lack of action that might actually require much more effort on the part of 
institutions whose existence is not taken for granted. This is particularly 
important in the case of Darfur when think tanks, media, civil society, and the 
international community broadly speaking were expecting and oftentimes 
demanding a stronger response to the stop the killings and the violence in Sudan. 
When confronted with this gap between actions and expectations, regional 
organizations have to give reasons to the lack of response and emphasise 
whatever they are actually doing even if these actions are not enough to solve the 
crisis of even stop the violence. In sum, they need to answer the question of ‘why 
should we have yet another organization – another relationship of domination 
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that costs time, money, and effort and regulates our lives – if it does not offer the 
responses to the most salient issues such as human rights violations?’ Arguments 
of inaction, as much as those of action, are crucial to regional organizations and 
they can be grouped into the four images all the same. 
3) Researching legitimation  
This section presents the sources that will be analysed and how they were 
collected as well as the method used to analyse the content of these documents 
and their relation to the broader literature. The empirical work per se follows in 
the next chapters. 
The material analysed in the process of self-legitimation consists of 
public documents produced by the organizations (EU, AU, and occasionally and 
for contrast the UN) as well as records of public speeches delivered by high 
ranked officials who are in most cases speaking on behalf of their organizations. 
In some cases, national officials that are directly linked to the policy planning 
and implementation, even if acting exclusively in their national capacity, are also 
considered. This last aspect is important since most of the security policies of 
these organizations are decided via inter-governmentalism where nation-states 
and their representatives play an important role and arguably also contribute to 
the organization’s narrative. 
Official documents and speeches have been collected to produce the most 
extensive possible data set in relation to the case studies. Since the goal of the 
content analysis is to look at public legitimation, only documents accessible in 
the media, official publications, and trough the Internet (official websites and 
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media websites) were considered. Thus, no archival research was considered 
necessary. In some cases, especially regarding the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS), the mission websites had been removed from the official domain, 
most probably due to the end of the mission. In such cases, the relevant 
documents could be retrieved via the website <https://archive.org/web/> and its 
‘Wayback Machine’, which stores the data that were available on the website 
from different moments back in time. Thus, the latest available version of each 
webpage has been considered for the research purpose of retrieving official 
documents as well as visual material that were public at the time of the policy 
implementation and in its aftermath. 
The research is limited to the period of around nine years, stretching from 
the resurgence and intensification of conflict and violence in the Sudanese region 
of Darfur in February 2003 to the signature of the Doha Document for Peace in 
July 2011 (01.02.2003 to 31.07.2011). In this period, three missions and one 
support mission have been initiated and coordinated by the African Union or by 
the European Union in Darfur and the adjacent areas of East Chad and Northeast 
Central African Republic (CAR).473 In sum, this phase of data collection relates 
the collection of documents produced by the EU and the AU during the nine-
years period and in relation to the missions and their policies of crisis 
management. In total, more than 500 documents, with sizes varying from one to 
several dozens of pages, have been classified and coded.  
A second method of collection refers to the research of public discourse, 
which was produced by these organizations’ officials and bureaucracies and then 
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reproduced by the media. To this end, the research used the media database 
Factiva <global.factiva.com>. For the data analysis to be feasible, the collection 
was limited in relation to time period and sources. Firstly, I considered press 
articles ranging three months before and after the launching of the missions as 
well as three months after periods of intense debate and media attention, which 
usually follow peaks of violence in the region. In sum, the date collection 
focused on key events. 
Table 2. Key Events in Darfur and the International Response 
Key Events 
Research Range 
Start date End date 
International attention on violence in Darfur 01.02.2003  
Launching of AMIS 18.03.2004 18.09.2004 
Launching of the EU’s Support to AMIS 18.04.2005 18.10.2005 
End of EU’s Support to AMIS  01.10.2007 01.02.2008 
End of AMIS (Transition to UNAMID) 01.10.2007 01.02.2008 
Launching of EUFOR Tchad/CAR 15.01.2008 15.05.2008 
End of EUFOR Chad (Transition to MINURCAT) 15.01.2009 15.05.2009 
Secondly, the search tool of Factiva makes possible to limit the research 
to a number of press agencies, including both European and African. The 
keywords used in the search tool include the mission names (AMIS, UNAMID, 
EUFOR TCHAD/CAR), the countries’ names in English and in French (Chad, 
Central African Republic or CAR, Sudan) as well as Darfur. The main goal of 
the collection of press articles is to look for literal quotations by officials and 
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politicians regarding the missions and the general responses to the crisis that 
might not be included in the documents produced by the regional organizations. 
The qualitative analysis of the data follows three steps as proposed by Pat 
Bazeley 474 : describe, compare, and relate. First, the analysis describes the 
categories and major themes that appear in the texts that have been gathered. The 
objective is to identify, in the texts and occasionally in images, the arguments of 
(de)legitimation – the passages that justify directly or indirectly the 
organizations’ roles and existence, the security missions, and the security 
governance as a whole. Special focus will be given, following Lagroye’s 
definition, to passages that explicitly or implicitly present the organizations and 
their security missions and policies as a necessity and a benefaction. 
Furthermore, it should be noted once more that the justification and the appraisal 
of missions might serve as a legitimation argument of the organizations 
themselves, not only of their policies. 
Before to the description of arguments and themes, the passages in text 
are coded in the computer software Nvivo in its latest version. With the software, 
nodes were created according to categories of legitimation arguments. Then, 
nodes were grouped according to larger patterns of legitimation – or ‘themes’ in 
standard content analysis vocabulary. It was based on these larger patterns of 
legitimation that it has been possible to identify the four large ‘images of 
regionalism’ described above. These images have been anticipated by the 
literature, both theoretical and conceptual, and by the formulation of the 
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hypothesis both deductively from previous empirical case studies and inductively 
from a research sample. They correspond to this thesis’ four main empirical 
chapters that follow: a. arguments of legitimation based input and output 
democratic legitimacy; b. arguments based tradition and bureaucratic de-
politicization; c. peace and urgency as argument for violence and a dramatization 
of issue and context; d. and finally the horizontal relationship among 
organizations in the process of legitimation. 
The text within the box below exemplifies the process of coding that 
follows in the empirical chapters. It consists of a message by EU High 
Representative for Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, at the moment when the EU’s 
support action in Darfur came to its end in 2007. This message was published by 
the official website of the European Union475 and reproduced fully or in parts by 
the media. 
First of all, such writing is an example of a posteriori legitimation, 
meaning that the document was produced after the policy has come to its end. It 
is safe to say that the ending of a policy marks a period of strong (de)legitimation 
efforts within a given system of governance. The differences between 
legitimation happening a priori and a posteriori are highlighted in the empirical 
chapters. For now, one can say that while the former is underpinned by 
expectations (sometimes based on previous and similar policies), the latter refers 
in retrospective to the output, efficiency and contribution of the mission already 
accomplished – or at least one version of these such results. 
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Table 3. Example of Document Analysis for Legitimation 
I thank and congratulate all the personnel, civilian and military, who 
over two and a half years have taken part in the EU action in support of AMIS. 
The action will now complete its mandate on 31 December 2007 in the context of 
the handover from AMIS to UNAMID. 
In a difficult context, AMIS has contributed significantly to the protection 
of the civilian population and to efforts aimed at improving the security and 
humanitarian situation in Darfur. 
An innovative effort, the EU supporting action has provided AMIS with 
key military and civilian assistance, financial and logistic support, as well as 
support for its civilian policing capacity. It has done so at the request of the 
African Union and in full respect of its ownership. I am grateful to the African 
Union and its personnel for the cooperation at all levels. 
The EU supporting action to AMIS was a concrete example of the ever 
closer relations that are developing between the EU and the AU and that were 
highlighted by the recent EU-Africa summit in Lisbon. EU and African leaders 
noted then that the African peace and security architecture is taking shape under 
the AU's leadership and that the EU has been a key partner for African countries 
and organisations to help create conditions for lasting peace and stability. 
After having supported AMIS, the EU will continue to remain engaged and help 
UNAMID in its efforts to solve the crisis in Darfur. 
Solana’s speech is useful as an example because it counts at least four 
patterns of legitimation. Firstly, the wave underline marks a constant trend in 
such sources analysed of what is here called dramatization of the context or issue 
being described. The reality on the ground is constantly portrayed as dramatic 
(e.g. humanitarian crises, massacre, violent context, etc.), leaving behind an 
element of urgency and necessity to protect the population and restore order and 
peace. Arguably, this pattern is more salient before the policy is implemented. 
Logically, the policy in place is legitimated because it is portrayed as necessary. 
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A second pattern of legitimation is marked by a double underline. It 
refers to the use of the positive output, which is in this case a retrospective 
account of the policy’s contribution, as argument of legitimation. The words 
‘contributed significantly’ mark the positive evaluation of the policy outcome. 
The EU action in Darfur has been successful, the argument goes, by providing 
the AMIS mission with the necessary financial and logistical support along with 
assistance and support to various actions. Thus, as far as the legitimation formula 
is concerned, EU’s policy is legitimated because it had efficient results according 
to accepted standards or, in other words, was a ‘benefaction’. 
A third element of legitimation is highlighted by a dotted underline. It 
refers to the legitimacy of the policy that is based on criteria such as ‘ownership’ 
or ‘request’ and indicates the participation and approval by the people or by the 
organizations representing it. This kind of argumentation points to the fact that 
relevant actors (e.g. population, representatives, regional organizations, etc.) 
have an ‘input’ in the processes of ruling and decision-making of the policies 
affecting them. In many cases, it also refers to the legality of such actions since 
organizations are usually bound to act only in case of approval by competent 
actors. 
Finally, the last passage, marked by a thick underline, exemplifies a 
recurrent habit of such international institutions: the reference to other 
organizations’ policies, and to the mutual recognition of their values. In this case, 
words such as ‘cooperation’, ‘key partner’, and ‘ever closer relations’ highlight a 
process of mutual legitimation between the African Union and the European 
Union. The last paragraph contains references to the United Nations mission 
  196 
UNAMID, which took the main responsibilities in Darfur. Words such as 
‘engaged’ and ‘help’ also highlight the relationship between organizations. 
By this stage, it should be noted that there is the possibility of distinct 
arguments overlapping in a same extract of a text. The final sentence, for 
instance, is both an engagement of multilateral legitimation trough partnership as 
well as a claim of efficacy in ‘solving’ the crises in the future. There is no a 
priori reason for excluding any of the different arguments that are present in this 
kind of sentence. Therefore, a same passage might be relevant in different 
analysis or chapters and might as well illustrate different images. 
Following the description, possible differences and similarities are 
compared a. across time within the nine years period, b. across the organizations 
involved in the security governance of the crisis in Darfur and Chad, and c. 
across different policies promoted by the same organizations in the case of both 
the EU’s support mission to Darfur and the military engagement in Chad and 
CAR. In case these comparisons provide useful insights, they are detailed within 
the relevant chapter. Even if the research is not a comparative study per se (i.e. a 
comparison from which falsifiable propositions are generated), the comparison 
might highlight divergent – perhaps contradictory – arguments of legitimation 
that are used to (re)calibrate the ideal-typical model for the legitimation of RSOs 
and their policies. The purpose of the comparison, or an ‘individuating 
comparison’, is to specify particular and concrete configurations.476 Hence the 
importance of studying the legitimation of two different organizations – one from 
within the region and another from outside the region – in the same context. 
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Finally, the research shall relate the findings of both the description of 
arguments and the comparison with the existing literature on the topic. On the  
one hand, there is a relevant empirical literature on the missions themselves, on 
the relations between regional and global organizations, on the relation between 
Africa and Europe, and on humanitarian interventions broadly. On the other 
hand, there is a normative literature concerned with principles of legitimacy and 
with different normative underpinnings for security policies, regional integration 
and international institutions, and intervention. It is in this phase that the research 
insights are generated from the analysis of the evidence already collected and its 
contrast with existing interpretations.477 
Conclusion 
Taken together, chapter 3 and 4 work towards de-essentializing the 
concepts of legitimacy and legitimation and proposing how one can indirectly 
conduct research of legitimation for the purposes presented in the first two 
chapters, which are to understand how regional security organizations and 
security regionalism fit within security governance and between two more 
‘traditional’ levels of security provision, the national and the global. By de-
essentializing the concept, we allow social actors to essentialize it in their 
intersubjective relations.478 
In an exercise of constructing an ideal-type for studying legitimation, we 
propose five main questions, four of which are answered in the table below, 
which narrow down the research. First of all, we chose to look at policies of 
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crisis management by regional organizations in the context of the conflict in 
Darfur, Chad, and CAR from 2003 to 2011. By doing so, we focus on the 
legitimation of policies instead of the direct legitimation of the polity, the 
organization or the process of integration. Secondly, we look at the legitimation 
discourse of the regional organizations themselves in an exercise of self-
legitimation towards the international community broadly speaking. Finally, the 
object of research is the public discourse of RSOs – the documents they 
produced during the period – that might serve as justification for their acts. 
Table 4. The Elements of the Legitimation Process in this Research 
Legitimation process as analysed in this research 
Object of legitimation 
Security missions of RSOs in Darfur, 
Chad and CAR (2003-2011) and other 
policies of ‘crisis management’. 
Indirectly: RSOs themselves and their 
position within security governance 
Legitimating actors Regional Security Organizations (the bureaucracies of the EU and the AU) 
Legitimating audience International Community 
Research Object 
Public discourses of RSOs on their 
security missions and the broad 
response to the crisis in Darfur. 
Arguments of Legitimation 
Four images: 
Beneficial Regionalism 
Necessary Regionalism 
Inevitable Regionalism 
Multilateral Regionalism 
However, the most important question is the identification and analysis of 
the arguments of legitimation contained in the verbal utterances of regional 
organizations in relation to their policies. Hence, fours larger patterns of 
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legitimation have been identified following the literatures on legitimacy, 
legitimation, security, and regionalism. In this regard, the images of beneficial, 
necessary, inevitable, and multilateral regionalism correspond to the empirical 
chapters that follow and that will present the narratives of RSOs in contrast to the 
existing literature on legitimacy, legitimation, and regional organizations and 
their security policies of crisis management.  
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THE IMAGES OF SECURITY REGIONALISM 
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Chapter 5 
THE BENEFICIAL REGIONALISM 
 
When regional security organizations (RSOs) claim that they support, 
contribute, or help to solve a problem or manage a crisis – in sum, when they 
claim to do something ‘good’ – they engage in legitimation of their actions and 
of their existence via an image of beneficial regionalism. This is in essence a 
consequentialist claim that stresses the positive outcomes of actions for a given 
community, an action that maximizes good479 and is ‘problem-solving’. In the 
literature of EU’s democratic legitimacy480, this type of argument relates to the 
idea of output legitimacy – the effectiveness of policies for the people – in 
contrast with input legitimacy – the government by the people by means of their 
participation in politics. 
This chapter gives a closer look at these arguments of democratic 
legitimacy that serve to legitimate security regionalism in the case studies: the 
policies adopted by the EU and the AU in relation to the crisis in Darfur as well 
as their very existences and positions within security governance. In this regard, 
the initial finding is that the anticipated image of democratic regionalism is at 
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best incomplete when it concerns security policies. While RSOs do not reject 
what could be considered input-related arguments such as people’s political 
participation, they tend to focus much more on their contributions and problem-
solving policies for the people and for the ‘peace and stability’ in the region. 
Thus, this prevalence of output-related arguments is the key to the image of 
beneficial regionalism, which in turn leads to two additional observations.  
First, even if the focus is indeed on the positive outcome of regional 
organizations’ policies, this does not necessarily mean that they claim to do 
things more efficiently than other institutions, national states, and the United 
Nations. The ‘comparative advantage’ of regionalism is rarely, if at all, claimed 
by regional organizations when they attempt at justifying their actions. They 
rather place their actions – which are claimed to be effective and problem-
solving – in complementarity to other institutions within security governance. 
Second, the image of beneficial regionalism indicates that more important 
than the positive outcome that might justify the action itself are the actions that 
are showcased to justify the existence of the RSO in the first place, or at least the 
security dimension of regional organizations such as the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture. In front of 
perceived inaction, when it is generally expected that regional organizations will 
act in response to a crisis, these organizations struggle to remain relevant, and 
their discourse highlights what they do and how they remain engaged and 
committed to support and to contribute to solving the problem. 
This chapter’s first section looks at the input-output arguments and the 
possible comparative advantages of RSOs that could be evoked. Section two 
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shows that not only policies need to be legitimated, but also that actions 
themselves might serve as arguments in the legitimation of the organizations. 
Finally, the last two sections look at the specificities of the AU and EU 
arguments within the image of beneficial regionalism. 
1) Output and input arguments: a consequentialist image 
Most of the literature on democratic legitimacy is inspired by the output-
input dichotomy proposed by Fritz Scharpf481, who in turn based its conceptual 
tool on system theory. Input legitimating arguments, on the one hand, are those 
referring to ‘government by the people’, or the ideas of participation of 
individuals and groups, the manifestation of the preferences of the governed and 
the Rousseauian general will of the people in elections, referendums, citizen 
initiatives and other forms of political engagement 482 . Output legitimating 
arguments, on the other hand, are usually translated into ‘government for the 
people’ or, in other words, the notion that “government should govern in a way 
that is profitable for the collective wellbeing of the people”483. Hence, output 
refers to effective problem-solving ruling in terms of what is in the interest of the 
people. 
The empirical analysis suggests that output-related legitimacy claims are 
much more frequent than input-related claims in the case studies of both the 
                                                
481 Scharpf, Fritz W., Governance in Europe: Effective and Democratic; See also: Marks, Gary et 
al., eds., Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1996). 
482 Scharpf, Fritz W., "Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU", 
2-3. 
483  Benz, Arthur and Yannis Papadopoulos, eds., Governance and Democracy: Comparing 
National, European and International Experiences (London: Routledge, 2006), 5; 
Schmidt, Vivien A., "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: 
Input, Output and ‘Throughput’", 10-14. 
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European Union and the African Union. Therefore, the preliminary question here 
refers to the scope of these arguments. Scharpf presents these two sets of 
arguments as constituting “the core notions of democratic legitimacy” 484 . 
Nevertheless, as much as both patterns are certainly present in the legitimating 
discourse of (Western) liberal democracies, to restrict them to such polities 
would be to overlook a deeper philosophical divide of human activity between 
consequentialist and deontological ethics. Output-related arguments, or 
consequentialist arguments for that matter, are common to all political 
institutions as legitimation is about portraying something as good and 
necessary 485 , therefore problem-solving. By consequence, when we discuss 
arguments of legitimation and not about standards in a normative approach 
legitimacy486, there is no reason to limit the output-input dichotomy to liberal 
democracies or to the European governance. In this regard, this research’s case 
studies sustain this widening of the concept. 
In the discourse of both regional organizations, legitimating arguments 
relating to the output of the RSOs’ policies are usually general claims of 
‘contribution’ or ‘improvement’ of the situation that the policy or the mission 
was intended to address. Such is the case of the AU’s claims regarding its 
mission in Darfur, first during its implementation in 2005 and then right after the 
transition towards UNAMID in 2009: 
                                                
484 Scharpf, Fritz W., "Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU". 
485 Lagroye, Jacques, "La légitimation." 
486 See chapter 3. 
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The [assessment] mission noted a trend towards 
general improvement, particularly in the areas where 
AMIS is deployed.487 
Council commends the personnel and leadership 
of the Mission for their dedication and contribution to 
the promotion of lasting peace and reconciliation in 
Darfur.488 
Both of the above claims of effectiveness exemplify the majority of 
output-related arguments in the case studies, meaning those that retroactively 
assess the policies’ positive outcome up until a certain point in time. But is also 
possible to justify a mission according to the prospect of its contribution, 
meaning the future outcome. In other words, the policy is legitimated because it 
will be, the organization argues, a force for good. When writing to an Irish 
newspaper, HR/SG Javier Solana reassured the public that the Irish troops, which 
were being deployed in the framework of the ESDP, had a problem-solving 
potential via the EU’s mission EUFOR: 
It will be the EU's biggest military operation in 
the world, and will improve security for the people of 
Chad and Central African Republic. I am delighted that 
Ireland is making a significant contribution to this UN-
mandated operation.489 
These arguments that anticipate the policy outcome, however, are far less 
frequent than those that use the assessment of what has already been done; and 
there are at least two reasons for this. First, the policies here analysed are not 
controversial. On the contrary, as it is argued in the following section, they are 
rather ‘demanded’ by the international community at one point or another and, 
                                                
487  African Union Commission, "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Conflict 
Situations in Africa", EX.CL/191 (VII) Sirte, 2005. para. 43. 
488 Peace and Security Council, "Communique of the 198th Meeting of the Peace and Security 
Council", PSC/PR/COMM(CX CVIII) Addis Ababa, 2009. para. 4. 
489 Solana, Javier, "Chad mission crucial to union's peace effort in Africa. ," The Irish Times, 28 
January 2008. 
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by consequence, require less justification before they take place. The second 
reason is simply a matter of time and the amount of discourse produced in 
relation to the mission. Simply put, there is much more discourse produced 
during and after the policy implementation than before the mission because 
during much of the time in which the organization talks about its actions, the 
policies are still happening or have already happened. Hence, they supposedly 
already present outcomes that can be claimed as positive. While the public 
discourse on the decision-making leading to the EUFOR Tchad/CAR took only a 
few months and produced no more than a handful of documents, the actual 
timespan of the mission was one year – longer if including the deployment – and 
much of the discourse was even produced after the transition to the 
MINURCAT: 
Southern Chad counts around 45 000 refugees 
from CAR. By its action, the force [EUFOR] should 
allow humanitarian actors to work in the sufficient 
security conditions and to move freely.490 
In helping to improve overall security in its 
operational area, EUFOR has also facilitated the 
activities of humanitarian workers. It has contributed 
towards protecting the staff of the United Nations and 
humanitarian organisations, thereby enabling relations 
of trust to be established with the latter. Moreover, the 
EUFOR patrols have helped to deter attacks against the 
civilian population in the operational area.491 
To say that output-related legitimacy claims prevail over input or 
participation arguments is a relevant empirical finding. However, it doesn’t tell 
much about the nature of these claims to security regionalism in particular 
                                                
490 Arnould, Claude-France, "La PESD en action, au Tchad et en République centrafricaine.," 
ESDP Newsletter 2007. 12. Translation mine. 
491 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Operation EUFOR Tchad/CAR", 
7770/09 Brussels, 2009. para. 3. 
  207 
because virtually all regimes claim to act for the good of the people. To do things 
better collectively – for instance, keeping people safe or building roads and 
bridges – is the consequentialist justification of the state. Effective government, 
Fritz Scharpf argues in relation to national-states, is about the “capacity for 
achieving common purposes and dealing with common problems that are beyond 
the reach of individuals and families acting on their own, through market 
exchanges, or through uncoerced cooperation in civil society.”492 Hence, a more 
interesting question in the case of security regionalism would be whether 
regional organizations claim that they can do better than individuals and families, 
market exchanges, uncoerced cooperation and also better than national states and 
the United Nations? Do they actually challenge these other ‘levels’493 in terms of 
performance by evoking supposed comparative advantages? 
The short answer is no. In theory, regional organizations could claim their 
positive outcomes and refer to their supposedly unique advantages. Rodrigo 
Tavares494 as well as Paul Diehl495 list a few of these assets that are usually 
debated in the literature. For Diehl, in relation to the organizations of universal 
membership such as the UN, regional organizations could benefit from greater 
consensus among members due to their supposed homogeneity of identity, or at 
least of interests due to the fact that they face common regional problems. RSOs 
could also benefit from greater support of the disputants, both the local 
                                                
492 Scharpf, Fritz W., "Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU", 
3. 
493 See chapter 2 on the potential challenges imposed by security regionalism on other traditional 
levels of security governance. 
494 Tavares, Rodrigo, Regional Security: The Capacity of Regional Organizations, 12-4. 
495  Diehl, Paul F., "New Roles for Regional Organizations," in Leashing the Dogs of War: 
Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. C.A. Crocker, F.O. hampson, and P. Aall 
(Washington: United States Institute of peace Press, 2007), 541-2. 
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government and the local population, because they are also ‘local’ in a sense. 
Finally, regional organizations would be better at solving conflicts instead of 
only managing them, meaning that they have a bigger interest to permanently 
address the underlying causes. 
To this list, Tavares proposes additional possible unique advantages that 
relate to how effective RSO’s policies might be in relation to other organizations. 
Hence, RSO would be more effective because they are closer to the conflicts and 
understand it better: they have prior knowledge about cultural, ethnical, and even 
languages on which they build their policies. In addition, policies of regional 
organizations, once more because of their proximity to the conflict, could be less 
costly because transport and logistics are very expensive and to cover shorter 
distance would be cheaper – a claim that the AU couldn’t possibly make in 
relation to AMIS exactly because the logistics of transport were provided by 
extra-regional partners, mainly NATO and the EU. 
RSOs claim they are effective and that they do good things. Only they do 
not link their claimed effective ruling to their regional character. This empirical 
finding was expected in the case of the European Union acting in Africa, since 
most of the portrayed advantages refer to the proximity to the crisis and the EU is 
not a regional organization from the region. Nevertheless, the AU also makes 
little to no reference to its particular nature as regional organization and how this 
makes its policies more effective. References to specific comparative advantages 
are in fact so rare that one of the few claims found in the analysed texts is 
actually made by the EU – its special representative for Sudan – about the AU’s 
actions in Darfur: 
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Nobody could have done this work better. The 
African Union was rapid, it deployed a lot of soldiers in 
a very short time, and the soldiers are working in Darfur 
under very basic conditions. It is also important that we 
develop regional peacekeeping capacities – this is 
unfortunately not the only conﬂict on the African 
continent. Already now we can imagine the needs in 
countries like Somalia or Congo. The troops of the 
African Union are in many cases also more welcome by 
the local population and conﬂicting parties than troops 
that might include soldiers from earlier colonial 
powers.496 
RSOs do say that they do good things and this, at the end of the day, is 
the image of beneficent regionalism. Only they do not say that they do better 
than individual, families, market, uncoerced cooperation or, more importantly, 
anything else offered by the state or global institutions like the UN, because there 
are regional. They simply do not put themselves in such comparative perspective 
when it comes to uncontroversial policies. Instead of touching upon possible 
comparative advantages vis-à-vis other ‘polities’, RSOs place their 
‘contributions’ in complementarity with those of other institutions within the 
governance of security. 
The Council stresses the importance of the 
international community acting and pronouncing itself 
in a coordinated and concerted manner. The deployment 
of EUFOR Tchad/RCA is a major EU contribution, 
which together with the UN mission MINURCAT in 
Chad and Central African Republic and in coordination 
with the Hybrid AU/UN mission UNAMID in Darfur 
helps to address the conflict in the region and its effects 
on the humanitarian situation.497 
For our part, we undertake that the African 
Union, working in tandem with the United Nations and 
the wider international community, will provide all 
                                                
496 Haavisto, Pekka, "Questions to Mr Pekka Haavisto, EU Special Representative for Sudan " 
ESDP Newsletter 2005. Emphasis mine. 
497 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Chad", 6651/08, Brussels, 2008. 
para. 6. Emphasis mine.  
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necessary support and guarantees for the full and 
scrupulous implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement once it is signed.498 
Naturally, to say that the organization is doing something when no other 
entity could or wanted to do – and an action to mitigate or resolve a crisis is 
expected or could be constructed as necessary – is in itself a statement that 
repositions the RSO within security governance. As Diehl argues: 
The United Nations and leading states have […] 
chosen to ignore certain wars or failed states. This 
leaves gaps that have been filled by regional 
organizations, many of which cannot afford to ignore 
the conflicts and problems at their doorsteps.499 
Hence, it is by clamming to fill this gap and effectively solve a problem, 
that regional organizations could find their place within security governance. To 
act where and when others could not act might be what justifies the existence of 
yet another ‘system of domination’. By appealing to this reasoning, RSOs could 
make the claim that they are more effective because of the greater consensus they 
enjoy and because of the greater interest they and their member-states have in 
solving the conflict. However, once more they do not link these advantages to the 
fact that they fill the gap. In the case of the AU’s mission AMIS and the EU’s 
mission EUFOR Tchad/CAR, for example, the RSOs did not claim to be filling 
the gap left by the UN. Instead, they claimed to be ‘preparing the terrain’ to the 
UN takeover with MINURCAT in Chad or to the transition to the hybrid mission 
in Darfur. 
                                                
498 Konaré, Alpha Omar, "Statement by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the 
Inter-Sudanese peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur", Addis Ababa, 2006. 
499 Diehl, Paul F., "New Roles for Regional Organizations," 539. Emphasis mine. 
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2) Staying relevant 
It is important to note that all the actions here analyzed, from the African 
Union mission in Sudan and its EU support package to the EUFOR in Chad and 
CAR passing by all the policies that aimed at addressing the crises in the region 
were not particularly controversial. They were not policies that needed to be 
justified because of a lack the consent of the host nation or the legal 
authorization of competent bodies such as the UNSC, or because public opinion 
was particularly against it or other countries and organizations publicly and 
extensively voiced opposition to them. Moreover, AMIS and EUFOR 
Tchad/CAR soldiers would use force only in self-defense and even so very rarely. 
For Darfur, the N’Djamena humanitarian cease-fire was already in place since 
2004 and this meant that, at least in theory, there was ‘peace to be kept’ and there 
was no need to enforce it or publicly take sides in the conflict. In this perspective, 
the case studies were far from being controversial actions such as NATO’s 
intervention in the Balkans or the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, the 
overall casualties among the troops remained low and most of the budgetary 
costs, at least the decision to allocate them, precede the financial breakdown of 
2008 and the Eurozone crisis. In sum, there was no particular contentious issue 
surrounding the actions of AU and EU. 
And if the actions were not controversial, they were rather expected. The 
violence in Darfur started to grab media attention late 2003 and reached a wider, 
international, audience beyond Sudan and the region as the numbers of dead and 
displaced people as well as the images of the attacks on villages reached the 
news. From early 2004, a great number of international NGOs, think tanks such 
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as Amnesty International 500 , Human Rights Watch 501 , International Crisis 
Group502, and The Brookings Institution503 all wrote reports on the matter that 
evaluated what had been done so far and also made recommendations. 
Regardless of the differences in these documents, they all insisted on the grave 
situation in Darfur and called for stronger action by the international community. 
Meanwhile, the images of the Janjaweed militias on horsebacks raiding villages 
became gradually known and the influx of refugees into Chad attracted wider 
media coverage. In April 2004, the advocacy group Save Darfur was created and 
strongly called on national governments, the United Nations and regional 
organizations to act against the violence in Darfur. As time went by, 
humanitarian and aid workers complained about the difficulties and insecurities 
to perform their tasks and quickly the word genocide reached the vocabulary of 
different governmental and non-governmental institutions. 
A constant fear at the beginning of the violence surge in Darfur, from 
2004 to 2005, was that it would evolve to ‘another Rwanda’, meaning yet 
another case of genocide marked and made possible by the inaction of the 
international community. Rwanda, for instance, had been perceived not only a 
failure of the UN but also a negative spot in the history of AU’s predecessor, the 
Organization of the African Union. Another moment of inaction would for long 
mark the existence of the new organization founded around the principle of non-
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indifference towards violence and human rights violations. It was a consensus at 
the time that AU’s involvement in Sudan constituted a critical test to the 
organization, something the AU itself and even the EU would recognize: 
[…] the success of the current mission of the 
African Union in Sudan will determine the future of the 
population in Darfur, but also the future capacity of the 
African Union to prevent and manage other crisis in 
Africa.504 
Clearly, the situation in Darfour is the litmus test 
of the capacity of the African Union to act effectively to 
address the conflicts that are tearing the Continent apart, 
and to implement its own principles.505 
But the beginning of the violence in Darfur marked not only the early 
days of the AU, but also the initial years of the European Security and Defense 
Policy initiated in 1999 that resonated EU’s ambition of being a global player. 
While the response to Darfur was not as a critical test to the EU as it was to AU’s 
perceived legitimacy, it was nonetheless important to its goals as a global 
security provider, which were very salient at the time. Finally, the normative 
context of the first years of the 21st century was marked by the rise of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ – first and foremost a responsibility of the national 
governments towards their populations506 but also of the international community 
in front of human rights violations. Despite different interpretations and various 
positions relating to the concept of R2P507, it certainly raised the expectations 
                                                
504  Solana, Javier, "Intervention de Javier Solana, Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Union 
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during crisis such as the one in Darfur to the point where the international 
community is said to have failed.508 Arguably, the costs of inaction – or more 
importantly the costs of perceived inaction – were significant for both 
organizations. 
Hence, if output-related arguments clearly prevail over input-related 
arguments, it seems that the effort was not so much about justifying the missions 
and actions by presenting the benefits of particular – sensitive or controversial – 
policies, but rather to showcase whatever the RSOs were doing to address the 
issue, even if very little in comparison to what was expected or to actually make 
a clear difference in the short run. Arguably, the emphasis on output legitimacy 
is about staying relevant and ‘proving’ the added value of the regional 
organization – showing that it is active in a context where it is somehow 
expected to intervene. 
To be perceived as relevant, both EU and AU make reference to the full 
spectrum of actions usually available to regional organizations 509 , from the 
politico-diplomatic initiatives such as mediation and the promotion of donor’s 
conferences to the missions themselves, and passing by sanctions regimes, 
financial support, the endorsement – or the rejection – of the International 
Criminal Court rulings, among others: 
                                                                                                                               
Affairs, 84, no. 4  (2008), 615-39; Chandler, David, "The responsibility to protect? 
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Since January 2004, the EU and its Member 
States have been providing a wide range of support to 
the African Union (AU) efforts to help stabilise the 
situation in Darfur. The support includes financial, 
personnel and political support to the Abuja talks 
process and the Ceasefire Commission, and planning, 
technical, financial and equipment support to AMIS I 
and AMIS II.510 
While the EU would constantly remind us of the ‘wide range’ policies 
implemented in and around Darfur, the AU would also struggle to demonstrate is 
relevance in different areas, such the role of AMIS: 
AMIS plays a key role in supporting 
humanitarian access and activities, contributing to the 
creation of a safe environment for the return of refugees 
and IDPs and assisting in the protection of the civilian 
population.511 
Beneficial regionalism is the regionalism that does something good, but it 
is also the regionalism does something in the first place, whatever it is, and 
remains relevant so that it can justify its existence. Some policies raise multiple 
issues that must be in themselves legitimated because they are controversial and 
they are not taken for granted. Other policies, and such appears to be the case of 
the EU’s and AU’s actions in relation to Darfur, are not so much as contestable 
in themselves but rather serve to legitimate the existence of the organizations 
behind them. Most of the time, more than the arguments that justify the policy, it 
is the policies – doing something and then saying it – that justify the polity’s 
existence. The next two sections add more details to the output-related arguments 
of both organizations, how they claim to remain relevant as security providers, 
and the questions that these arguments might raise. 
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3) The EU’s permanent support and commitment 
By analysing the EU’s discourse on its (in)actions in Darfur, Chad, and 
CAR, one has the impression that the organization is constantly struggling to 
show that it is a relevant piece in the regional security governance responding to 
the crisis. As a matter of fact, and given both the high expectations of the 
international community and the climate of enthusiasm of the initial years of 
ESDP captained by Javier Solana, it was even considered that the EU could 
engage in Darfur with a major military operation, including early discussions on 
size and mandate, but this ambition ended up being downsized to the support 
action to AMIS 2512. 
The key to the EU’s discourse on its response to Darfur and adjacent 
crisis is it ‘support role’ with which the organization manages the possible 
perceived gap between high expectations and little action. It obviously doesn’t 
claim to be leading the international response – such role is left to the AU and 
later to both the AU and the UN joint actions – but its relevance comes from its 
active engagement in supporting the other initiatives. Such is obviously the case 
of the support action to AMIS, which constitutes until today a singular case of 
EU foreign policy, but also includes ‘financial support’, ‘political support’, 
‘meditation support’, and in some cases a simple endorsement to other 
organizations’ actions and a promise to remain ‘actively engaged’. Hence, 
phrases like the European Union “stands ready to contribute to and facilitate this 
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process”513 or it “stands ready to step up its support to this end”514 appear in the 
vast majority of documents analyzed that assess the EU’s own actions, and this is 
the trend since the early days in 2004: 
The Council commends the African Union for 
assuming a leading role in this monitoring mission, and 
pledges its continued support to it, in political terms but 
also in the form of human resources, as well as 
technical, logistic and financial assistance, including 
from the Africa Peace Facility515 
This struggle to ‘be relevant’ and, more importantly, be to perceived as a 
relevant security actor actively engaged in the context is acknowledged by the 
EU itself when it focuses on the need to ensure visibility to its actions. One of the 
tasks of the Union’s Special Representative for Sudan, as established by the 
Council and the SG/HR, was exactly to ensure the “maximum effectiveness and 
visibility’ of Union’s contribution to the AU mission in the Darfur region”516, in 
other words, to showcase the organization’s actions. Making the actions visible – 
to say – is considered as crucial as making sure they are effective – to do. The 
same concern for visibility was made clear in the express demand to the EU 
personnel deployed in Darfur to wear identification: 
In order to ensure visibility of the EU supporting 
action, the members of the EU Police Team shall bear 
EU identification markings. […] In order to ensure 
                                                
513  Council of the European Union, "Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, 
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visibility of the EU supporting action, the military 
personnel shall bear EU identification markings.517 
The struggle to remain relevant and to justify the institution’s existence as 
a security actor is even more challenging when the organization is doing little to 
nothing in relation to the crisis. Such is the case of the EU when it was 
considerably reducing its engagement in the crisis management of Darfur, first 
with the end of the support action to AMIS at the beginning of UNAMID in 2008, 
and later at the end of EUFOR Tchad/CAR and the transfer of its tasks to the UN 
in 2009. By this period, as it is the case even nowadays, it could not be 
reasonably claimed that the conflict was resolved: the Darfur Peace Agreement 
of 2006 had largely failed due to the lack of inclusiveness; rebel groups kept 
fragmenting and would hardly join the negotiation table of what organizations 
choose to call ‘re-energized process’; the conflict had spilled-over in the region 
and tensions between governments in Sudan and Chad were high; internally 
displaced people and refugees were not coming back to their homes and a sense 
of insecurity persisted as well as the obstacles to humanitarian aid. In sum, the 
EU could not claim to be disengaging from Darfur because the crisis was over. 
In order to manage the inconvenience of the continuity of violence, an 
inconclusive peace process, and the persistence of internally displaced people in 
Sudan as well as refugees in Chad and CAR, on the one side, and the end of its 
missions, on the other, the EU had three discursive tools making reference to 
outputs. First, it repeatedly reaffirms that it ‘remains committed’, although not as 
engaged as before, to support the initiatives aiming at solving the crisis in Darfur 
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such as the hybrid AU/UN mission UNAMID and the round of negotiations in 
Qatar as well as MINURCAT in Chad: 
The EU is strongly committed - through Union 
instruments and bilateral cooperation by Member States 
– to support the Government of South Sudan in 
addressing these issues. The EU also remains committed 
to intensive political dialogue with the Government of 
Sudan in Khartoum on issues of mutual concern. 518 
The focus of the discourse is then on the organization’s continued 
commitment, by political and diplomatic support and, above all, by highlighting 
the financial contribution from its different institutions, mainly the European 
Commission and the funds from African Peace Facility, as well as by its 
member-states. Hence, the continuous financial contribution is showcased 
throughout the whole period: 
The EU has committed a total of over EUR 300 
million from the African Peace Facility in support of 
AMIS since June 2004. This has provided the funds 
necessary to pay personnel costs including salaries, 
allowances, insurance, travel, rations and medical 
costs.519 
A second discursive tool to manage this gradual disengagement in front 
of an unresolved crisis was to ‘include it’ in a larger context in which the 
organization was more active. In this case, if the EU was reducing its 
involvement in Darfur, it claims that it was nonetheless active in other scenarios 
where its policies would contribute to manage the Darfur crisis because they 
would all be ‘interdependent’ after all. Hence, by the time the support action to 
AMIS ends and the EUFOR Tchad/CAR mission is deploying, the EU argues for 
                                                
518 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Sudan", 12632/10, Brussels, 2010. 
para. 6. 
519  Council of the European Union, "Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, 
welcomes the successful completion of the EU supporting action to AMIS in Darfur." 
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a ‘comprehensive approach’ to the region, meaning that if it was not active in 
Darfur, it was at least contributing to the regional ramification whose solution is 
critical to the original crisis: 
In conducting this operation [EUFOR] the EU is 
stepping up its longstanding action in support of efforts 
to tackle the crisis in Darfur and to address its regional 
ramifications, notably in Eastern Chad and North-
eastern Central African Republic. In this context, 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA will ensure a high degree of 
coordination with UNAMID.520 
Once both actions, AMIS and EUFOR, complete their mandate by 2009 
and it is the referendum for the independence of the South Sudan in 2010 that 
grabs the attention, the EU turned to a ‘comprehensive approach’ to Sudan as a 
whole, highlighting more often then before the importance of addressing all 
issues in the country. In other words, if the organization is not sufficiently 
involved in the so far insolvable crisis in Darfur, it is, however, also committed 
to other areas of Sudan, which is taken as a whole, and actions in other parts 
would also count. 
Finally, a third tool to alleviate the perceived inaction of the organization 
vis-à-vis the crisis in Darfur is to amalgamate the contributions and the actions 
under the institutional framework of the EU with the bilateral actions of its 
member-states. Hence, the discourse would frequently emphasize not only the 
contribution of the missions and the financial support of the EU but also the 
bilateral engagements of countries such as the United Kingdom in the mediation 
in Darfur and France in Chad. An additional forth tool to alleviate the burden of 
                                                
520  Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Sudan/Char-CAR", 5922/08, 
Brussels, 2008. para. 9. 
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perceived inaction, this time through amalgamation with actions of other actors 
in security governance, is discussed in chapter 8 with the image of multilateral 
regionalism. 
4) The AU’s self-criticism and hard work 
While the EU struggles to showcase the output of its policies as a 
‘support role’ and how ‘actively committed’ it is to help solving the crisis in 
Darfur despite the gradual disengagement in later years, the AU also needs to 
confront issues of its own relating to how beneficial its actions were and have 
been so far. As a matter of fact, after years of actions and policies – multiple 
rounds of talks, the centre of mediation switching from Abuja to Tripoli and then 
to Qatar, a permanent re-launch of the peace process, the signature of at least a 
handful of documents between warring parties, and the transition from AMIS to 
UNAMID – the situation in Darfur remained, as it was in the beginning, a 
‘concern’. From the early days of its engagement when the organization aimed at 
a “a stable, peaceful and united Sudan”521 up until the end of the analysis in 2011 
or even up until now, the conflict remained unresolved and at best it is 
successfully ‘managed’ in certain periods before violence resurges. Moreover, 
the number of displaced people remains high. 
Given the persistence of the situation on the ground, a claim of success – 
or a claim of decisive positive output of the AU’s policies – of the missions and 
of permanent solution to the crisis would be unreasonable. Hence, the AU’s 
discourse is not only about showcasing its contribution in general or its position 
                                                
521  Peace and Security Council, "Briefing Note on the Renewal of the Mandate of the AU 
Mission in the Sudan (AMIS)", PSC/PR/2(XLII), Addis Ababa, 2005. para 11. 
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as the leader of the mediation effort in particular, but equally important was to 
explain the relative failure of the policies in so far as they didn’t ensure long-
term stability and peace for Darfur in the long run after almost a decade of 
involvement. By consequence, the organization uses three tools to manage this 
‘contradiction’: self-criticism followed by explanations of the lack of efficacy, 
the insistence on the hard work behind the policies, and in the later years a focus 
on the ‘domestication of the peace process’ in order to shift the burden to the 
national government. 
The first tool is a moderate self-criticism followed by an explanation on 
the reasons why the policy has not been effective as expected. Contrarily to the 
EU, the AU Commission produced reports that include a fair amount of critics in 
relation to its actions in Darfur, acknowledging above all the limitations of its 
policies, which were in turn linked to the limitations of the organization. These 
reports are similar to those produced by the Secretary-General of the UN and are 
equally public; at least they were available at the time of the missions. It was, for 
instance, by acknowledging the limits of the first version of AMIS, which was 
put in place right after the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire of 2004, that the 
AU legitimated the increase in size and in mandate that followed and 
transformed it into AMIS 2 later in 2004: 
It is generally agreed that the initial AMIS 
deployment has been useful, but that the Mission’s 
effectiveness has been constrained by its small size as 
well as logistic challenges. The military observers 
currently deployed, no matter how efficient and 
dedicated, cannot hope to provide meaningful 
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monitoring coverage to an area that is roughly the size 
of France.522 
AU’s self-criticism throughout the period – in the Commissioner reports 
and other documents – points out to a constrained effectiveness of its policies, 
from a slow deployment of troops to the inefficiency in performing the tasks 
assigned by the documents such as the Ceasefire of 2004 or the Darfur Peace 
Agreement of 2006, passing by the inability to actually prevent violence. In 
occasions, the honesty of the reports is truly surprising, such as when the AU 
makes comments about its mediation team in 2006, concluding that the “efforts 
exerted so far, including proximity talks and negotiations in small groups, did not 
yield any positive development.”523 
While self-criticism might justify an outside help, it can still work against 
an image of beneficial regionalism that portrays the regional organization as 
effective in dealing with the security issues. Hence, the AU is quick to explaining 
the reasons for its inefficiency and most of the criticism is accompanied by a 
justification that usually takes the blame of its own inefficacy away from 
organization. A common explanation is the lack of engagement and cooperation 
from other parties in the peace process such as the rebel groups, which would not 
be the organization’s fault. More than constantly pleading for their engagement, 
and shaming their acts of violence, the AU also points to the fact that the groups 
and the GoS did not fulfil their commitment as a reason to the failure of the 
peace process: 
                                                
522 Peace and Security Council, "Working Document on the Enhacement of the African Mission 
in the Sudan", PSC/MSC/2(I), Addis Ababa, 2004. para 1. Emphasis mine. 
523  
  224 
The Mission pointed out that the effectiveness of 
AMIS is directly related to the level of cooperation it 
receives from the parties to the conflict. Thus far, that 
cooperation has been extremely inconsistent.524 
In a harsh discourse motivated by intense media coverage and critique on 
the actions of the AU in 2005, AU Commission Special Representative, Baba 
Kingibe, is clear on where he assigns the blame: 
[…] the mechanism in place could have worked 
if the parties to the conflict in Darfur were acting in 
good faith and if they were genuinely committed to their 
undertakings in the various agreements they have 
signed.525 
Another explanation, which the AU links to the relative failure of peace 
talks and its multiple rounds, is the constant fragmentation of the rebel groups. 
While being composed of only two groups at the beginning of the conflict in 
2003 (i.e. JEM and SLM/A), the opposition gradually fragmented to the point 
where it was very difficult to have all parties joining the same negotiation table 
and rivalries accentuated. Even though efforts were made to ensure “unity, 
cohesion and representation of the Movements”526 into umbrella organizations, it 
was exactly the signature of the different agreements that would motivate 
internal divisions among those in favour and those against the documents and in 
occasions lead to in fight. 
[…] the increasing factionalization of the rebel 
movements and the continuing tribal tensions and 
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Deteriorating Situation in Darfur", Karthoum, 2005. 
http://www.sudantribune.com/article_impr.php3?id_article=11871. 13 April 2014. 
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conflicts, which have contributed to the perpetuation of 
the prevailing situation of violence and insecurity, have 
further compounded the problems confronting the 
Mission on the ground. 
The third set of explanations refers to the acknowledgement of AU’s own 
limits as a young organization. In this trend, the discourse highlights two 
shortcomings that usually appear together: the “financial and logistical 
constrains”527, especially in the case of the mission in Darfur. While exposing the 
lack of capacity and the lack of funds might pave the way to outside help and/or 
intervention – it contributes to the justification of the hybrid AU/UN mission – or 
at the same time jeopardize the organization’s stand in the conflict management, 
it might also contribute to mitigate the expectations and highlight that the 
organization is inexperienced and should actually be enhanced, not dismantled. 
The lack of capacity and funds, combined with goodwill and a dose of positive 
output, might actually justify the strengthening of the RSO if its goals are seen as 
legitimate. 
A second tool of the organization is to highlight the ‘hard work’ of its 
personnel, in the field and in the headquarters as well as of the special 
representatives, in executing the tasks assigned to them. These efforts are 
portrayed as having a value of their own. Despite the fact that much of the hard 
work might be compromised by the lack of effectiveness, it can be interpreted 
that the former compensates the latter to a certain extent. As a matter of fact, 
references to the hard work of the organization are among the most frequent in 
the coding process of the case studies, from the Commission that has “worked 
                                                
527 African Union Assembly, "Declaration on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union and the State of Peace and Security in Africa", 
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tirelessly”528 to the soldiers of AMIS and their “constant enormous efforts, […] 
their professionalism and the commitment […] in the struggle for a lasting peace 
in Sudan.”529 
Finally, by the end of the period here analysed and in the face of years of 
conflict and violence, the African Union turns to the ‘domestication of the peace 
process’, meaning that the Sudan and its government would take a larger role in 
resolving its own crisis and the outsiders would be no more than ‘enablers’. 
Since the beginning it was said that the GoS had a responsibility in protecting the 
civilians, an argument very much in line with the predominant notion of R2P, 
and the responsibility to ensure a safe environment. However, after years of 
repeated failure in bringing the rebels and the GoS to the table to a permanent 
agreement and in tackling the roots of the conflict with an inclusive process, 
came to light the idea of ‘domestication of the peace process’. The peace process 
is then portrayed as happening “in Darfur, for Darfurians, by Darfurians.” 530 The 
role of international actors is limited to making the process possible.” 
So, what is the solution? To sit down as 
Sudanese, as Darfurians and negotiate. We, of the 
United Nations, of the African Union, of the 
international community, can only facilitate. But the 
ultimate responsibility of peace in Darfur lies with the 
people of Darfur.531 
In this regard, much of the burden of ‘being effective’ or ‘being relevant’ 
is shifted to the GoS itself, its leaders, and the people in Darfur, reducing the 
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expectations on the AU actions – from leader to enabler. Other means of shifting 
or sharing the burden, this time within the larger regional governance, are 
discussed in chapter 8. 
Conclusion 
The first image of regionalism, which is grasped by the analysis of the 
discursive legitimation of the European Union and the African Union, is the 
image of beneficial regionalism. Accordingly, RSOs focus on the positive output 
of their policies and how they solve or will solve the problems for the people. In 
doing so, however, regional organizations rarely if ever resort to claims of 
‘comparative advantages’, frequently detailed in the literature of regionalism, in 
relation to other (non-regional) organizations and states. The analysis of the 
legitimation discourse of both organizations actually shows that those claims of 
good output are seen in complementarity to the output of other organizations, and 
not as better and more effective policies. 
Given, that the missions and policies implemented by the AU and the EU 
in the context of the crisis in Darfur were largely uncontroversial (i.e. authorized 
by the host government and the competent bodies) and that a response of the 
international community was expected, the main challenge was not to legitimate 
the policies in particular, but to legitimate the existence of the organizations – at 
least their security dimensions – through the policies. As relative newcomers, 
regional organizations’ legitimation takes place in deeper levels according 
Lagroye’s scale 532 , meaning that it goes beyond how ruling is exerted (the 
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policies and missions) and includes to the value of existence of a new institution 
(the regional security organization) or a new system of domination altogether. It 
is then by doing something and portraying themselves as relevant actors that the 
organizations legitimate their own existence.  
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Chapter 6 
THE NECESSARY REGIONALISM 
 
The threatening death appears immediately as disorder and 
chaos. Thus, the central theme of the rationalization of power 
can be reduced to two simple statements: power avoids death, 
it ensures order and life, by repressing the disorder; in 
renewing the gift, it ensures prosperity.533 
 
Legitimation, writes Jacques Lagroye, is process in which meaningful 
practices represent the existence of the unequal power relation inherent to 
political institutions as a social necessity and a benefaction534. The image of 
necessary regionalism touches upon the former aspect, meaning that it portrays 
the policies of regional organizations as well as their existences as necessary in 
the face of a social context marked ‘chaos, violence, and death’. Hence, the 
image constructs its main argument as an opposition: the chaos and disorder in 
absence of power relations and rulers versus the order and prosperity in the 
presence of power and a ruling system based in inequality between rulers and 
ruled. 
Lagroye called ‘rationalization of power’ this process of justification of 
unequal power relations because they are necessary. Chapter 5 touches upon the 
beneficent regionalism, meaning the positive output of a policy and its problem-
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solving capacity. But for a policy to be perceived as a solution to a problem535, 
there has to be a problem in the first place because logically there is no need to 
fix what is not broken. In the case of security regionalism and regional security 
organizations, the ‘problem’ is a security issue or a threat and the solution would 
be, at least in part, the actions of the same RSOs. Hence, there can be threats to 
regional and international order, to peace and stability, to the well-being of 
individuals and their lives, all of which could eventually legitimate political 
institutions because they are seen as necessary.  
We now know from critical security studies and the literature of 
securitization – at least such is one of the theoretical assumptions underpinning 
this research on legitimation536 – that threats are socially constructed and that 
security is not immutable, but performative. Hence, by legitimating their actions 
and policies, RSOs participate in the process of determining what constitutes and 
what does not constitute a threat and to whom, why does it matter, and how can 
it be solved. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first one looks at the 
‘dramatization’ in the discourse of RSOs, meaning the trend by which regional 
organizations depict a given situation as dramatic, violent, and deadly. The 
second section examines what is that is being threatened according to the RSOs’ 
discourses, from regional order and stability to the lives and human rights of 
individuals in Darfur and adjacent areas. Finally, the third section looks at how 
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the argument of necessity is constructed through an opposition of chaos, violence 
and instability on the one hand, and peace, order and stability on the other. 
1) Talking security: dramatization 
In the so-called field of security, only certain groups and institutions 
“authorize themselves and […] are authorized to state what security is” 537 . 
Discourse is shaped and controlled by a number of social procedures of 
exclusion, which define what shall be said, who is in the position to do so and 
how it should be done.538 The same understanding applies to the definition of 
what constitutes a threat, for not everybody can do so and the characterization as 
such is seen as “part of a political and material struggle, rather than as 
corresponding to an immanent quality of the situation” 539 . Therefore, it is 
understood that for every security issue, there is a struggle among different actors 
for the right to speak about it and to deal with it. Regional organizations like the 
European Union or the African Union are part of this struggle when they assess a 
situation in their region or abroad, point out to what they consider to be threats, 
or simply ‘express concern’ regarding a conflict and an episode of violence. 
Even if RSOs do not have the formal authority to determine what constitutes a 
threat to peace and security as the UNSC has according to the UN Charter, they 
nonetheless ‘speak security’. 
What is probably the most frequent occurrence in the discourse of the 
European Union and the African Union in relation to Darfur since 2003 is the 
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‘dramatization’ of the situation. In this pattern, RSOs express their own 
assessment of the conflict as dramatic by any given reason: attacks on civilians, 
aerial bombings, disruption of humanitarian assistance, attacks on mission 
personnel, and the like. Just as national states and United Nations, the AU and 
the EU ‘express concern’, ‘condemn’ or ‘call the attention’ to certain issues and 
by doing so they engage in defining what constitutes a threat or a security 
problem. RSOs emphasise certain events over others and highlight a number of 
aspects according to their point of view. Consequently, they tell their own story 
of the events and present their own judgments, which are different from the 
multiple possible versions of the same event – from rebels groups to the 
governments: 
The Council remains deeply concerned about the 
appalling security situation in Darfur which continues to 
threaten the civilian population and obstructs efforts of 
humanitarian organisations to provide much needed 
assistance. Despite a decline in direct military 
confrontations, there has been no improvement with 
regard to the overall level of violence and lawlessness. 
The Council is particularly concerned by the recent 
series of unprovoked attacks against AMIS, in which 
nine peacekeepers were killed in the last four weeks 
alone […].540 
The chairman CFC notes with regret the 
unfolding skirmish in Haskanita area of the Darfur 
Region over the past 24hours. Government of Sudan 
armed forces and non-signatory rebel factions have 
engaged in hostilities leading to loss of lives and 
properties.541 
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When the African Union notes that that the “humanitarian situation in 
Darfur is extremely grave”542 or that the situation in El Fasher “continues to be 
extremely tense”543, it does not dispose of a universal and objective point of 
reference for measuring how tense and grave the situation really is. When the 
European Union expresses concern over “the appalling security, humanitarian 
and human rights situation in Darfur” or when it stresses that the fight in the 
region is “causing grave human suffering”544, it does not base its claims on an 
objective spectrum of human suffering or human rights violations. These 
statements are the organizations’ own assessments and judgments that are not 
attached to any possible immanent quality of the situation. The very fact that 
they talk about it in the first place and, consciously or not, ‘choose’ to mention 
certain events is already an assessment of what is a security issue and which are 
the threats. 
What is considered ‘extremely grave’ in the discourse of one organization 
might be completely absent from the discourse of another. The conflict in Darfur 
started already in February 2003, but it was only many months later that the 
African Union and the European Union ‘took notice’ of the events and assessed 
their gravity as a threat to local, national or regional security. For the UN, Darfur 
was still only a side note of a much larger concern that was the North-South Civil 
War when the AU, humanitarian workers, and NGOs were already expressing 
their ‘deep concern’ and trying to call the world’s attention early in 2004. 
Likewise, in the later years, the security situation in Darfur appeared as much 
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more of a concern for the AU than it was for the EU. The very fact that 
organizations assess the same situation differently also attests to the fact that 
RSOs participate in the struggle of defining what security is in a given context.  
Furthermore, what is left unsaid is at least as important as what is said in 
an organization’s assessment of the situation. Deliberately or not, any given 
discourse always leaves behind parts of the story. But the unsaid is hard to 
conceive from an outsiders’ position if one sticks to the discourse of only one 
actor. Hence, the importance of comparing how the EU and the AU refer to the 
same situation. For instance, although the discourse on Darfur seems to align for 
most of the core issues (e.g. the violence in Darfur was not considered a 
genocide by neither of the two organizations), there has been a difference 
regarding how heavily the organizations would point fingers to the (in)actions of 
Government of Sudan as a security issue. The EU, especially in 2004 and 2005, 
expressly accused the GoS of being an impediment to the peace process and of 
not respecting its commitments: 
The Council […] expresses its dissatisfaction 
that the Government of Sudan has not implemented the 
other most urgent obligations manifested in the Joint 
Communiqué of 3 July [2004]. There is no indication 
that the Government of Sudan has taken real and 
provable steps to disarm and neutralise the armed 
militia, including the Janjaweed. […] Despite all 
contrary announcements of the Government of Sudan, 
there are continuing reports about massive human rights 
violations by the armed militia including the Janjaweed, 
including systematic rape of women.545 
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By consequence, the EU not only imposed sanctions, but also threatened 
to expand the sanctions regime if the GoS was not to abide to its own 
declarations and obligations such as disarming the militia and facilitating the 
humanitarian work. The AU, on its side, rarely if ever directly and publicly 
expressed dissatisfaction in relation to the GoS or threatened Khartoum with hard 
measures such as sanctions or, even less, intervention without its prior 
authorization. The GoS was depicted more often as a part of the solution rather 
than a part the problem. Perhaps because of this attitude, the AU was often the 
only the actor negotiating with Sudan when the GoS would shut the door to the 
international community at large. 
The main point here is that these are two different stories, which are told 
about the same dramatic situation and the role of an actor, the GoS, in this 
situation. In the EU’s storyline, the GoS is one of the protagonists and is closer to 
be portrayed as part of threat or at least as an obstacle to peace. In the AU’s 
storyline, the GoS is hardly mentioned in negative terms and is often 
amalgamated as one of the many parties in conflict when the AU condemns the 
acts of violence. Recently, following the resignation of UNAMID spokesperson, 
the AU along with the UN were accused of hiding crucial information about the 
authorship of attacks in Darfur and of ‘under-reporting’ human rights violations. 
Even when it was clear that the perpetrators of violence, which included attacks 
against humanitarian workers and the mission’ bases and personnel, were linked 
to the GoS, the UNAMID reports would not confirm its culpability546. Hence, 
because they feared reprisal from the GoS or because of any other given reason, 
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the AU selected the facts it would report and told the story accordingly, leaving 
some parts untold. 
Finally, security discourses function as a double-edged sword: while they 
might be part of the legitimation process of the power relations in place, they 
also establish a particular set of responsibilities to actors in dealing with the 
problem. 547  This responsibility, on the one hand, is not always welcomed 
because it certainly raises expectations, which can be hard to meet as shown in 
chapter 5, or because the actor is unable or unwilling to act in response to the 
crisis due to the high costs or any other given reason. The US government’s 
hesitation in defining the events in Rwanda in 1994 as genocide exemplifies this 
aspect. If an action is seen as necessary and the duties fall on the shoulders of an 
organization that is incapable of dealing with the task, then such discourse might 
end up de-legitimating the organization because it ‘does not do what it is 
supposed to do’. On the other hand, being perceived as having the duty to act 
indicates that the organization is seen as having a legitimate standing in the 
system, which in turn ascribes it this responsibility. While processes other than 
the organizations’ own discourse might ‘ascribe’ these obligations, the case 
studies show that the regional organizations, especially the AU, were particularly 
interested in reaffirming or accepting their duties: 
The need to effectively address the current 
conflict and the resulting humanitarian and human rights 
crisis cannot be overemphasized. The AU is therefore, 
duty bound to play a leading role in resolving this crisis. 
Of particular importance in this regard is the need to 
ensure the protection of the civilian population and avert 
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any further deterioration of the humanitarian 
situation.548 
We also believe that it is Africa’s crisis and, as 
such, Africa has a duty to help the people of Sudan to 
achieve a lasting solution.549 
The EU’s discourse presents much less references to the organization’s 
duties and obligations arising from the dramatic situation in Darfur, and yet this 
links appear in some passages, notably at the beginning in 2004 and 2005. Not 
surprisingly, when the EU disengaged from the crisis in Darfur, its actions 
became less of an ‘obligation’ as they were in 2005 according to the words of 
Javier Solana coming back from a trip to Sudan: 
I brought back with me three conclusions: the 
stability of Sudan has not yet been achieved; Sudan's 
stability is fundamental to the entire African continent; 
and the international community, notably Europe, has a 
duty to act and to achieve results in Sudan.550 
When organizations such as the EU or the AU tell us that they have the 
duty to act in response to a given situation such as Darfur, they are assigning this 
‘burden’ to their organization only because they are acting or planning to do so. 
At the very least this responsibility that the organization might be unable to fulfil 
might justify an enhancement of mandate or the strengthening of the 
organization. Simply put, if they are seen as responsible to manage a crisis, they 
are logically seen as having the right to do so – have the responsibility because 
they are entitled to it as an organization occupying a legitimate position in 
security governance. 
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This trend of dramatization of the conflict in Darfur is not to be neglected 
as a mere written translation of what is ‘really happening’ on the ground. It is the 
organization’s assessment of the situation and a defining part of the legitimation 
of the actions and of the existence of regional security organizations. There 
cannot be a solution without a problem. Defining this problem and its limits, 
which for security organizations means a threat or a security issue and how big it 
is, is the first step of the ‘rationalization of power’. The section below looks at 
who or what, according to the discourse of RSOs, is being threaded with the 
crisis in Darfur. 
2) Whose security? 
This pattern of legitimation and ‘rationalization of power’ by portraying a 
policy as necessary given a dramatic and urgent security situation overlaps 
considerably with the well-established concept of securitization551. Similarly to 
legitimation, securitization is a discursive and intersubjective process. Also 
similarly to legitimation via rationalization of power, securitization is about 
constructing – within a political community - a threat to a “valued referent 
object”.552 Hence, both ideas converge at the understanding that there are no 
objectives or immanent threats and that they do not pre-exist independently from 
an intersubjective social process. 
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But these two concepts do not completely coincide in every aspect. While 
both processes refer to portraying a given situation as a threat to one or multiple 
valued objects, securitization calls for urgent measures to address urgent needs; 
measures that go beyond normal politics and have been called ‘exceptional’. The 
enactment of these exceptional and urgent measures is actually seen as the 
indicator that securitization – or the securitizing move – is successful. Because 
the securitizing actor is in fact claiming its right – or the other’s right – to special 
measures in order to address what it says is existential threat, it can be said that it 
is legitimating the exceptional measures.  
However, as defined in chapter 3, legitimation is more encompassing 
than justifying only special and urgent measures. Not every policy or action that 
is seen as a necessity is also exceptional. The AU mediation in Darfur or the 
EU’s assistance mission to AMIS can be portrayed as necessary given the 
violence, hence a threat, but they are not at all exceptional as would be, for 
example, a military intervention without prior authorization of the Government 
of Sudan. 
 Other distinctions between securitization and legitimation are more 
nuanced. Firstly, the process of legitimation is broader in terms of the arguments 
that can be evoked, going beyond the idea that actions are justified because they 
deal with urgent threats. This thesis alone presents patterns of arguments such as 
multilateralism and legality in other chapters, which add to the argument of 
necessity. Secondly, while securitization focuses on the construction of threats 
and how they come to justify actions, legitimation concerns above all the 
unequal power relation between rulers and ruled. In the case studies, this means 
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that legitimation is not concerned only with the policies of regional 
organizations, but also with their position within a larger system of governance 
and, as seen in chapter 5, how policies themselves actually legitimate such 
position. Finally, while a successful process of securitization establishes that 
‘something has to be done’, and this is an exceptional measure, the legitimation 
also refers to ‘what is to be done’, ‘by whom’, ‘when’, and ‘how’.  
Fonseca illustrates this last point when commenting on the changes in the 
normative context after the Cold War in regards to non-indifference and the 
action of the Security Council: 
If we look at the actions of the Security Council 
in cases of conflict after 1989, we will see that the 
debate on the legitimacy of the mechanisms of the UN 
Charter is not questioned any longer in the sense that the 
‘international community’ can act in response to 
situations like those in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, and 
Bosnia. The problem shifts to how to act and which is 
the most efficient way to respond to the conflict.553 
Even if there is a need to establish the situations like Somalia, Ruanda, 
Angola or, in this case, Darfur as problematic and requiring action, the follow up 
question refers to what kind of (re)action would be legitimate. As a matter of 
fact, the European Union and the African Union frequently highlighted the need 
and the preference for a ‘political solution’ to answer the ‘security problem’ in 
Darfur, which in their discourse means a diplomatic, negotiated and non-violent 
process: 
The Council recalls that peace in Sudan will 
never be complete without a lasting settlement of the 
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situation in Darfur. Therefore, it remains committed to 
finding a political solution to the problems in Darfur.554 
Second, the DPP [Darfur Peace Process] is a 
political process. The armed conflict in Darfur is rooted 
in a political conflict, which needs a political solution. 
Darfurians have political views and are divided 
accordingly. Only a political process can foster a 
political consensus that will deligitimise armed 
conflict.555 
Thus, a ‘how to’ answer that is far from any exceptional measure one 
could foreseen. Even if there is indeed a security and dramatic situation in Sudan, 
it is the ‘political process’ of negotiation, mediation, and compromise that is 
depicted as the solution to the security problem. From this perspective, and 
because it lacks exceptional measures “going beyond rules that would otherwise 
bind”556, the legitimation of RSOs in Darfur does not equate to securitization. 
However, by borrowing the concept of ‘referent object’ from securitization 
theory, which is the socially valued object that being threatened and ‘has to 
survive’, it is possible to grasp who or what is in danger from the point of view 
of regional organizations. In other words, it is possible to analyse whose security 
matters and, by consequence, whose security might legitimate the policies of 
regional organizations. 
The most common occurrences of ‘dramatization’ in the discourse of 
RSOs relate directly or indirectly to the insecurity of the population in Darfur, 
meaning that people as individuals and as a collective are being threatened by the 
violence in the region. The situation is said to cause deep concern because the 
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lives of individuals – or their way of life and their way of making a living – is 
threatened. Hence, their lives are in danger because of the disruption of the 
humanitarian assistance, attacks against aid workers, and the like: 
As in the past, insecurity continues to affect the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance. The recurrence of 
violence in some areas by armed militia and armed 
bandits, especially the Janjaweed militia, has forced 
local communities to flee.557 
The Council remains deeply concerned about the 
humanitarian and security situation on the ground, 
including the harassment and kidnapping of 
humanitarian aid workers and peace keepers.558 
Other passages in their discourse highlight the permanent insecurity 
afflicting refugees and internally displaced people in their camps in Chad, CAR, 
and Darfur. The number of displaced people itself it presented as dramatic: 
The urgency of the situation hardly needs to be 
overemphasized. As stressed by the Joint Special 
Representative, while the situation on the ground has 
changed from the period of intense hostilities in 2003-
04, the war in Darfur continues, civilians are exposed to 
an unacceptable risk of violence, millions of people 
continue to live in IDP camps or as refugees in 
neighboring Chad.559 
The Council expressed its concern about the 
security conditions in the Darfur refugee camps located 
in Chad.560 
Moreover, the situation is often depicted as a ‘humanitarian crisis’ and 
human rights violations are then highlighted: 
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The European Council continues to be deeply 
concerned at the serious infringements of human rights 
and of international humanitarian law committed against 
the civil population in Darfur, and at the hindrance of 
the efforts of humanitarian organisations […].561 
As the hostilities between the parties have 
intensified, civilians have borne the burnt of the fallout. 
Grave human rights violations have been committed 
during the recent fighting, including abductions, torture, 
displacement, rape and destruction of food stocks. The 
attacks on civilian villages have led to the displacement 
of thousands of villagers, many of whom continue to be 
subjected to human rights abuses inside the very camps 
in which they have taken refuge.562 
It is important to quote all the above passages because they are examples 
of the ‘stories’ that RSOs tell and contribute to the depiction of a dramatic 
situation and of an overall context of insecurity threatening the population in 
Darfur. Moreover, they also shed light on yet another point mentioned in chapter 
5: the ruling for whom, or whose security matter? In the case of the EU’s policies 
in Darfur, CAR, and Chad, the analysis helps us to acknowledge that the 
argument of ‘government for the people’ is not limited to solving issues directly 
infringing the electorate or the citizens of the organizations’ member-states. It 
might as well be used in reference to the threats against communities outside the 
traditional ruling hierarchy even when those communities do not constitute 
audiences capable of directly influencing the decision-making. 
In very few occasions, if ever, were the actions of the EU in Darfur and 
Chad justified in terms of direct benefits to the European population, even less as 
being necessary responses to threats against the EU member states and their 
populations. Not even the classic arguments of interdependence and potential 
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instability spreading across continents were used. In the EU’s discourse, people 
facing violence are entitled to outside help – including help from outside their 
region – even when they do not fall within the traditional government-citizens 
hierarchy of nation states. Such is the case, for instance, of the people in the 
territory where a EU mission takes place, like the people of Chad and CAR. 
Certainly the government – or in this case the governance – can also be said to 
contribute to their wellbeing as well: 
In a very demanding terrain, they effectively 
contributed to a safer environment for civilians, in 
particular refugees and displaced people. They also 
enabled the UN, international humanitarian 
organisations and NGOs to carry out their work safely. 
The presence of EUFOR Tchad/RCA has made a 
positive difference to the security environment.563 
Hence, ‘doing good’ and addressing security problems of ‘others’ can 
also justify the regionalist policies if a given audience sees the referent object as 
entitled to help. But the conflict in Darfur was said to be a major concern “[n]ot 
only because of its gravity for the population, but also for reasons of national and 
regional stability.”564 This means that the lives of people in the region were not 
the only valued referent object being threatened, but that stability and regional 
order were seen as somehow valuable. Sudan itself ‘had to exist’ in the discourse 
of both AU and EU as “stable, peaceful and united”565 for the former and as 
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“peaceful, democratic and prosperous”566 for the latter. Furthermore, this concern 
over regional stability was clear in the discourse when the organizations 
portrayed the situation in Chad and, for the European Union, the deployment of 
the EUFOR mission: 
The destabilising effects of the Darfur conflict in 
the wider region, in particular in Chad and in the Central 
African Republic, are of great concern to the European 
Council. It reiterates that any further tension poses a 
serious threat to peace and the stability of the entire 
region.567 
Finally, the tension between the Sudan and 
Chad, exacerbated by the desertion of Chadian soldiers 
who retreated towards the border between the two 
countries and the attack, on 18 December 2005, on the 
town of Adré, threaten to destabilize the entire region, 
especially as the general situation is particularly fragile. 
This situation is all the more disturbing as the Adré 
incident was followed by accusations and counter 
accusations between Chad and Sudan.568 
Hence, the logic in the discourses would go as follows: the situation in 
Darfur concerns the national stability of Sudan, which in turn impacts the 
stability of neighbouring countries and risks putting their bilateral relations in 
danger to, finally, lead to the regional instability becoming an issue of “vital 
interest to the African continent.”569 
Finally, a relevant question would be whether RSOs construct threats 
having themselves as referent objects. This is a valid hypothesis because 
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securitization theory argues that states have for long securitized issues in relation 
their national security and justified exceptional policies accordingly. 570 
Traditional security studies have been statecentric not only because they insist in 
neglecting other referent objects, but also because securitization by states of 
threats to states is empirically very common – states are usually a socially valued 
object and state officials are by default in a position of authority and enjoy other 
“felicity conditions”571. The European regional project, argues Ole Wæver, was 
underpinned by the successful securitization of the European past marked war 
and power politics against the current and future Europe of peace, therefore, 
constituting a threat not only to the EU and regional stability, but also to the 
national states. 
As a matter of fact, both organizations often come out in defence of the 
missions’ personnel deployed in the region and are quick to report and condemn 
the violent attacks against them: 
As we settle down to consider the security 
situation in Darfur and cases of Ceasefire violations, I 
must reiterate that AMIS is deeply concerned and 
disturbed about the increasing assaults and attacks on 
our personnel and properties. Our military officer, who 
was abducted on 10 December 2007 along with his 
vehicle, is still missing with no clue whatsoever as to 
who committed this abominable act.572 
"I strongly condemn the attack on the AMIS 
peacekeeping forces in Haskanita in Darfur […] The 
                                                
570 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework of Analysis, 15-9. 
571 Peoples, Columba and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies: An introduction, 76. 
572 Mukaruliza, Monique, "Opening remarks by Ms Monique Mukaruliza, Ag SRCC/HoM and 
Chairperson of the 5th Session of the Joint Commission in El Fasher", El Fasher, 2007. 
  247 
attack is unjustifiable and constitutes a grave violation 
of the ceasefire agreement.573 
Yet, as far as the case study of the crisis in Darfur is concerned, the act of 
reporting on the attacks against the mission’s personnel is far from portraying a 
danger to the organization itself, even less an existential threat to the EU and AU 
membership. By analysing how these reports of attacks against UNAMID, 
AMIS, EUFOR, or humanitarian workers appear in the discourse, one can 
actually conclude that they serve more to stress the general insecurity of the 
region and therefore to the population since ‘even humanitarian worker are 
attacked!’ In addition, they also seem to go towards de-legitimating the 
perpetrators of violence who are acting against ‘those who are there to help’ and 
against humanitarian law that protects aid workers. Hence, these attacks could 
not be reasonably depicted as endangering the existence of the organization. 
In sum, RSOs take on themselves to determine what constitutes a threat 
to the people of Darfur, and to national and regional order. They ‘talk security’ 
not only concerning the peace and stability in their own region, but also other’s 
beyond their membership. The dramatic situation is said to be tragic for the 
people in the region; and it is also tragic for the maintenance of regional order 
and by extension, the peace and stability of the continent. 
3) Talking security: the necessary (in)action 
By depicting a situation as dramatic, RSOs participate in the performative 
construction of security and threats to various referent objects whose existence is 
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in turn valued. Hence, the situation in Darfur is said to be violent and chaotic, 
although not a genocide, endangering lives of the local population and the 
national and regional stability, although not the organizations per se. However, 
the process of rationalization is also about presenting power as “the condition of 
the triumph” 574 over these threats and violent chaos, at least partially and, as 
shown in chapter 8, in cooperation with other organizations. Legitimation by the 
image of necessary regionalism translates into oppositions such as chaos and 
order, or violence and stability, and conflict and peace. The key to this 
opposition lies into presenting the power in place and its action as the necessary 
condition that brings peace, order, and stability. 
When explaining what he calls legitimation by rationalization, Lagroye575 
illustrates this notion by evoking examples from kingdoms and political orders 
around the globe and mostly in the past. In all of them, there is a differentiation 
between a specialized coercive power and the rest – an unequal power relation of 
rulers and ruled. This inequality is then ‘rationalized’ by rituals and practices 
taking place in key moments such as transitions, the inaugurations of kings, the 
ascension of tribal leaders, and the New Year or harvest celebrations. In the 
kingdom of Agni, present day Ivory Coast, for instance, the death of the king and 
the beginning of the interregnum period were marked by a series of ‘make-
believe’ practices in which the hierarchical status quo is altered to favour those 
traditionally in the bottom of the power relation. What follows is a made-up 
scenario of death, pillage, and crime, which is accompanied by the mocking of 
kings and other rulers. It is only the inauguration of the new king and the end of 
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the interregnum period that bring stability and order back to this made-up world. 
The king is the condition of stability; the ritual of ‘coronation’ expels from the 
kingdom all those who symbolically wronged the ruler during the mocking 
parades. Thus, the ruler is portrayed as what separates life and prosperity from 
death and violence. 
In the case of regional security governance, it is the existence and mainly 
the policies of regional security organizations that are presented as crucial to end 
violence or at least ‘manage it’. Of course, RSOs do not parade their troops – 
more accurately, the member states’ troops – or personnel in a symbolic 
showcase between a chaotic interregnum and an orderly and peaceful policy of 
crisis management. Being bureaucracies, they present their actions as necessary 
through public discourse576, meaning that above all they tell us how necessary 
their actions are. The logic of opposition between life and death, however, 
remains the same. 
A crucial and direct example of this logic of opposition in which the 
regional organization is presented as the solution to the security problems relates 
to the decision by the African Union to extend the mandate of the AMIS late in 
2006. At the time, the Darfur Peace Agreement, which had been signed in Abuja 
in May, was already showing significant signs of weakness and the GoS had not 
only rejected the UN Resolution calling for peacekeeping in Darfur, but also 
called for the withdrawal of African troops by the end of September. Facing this 
context of uncertainty, the AU proposed, in the Commission’s Report of mid-
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September, two opposing alternatives: the extension of the mission’s mandate for 
additional three months along with its enhancement and the tentative of 
convincing the GoS of accepting the transition or the end of AMIS. It is 
important to quote the full passage, even if long, because this is probably the 
most pertinent and clear example of legitimation by necessity. Hence, the AU 
Commission argues that the PSC had two options, first: 
[It] could consider that all avenues have been 
explored to secure the consent of the Government to the 
proposed transition and that there is no hope of 
obtaining it. In this respect, Council, in line with its 
decision of 27 June 2006, may decide to terminate the 
mandate of AMIS by 30 September 2006, especially in 
view of the lack of capacity and financial resources and 
logistics. However, it is important to underline the 
implications of such a decision for the security and 
humanitarian situation on the ground. Indeed, the 
vacuum that would be created by the withdrawal of 
AMIS would result in an escalation of the conflict, given 
the current levels of military build-up and mobilization 
of forces by all sides to the conflict. This would, 
inevitably, result in more suffering for an already 
traumatized population and an increased displacement 
of people. The ramifications of such a humanitarian 
tragedy would not only be felt in Darfur, but will also 
impact on neighbouring countries such as Chad and the 
Central African Republic. The resources that would be 
needed to address such a crisis would undoubtedly be 
much more than it would have taken to strengthen and 
maintain AMIS. Worse still, the implementation of the 
DPA would be totally jeopardized.577 
The consequences of a possible termination of the mandate, as depicted 
by the AU, could not be more clear and tragic. The vacuum that would be 
created with the withdrawal of AMIS mirrors the interregnum periods as 
presented above in Lagroye’s examples, except that the AU does not engage in 
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symbolic practices of ‘make-believe’. Instead, it showcases chaos via a 
hypothetical future in its discourse. Thus, without the organization’s mission 
deployed in Darfur, chaos would unfold with the escalation of conflict, more 
suffering to the population, more displacement, regional instability in 
neighbouring countries, the complete failure of the peace process. Even the 
foreseen costs of reengaging in the future would be higher. Put simply, the 
situation in Darfur without AMIS would equal chaos and death. 
The other option, which in the end is very similar to what was eventually 
decided in New York together with the UN and international partners, would be 
to extend the AMIS further in time, enhance it so it could better fulfil its 
mandate, and prepare the terrain for a transition to the UN – at the time, the idea 
of a hybrid mission was not yet being publicly discussed. If the first option was 
the vacuum, the second option was the continuity of the RSO’s mission and the 
renewal of the efforts aiming at convincing the GoS to allow a transition: 
Council may come to the conclusion that the 
efforts made by the AU and the international community 
to convince the Government of the need for a UN 
deployment in Darfur have, so far, been insufficient, and 
that such efforts must continue and be intensified, 
through, in particular, the engagement of the United 
Nations, to provide all the required explanations and 
clarifications, to allay the fears and suspicions of 
Government. In order to achieve this objective, Council 
may wish to extend the mandate of AMIS for a three 
months period up to 31 December 2006, with the hope 
and understanding that the consultations between the 
Government and the UN would conclude soon and 
positively. Under the circumstances, this option may 
prove to be the most workable, in spite of the difficulties 
that would be encountered […] One of the positive 
aspects of this option could be the enhancement of AMIS 
to enable it play an increased role in stabilizing the 
situation on the ground and, thus, facilitate the rapid 
implementation of the DPA. This option would be 
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largely dependent on the issues of funding and 
sustainability of AMIS being addressed upfront and in a 
clear and consistent manner, so that the future of AMIS 
operation does not depend on issues that are peripheral 
to peace in Darfur.578 
Hence, the continuation the AU mission and its enhancement would mean 
the stability to the future transition of the UN and to the implementation of the 
Peace Agreement. This argument of necessity even justifies the appeal for more 
predictable funding vis-à-vis the international community. If the presence of 
AMIS is not said to lead to peace and prosperity, at least it can ensure stability as 
opposed to chaos of its hypothetical depart. In these two passages, the AU is not 
only offering alternatives, given that the likelihood of a total AMIS withdrawal at 
the time was very low at best. The AU is above all presenting its actions, the 
AMIS mission in particular, as the necessary condition to avoid the descent into 
disorder and death – even if the situation would remain unstable and require a 
future transition. 
This legitimation argument of necessity is present, although not as clearly 
as in the example above, throughout the discourses of the AU and the EU. Both 
RSOs picture their actions, and in occasions their existence and position within 
security governance, as a necessary solution – at least temporary or partial – to 
the security issue in Darfur and its region. In some cases, it is not only the action 
of the organization alone, but also the response of the international community at 
large that is necessary. Such as in the example below where the EU contrasts the 
risk of ‘large-scale death’ with the need to humanitarian assistance. 
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The humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region is 
extremely serious. Unless immediate action is taken, 
this crisis will lead to large-scale death for the 
vulnerable population of Darfur. It is, therefore, 
incumbent on the Sudanese authorities to extend full 
cooperation to the international community, in particular 
the UN Humanitarian agencies and the NGOs, to 
facilitate the provision of the much-needed assistance to 
the civilian population. 
In addition, legitimation by rationalization might build upon punctual 
moments. The example below comes from yet another report by the AU 
Commission of the events taking place in December 2006 in Darfur, which in 
turn relied on reports received from the AMIS on the ground. Hence, AMIS’ 
intervention is said to prevent further escalation of violence:  
The Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission has received with great concern reports 
from AMIS Force Headquarters in El Fasher that on 4 
December 2006, armed Arab militias invaded the cattle 
market in the city of El Fasher where they opened fire 
and harassed people in the market. Five SLA (M) 
soldiers in the area, who were not armed, decided to 
intervene leading to extensive firing from the Arab 
militia. The quick intervention of AMIS Forces 
succeeded in preventing further escalation of the 
fighting. […] The situation continues to be extremely 
tense.579 
The AMIS’ intervention prevented escalation, and yet the ‘situation 
continues to be extremely tense’. Arguably, the apparent contradiction of 
necessary power is that it is not one that comes to permanently solve the security 
issue. Rather, it is what constantly keeps ‘death and chaos’ from coming back. It 
is necessary in a context where the situation of insecurity is the situation by 
default, only altered by the institutions’ redeeming features as long as the 
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organization is present. Things might get better, and this is the argument of 
contribution behind the beneficial regionalism in chapter 5, but the situation 
remains dramatic as chaos and violence risk to return if not for the presence of 
the RSO and its actions. If it were to solve the problem completely, then it would 
not be necessary anymore. Very often, regionalism appears as necessary in order 
to ‘manage’ the crisis, not to solve it. 
Finally, this discourse of ‘necessity to do something’ in the face of a 
dramatic situation if often accompanied by a sense of urgency. In this regard, the 
response to Darfur was said to be urgent in 2006 when Javier Solana stated that 
“[t]he long-suffering people of Darfur need help - not next week, or next month, 
but today” 580  and “[t]he current situation requires immediate action.” 581  It 
continued to be urgent in 2011 when the AU PSC stated “that achieving peace in 
Darfur is a matter of urgency, recognizing that the people of Darfur have been 
waiting for peace for too long.”582 And stressed the need 
[…] for speedy progress in the search for peace, 
security, justice and reconciliation in Darfur, bearing in 
mind that civilians in that region continue to be exposed 
to an unacceptable risk of violence, millions of people 
continue to live in IDP camps or as refugees in 
neighboring Chad and the increasing frustration in the 
IDP camps.583 
In chapter 1, it is established that security generally refers to urgency and 
special allocation of resources. This necessity of ‘speedy progress’, it is argued 
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in the literature, might justify the adoption of exceptional measures. However, 
the responses to the violence in Darfur, as already mentioned, are not exceptional 
or particularly controversial – the argument of urgency is not justifying 
something beyond normal politics. It does not follow a reasoning such as 
‘because it is urgent we will adopt the emergency measure B instead of normal 
policy A’. Rather, the sense of urgency seems to be part of the general depiction 
of the dramatic situation in the region. Hence, the reasoning goes as follow ‘it is 
urgent and dramatic, we will continue to do A, but we need to do it quickly and 
we need help’.  
Nevertheless, the arguments of ‘urgency and security’ and of ‘need for 
stability and peace’ might indeed alter the peace process’ ‘normal’ course and 
might be evoked to justify certain positions that would otherwise be perceived as 
unreasonable or even illegitimate. Perhaps the clearest illustration to this point is 
the divergence between the AU and the EU on the ruling of the International 
Criminal Court and the issue of arrest warrants against leaders of rebel factions 
and members of the GoS, including the president Al-Bashir. For the EU, “a 
lasting peace in Darfur cannot be achieved without justice and reconciliation”584 
and the multiple arrest warrants should be respected in order to bring perpetrators 
to justice: 
The Council recalls that impunity for the most 
serious crimes under international law can never be 
accepted. The Council reiterates its support for the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and calls upon the 
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  256 
GoS to cooperate fully with the ICC in accordance with 
its obligations under international law.585 
Even if Sudan had not granted jurisdiction to the ICC, the Security 
Council had ‘imposed’ this jurisdiction by referring the case of Darfur to the 
Court. For the AU, the Security Council referral to the ICC had been a mistake 
and it constantly asked the body to come back on its decision, an action that 
would consequently interrupt the investigation: 
Renewed and concerted efforts should be made 
for the Security Council to defer the process initiated by 
the ICC in line with the request made by [Peace and 
Security] Council. […] it is important to ensure that the 
ongoing peace efforts are not jeopardized and to avert 
further suffering for the people of the Sudan and greater 
destabilization with far-reaching consequences for the 
country and the region.586 
Regardless of the reasons that led the AU to reject the ICC ruling, the 
important aspect is the argument that the RSO brings to justify its position – and 
also the (in)action of not making the same appeal for the arrest of those called by 
the Court in The Hague. The normal course of action would be to abide and 
support the ICC ruling because that would essentially be following international 
law, which is the core argument of inevitable regionalism and legitimation by 
law in chapter 7. But necessity changes this course of action: in the AU’s 
discourse, the need of peace and stability ‘trumps’ justice, at least temporarily, 
given the urgency of the situation and the risk of jeopardizing the cooperation 
with the GoS. Hence, while the arguments of urgency and necessity are not used 
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to justify exceptional measures, they are nonetheless used to explain positions 
that could seem unjustified in the eyes of certain audiences. 
Conclusion 
Necessary regionalism is the image that connects the dramatic and 
chaotic situation with the necessity of power and hierarchy between rulers and 
ruled. On the one hand it presents a problem, a security problem, which has to be 
addressed. On the other, it presents the (new) power relation as the solution to 
such problems. By depicting the security situation in Darfur and surrounding 
areas as dramatic and violent, and by presenting themselves as necessary to the 
‘viable solution’, the EU and the AU justify their policies as well as their 
authoritative claims. In the face of insecurity, a hierarchical power relation is 
said bring security. In the face of violence, domination is said to bring peace and 
stability – even if through the use of force and ‘legitimate coercion’. Power is 
presented as a sine qua non condition of triumph over chaos and, by 
consequence, a necessity. 
Even for the low-intensity missions such as EUFOR and AMIS, RSOs 
have to connect the necessity of their actions to the dramatic situation. This 
dramatization, however, does not imply an existential threat to the organizations 
themselves, nor to their member states far away from Darfur. Rather, RSOs point 
to threats endangering the lives of the local population, on the one hand, and the 
regional stability, on the other. These threats, it is argued by the organizations, 
necessitate urgent and speedy measures. On the one hand, this does not mean that 
urgency is used to justify exceptional actions beyond normal politics in a type of 
argument mirroring securitization. On the other hand, the argument of peace and 
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stability might justify possibly ‘controversial’ stands and policies such as, for 
example, the AU’s position against the ICC arrest warrants.  
Finally, the depiction of a necessity that is in turn based on a dramatic 
situation is arguably an unstable image for two reasons. First, the dramatization 
of the context risks creating, for certain audiences, a responsibility that the 
organization cannot handle or is unwilling to meet. If the necessity is somehow 
seen as bigger than what is actually provided by the RSO and its partners, then 
legitimation easily becomes de-legitimation. Second, there is a picture of quasi-
permanent necessity of power. While RSOs contribute with positive policy 
outcomes and the situation is said to improve – it must somehow improve 
because that is also the image of beneficial regionalism – in the same discourse it 
is said that the situation does not improve to a point where it is permanently 
solved: there is a continuous risk of chaos and violence returning or escalating. 
Thus, there is actually an underlining tension between showing how the policy 
has contributed to the improving of the situation and how the same or other 
policies as well as the presence of the organization are still needed because the 
situation ‘remains tense’ or there is ‘a sense of insecurity’. If power were to 
forever expel ‘death and chaos’, it wouldn’t be needed anymore. Thus, one can 
often read passages such as ‘the security improves, but the situation remains 
fragile’, meaning that violence might be back if missions are called back and 
organizations withdrawal or are not given the proper means to face the challenge.  
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Chapter 7 
THE INEVITABLE REGIONALISM 
 
Domination in the most general sense is one of the most 
important elements of social action. Of course, not every form 
of social action reveals structure of dominancy. But in most of 
the varieties of social action domination plays a considerable 
role, even where it is not obvious at first sight.587 
 
Domination is intrinsic to virtually every social action and any system of 
domination feels compelled to justify this inequality. Yet, oftentimes the 
legitimation is exactly the attempt to hide this unequal relation behind a veil of 
de-personalized, rational-legal administration. The image of inevitable 
regionalism serves as argument of legitimation by portraying the actions and 
policies of regional organizations as natural, bureaucratic, a-political, or ‘just the 
way things are or have always been’. RSOs attempt to strip away the need to 
legitimate their policies, in the first place, because they are lawful or because it is 
in their tradition to implement a certain policy or act in a certain region and take 
a given position within the system of governance. In this sense, the relationship 
of domination – which at the end on the day is what is being legitimated – is 
denied because the ‘political’ lies elsewhere and the regional bureaucracy is 
following orders and strictly executing what it is supposed to do. By ‘only’ 
following law, decisions of member states, or bureaucratic procedures, RSOs 
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would not really decide or impose anything. If there is no choice in what they do, 
then regionalism is inevitable as far as RSOs are concerned. 
This chapter draws heavily on Max Weber’s work and the three 
legitimating principles for domination588 – charismatic, traditional, and legal-
bureaucratic – and uses these ideal types to look for particular patterns in the 
discourse analysis of official documents. While the argument of charisma is 
absent, the argument of tradition is sometimes linked to the regional identity of 
the organizations, be it as EU’s tradition as ‘global actor’ or as AU’s tradition as 
the personification of ‘brotherhood of Africa’. The fact that said ‘traditions’ are 
actually only a few years old doesn’t seem to matter. Finally, the most salient of 
the three legitimating principles is by far “the virtue of legality”589 in which the 
regional bureaucracy portrays its actions as neutral, transparent, and above all as 
legal because it would be just following lawful orders and implementing 
mandates. This last aspect is also understood trough the idea of legitimation by 
law. Although positive law has to be itself legitimated590, it also serves as a 
legitimating argument both as international law and by the rules and procedures 
internal to the organizations such as European law. 
Finally, to portray certain factors as being beyond the organization’s 
control or reach – hence, inevitable – may also justify perceived inaction in front 
of high expectations as well the failure or the excessive duration of the policy, 
which might take a long time to produce the results. As in Darfur, after more 
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than a decade of crisis management and dozens of different initiatives, the 
‘lasting solution’, which was foreseen back in 2003, remains something to be 
achieved. In order to justify everything else it is not doing or has failed to 
produce, the organization may also evoke arguments of inevitability – factors it 
does not control such as the hardship of the context or locate the ‘political 
decision’ outside the bureaucracy. 
1) The impersonal and bureaucratic argument 
We know from Max Weber’s scholarship that the modern state turned to 
the “depersonalized, public governance based on the rule of law”591 to replace 
the ad hoc and personalistic justifications of authority and domination such as the 
leader’s charisma or the royal family’s tradition to be in power. This modern 
domination is exercised by the “servant of the state”592, someone we usually call 
a bureaucrat, in the collective of a bureaucracy or an administration. Hence, the 
legitimacy of the modern state, and more precisely its capacity to successfully 
claim the monopoly to yield force and extract social resources, derives from the 
legal-bureaucratic argument. In a sense, it is the object of legitimation, the 
relationship of domination that is denied in the first place and hidden behind an 
impersonal ‘veil’. But the process of legitimation cannot be reduced to national 
politics and the state. In chapter 3, we postulate, based on the works of Max 
Weber himself, Jacques Lagroye, and Rodney Barker among others, that every 
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system of domination “has the strongest need of self-justification” and that it 
does so by “appealing to the principles of its legitimation”593.  
To identify these principles of legitimation for regional organizations has 
actually been this research’s main goal. RSOs do not claim the monopoly of 
legitimate violence, nor could they because this would be far detached from their 
actual capacity. Yet, they legitimate their positions and their policies by evoking 
arguments of impersonality. As a matter o fact, the literature on international 
organizations often refers to them as neutral and a-political, as in the words of 
John Duffield: 
As relatively neutral actors, international 
organisations may be able to serve as monitors or 
arbiters in politically charged situations where others 
may be refused access. Even if they are working on 
behalf of member states, their seemingly non-partisan 
nature will often make their activities more 
acceptable.594 
Indeed, when assessing their missions and policies in Darfur, both the AU 
and the EU depict these actions as neutral or impartial. For example, when the 
parties in the conflict, rebel groups and militias, attacked the mission personnel, 
the AU would stress the neutrality of the troops and of the organization itself: 
It wishes to remind all concerned that AMIS is 
in Darfur, as neutral body, to help put an end to the 
conflict and the suffering of the people of Darfur. The 
AU has no other agenda in Darfur and will hold the 
leaders of these Groups personally responsible for any 
attempt to broaden the scope of the conflict by military 
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means, especially through the deliberate targeting of 
AMIS personnel and its installations.595 
When commenting on the end of the mission EUFOR Tchad/CAR and 
the transition to MINURCAT, the EU Special Representative for Sudan, Torben 
Brylle, highlighted this same neutrality as a legacy: 
And the trust that EUFOR has earned and the 
neutrality it has demonstrated are also a legacy that, I 
believe, is conferred onto the follow-on MINURCAT.596 
Javier Solana was also quick to identify impartiality of the EUFOR as 
condition for its success based on previous EU experiences: 
The EU troops in Congo in 2003 and 2006 were 
known for their impartiality and this was an important 
condition for their success. It will be the same in Chad 
and Central African Republic in 2008.597 
This is a common trend for both organizations. In case of the AU, it 
would manifest in response to attacks against its personnel on the ground and to 
accusations of being instrumentalized by outsiders. In the case of the EU, it was 
much more prevalent in the case of the mission in Chad and CAR in 2008. When 
explaining the functioning of EUFOR, for instance, the EU very often affirmed it 
would “be conducted in a neutral, impartial and independent manner”598. Exactly 
what was the meaning of impartial, neutral and independent for the organization, 
however, was not explained. In fact, these three adjectives seem to be used 
independently from the conceptual differentiations that are made by scholars. 
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They seem to mean no more than a disinterested action of an organization that 
does not take sides and is simply following its mandate: 
Thus, by protecting refugees, displaced persons 
and humanitarian staff, operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
has acted in accordance with its mandate. EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA will continue to act in a way that is 
impartial, neutral and independent. 
In this regard, by being neutral and impartial, and by simply 
implementing the mandates that are trusted to it by the UN or by its member 
states, the organizations are portrayed as a ‘vehicles’ – an administration or a 
bureaucracy – that do not decide, only execute. By saying that they are 
‘independent’, the organizations are not claiming a sort of freedom to decide on 
their own, but something rather different: the freedom from external and political 
influences that would disturb the pure implementation of policies, which is the 
task of their bureaucracies. 
In occasions, this bureaucracy needs to be expanded exactly to ensure the 
effective implementation of the mandates or the mandate has to be changed in 
order to better implement the agreements. Such was the case at the negotiations 
about the expansion of first AMIS to fulfil the original mandate of the 
Humanitarian Ceasefire in 2004 and the enhancement of the mission following 
the signature of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006 and the demands of larger 
monitoring and security forces: 
In this respect, the expansion of the AU Mission 
on the ground is of particular importance, if greater 
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compliance by the Parties with the Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement is to be achieved.599 
[…] need to review the current mandate of 
AMIS and to increase significantly its strength, 
particularly in light of the additional tasks to be 
performed by the Mission as part of the implementation 
of the provisions of the DPA relating to the 
Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Security 
Arrangements600 
In sum, while the ideas of neutrality and de-personalized ruling are 
legitimating principles that might help in the justification of the modern state and 
its permanent administration, they are also present in the discourse of regional 
bureaucracies such as the European Union and the African Union when, for 
example, they insist on the impartiality of their security missions. Furthermore, 
these perceived neutral bureaucracies are ‘vehicles’ for the implementation of 
rational rules and norms601. In other words, it is law that ultimately serves as an 
argument of legitimation for RSOs in the image of inevitable regionalism. 
2) Legitimation by law(s) 
In their discourses, the legal-bureaucratic argument manifests itself 
mainly in the insistence on the part of RSOs on the legality of their acts. 
Legitimation by law is actually so crucial as an argument of political legitimation 
that legality is often treated as a sufficient condition to legitimacy of acts and 
decisions.602 The ruling and the domination would be legitimate, in this case, as 
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long as they correspond to the agreed upon rules and laws. In the case of modern 
bureaucracies, the relationship of domination is justified because it is impersonal 
as the “obedience is thus given to the norms rather than to the person”.603  
Even if positive law has to be itself legitimated, it is also an important 
legitimizing principle.604 Legal norms, as early constructivists such as Friedrich 
Kratochwil already argued, “figure prominently in defining issues and in 
legitimization and delegitimization attempts.” 605  He then goes to say that 
“although rules are obviously not neutral as to the distribution of benefits, their 
impersonal character distinguishes them from immediate (and more blatant) 
exercises of power.”606 Hence, law and rules can be both objects and arguments 
of legitimation depending on the context and, more importantly, there can be a 
‘political use’ of law that is interpreted accordingly. 
In a national context, rulers appeal to the positive ‘law of the land’ and to 
the various other sources law in its national legal system such as juridical 
doctrine, jurisprudence, costume, general principles of law, or certain 
international treaties. But in an international context, the legitimation by law 
enters a grey zone as the jurisdiction and validity of legal norms is not always 
clear, and the existence of governance instead of government makes enforcement 
harder, if at all possible. There is clearly a need to reflect upon the transposition 
of the idea of legitimation by law from a national to an international level. 
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The Weberian ‘rational-legal domination’ is certainly bound to its 
historical context of early 20th century European nations, but as an ideal-type it is 
possible to apply it in other contexts since it does provide further analytical 
insights. Legitimation by law would be more effective where political and 
juridical hierarchy is stronger and where legitimacy and legality would go hand 
in hand. The further we depart from this hierarchical system, the weaker is the 
grip of law as an argument.607 At the levels above the state, international law is 
arguably more open to criticism in terms of being simply a reflection of power 
relations (hence, not as ‘neutral and impersonal’); being a system that strong 
states can simply ignore as they please or control it to maximize their interests 
(e.g. the GoS critique of the uses of the International Criminal Court by the 
western countries); or being a mechanism that perpetuates inequalities despite 
nominally defending sovereignty and equality (e.g. the UN and its Security 
Council). 
Yet, international law – or simply the fact that actions and the authority 
respect existing law – is often evoked by regional organizations as an argument 
that justifies their actions regardless of its often-cited flaws. Indeed, legitimation 
by law of the actions of regional security organizations follows fours main 
trends. First, the organizations appeal to the commonly accepted hierarchy of 
international law in regards to the provision of peace security and emphasise the 
endorsement, usually via resolution, of the UN Security Council. Secondly and 
thirdly, RSOs evoke the principles of sovereignty – the emphasis on the 
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consensus of the host nation – and pacta sunt servanda – the parties in conflict 
are held to their commitments. Finally, the organizations might appeal to their 
‘intra-institutional’ law, a trend that is much more salient for the European Union 
given the development of the EU law. 
Of all the references to international law, the endorsements and the 
authorizations of the United Nations Security Council figure prominently in the 
discourses of both the AU and the EU. Hence, both organizations portray their 
actions to be in accordance with what was determined by the UNSC, in itself 
seen a source of law608, in its resolutions. In the case of the EU, the organization 
seeks to legally underpin two particular actions, which could be seen as more 
assertive than others: the sanctions regimes against the against those obstructing 
peace in Sudan and its military mission in Chad and CAR: 
[…] the EU will continue to monitor the 
situation in Darfur and will consider to take appropriate 
measures which could include sanctions, against the 
Government of Sudan as well as the rebel groups, in 
accordance with the UNSC Resolution 1556 and 1564, 
if no tangible progress is achieved in this respect.609 
Enjoying a strong legitimacy after the unanimous 
adoption by the UN Security Council of the Resolution 
1778 (2007), EUFOR Tchad/RCA will be deployed in 
east Chad and north-east Central African Republic for 
one year.610 
For the AU, it was generally its position as the leader of the mediation 
process, which would be legitimated by the UNSC resolutions: 
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In its resolution 1564 (2004) adopted on 18 
September 2004, the UN Security Council called upon 
the Government and the rebel groups to work together 
under the auspices of the AU to reach a political 
solution. […] The Security Council also underscored 
and supported the role of the AU in monitoring the 
implementation of all such agreements reached.611 
When they stress how their actions correspond to the UNSC resolution, 
RSOs implicitly refer to a hierarchical system of peace and security that, as 
shown seen in chapter 2, exists only as an abstract idea. In the case of the 
EUFOR Tchad/CAR, the EU would even highlight the fact that it was executing 
the UNSC Resolution 1778 and in that sense ‘following orders’, as if there was 
no influence or request from its member states in the decision of the Council. It 
suffices to think that two out of five permanent members of the UNSC are also 
members of the EU (i.e. France and United Kingdom) and a ‘request’ or a 
resolution that the EU was not willing to accept would not pass by the Council 
anyway because of this membership overlap. 
The UN Resolution 1778 provided for a double 
international presence in Chad and Central African 
Republic: that of the UN with MINURCAT, mainly for 
training Chadian police officers, and that of the EU with 
EUFOR, which would create security conditions for the 
action of the United Nations and help to protect the 
population both in eastern Chad and in the north-eastern 
part of Central African Republic (CAR).612 
In parallel, the UN Secretary General is said to have, in his report of 
August 2007, “[…] proposed the deployment of a multidimensional presence, 
including a possible EU military component” and that “the President of the 
UNSC made a statement on behalf of the Security Council, welcoming the UN 
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Secretary General's proposals on a multidimensional presence […] including a 
possible EU military deployment”613. Regardless of it being a political decision 
in many ways motivated by the EU willingness to intervene in the conflict, the 
EU is said to simply comply with the decisions of this ‘impersonal body’. In this 
and other cases, legitimation by (international) law turns to be a circular 
argument since organizations are evoking legal norms and resolutions that come 
into being because the same organizations – or its member states – push them 
forward and influenced the process.  
 If the EU were simply implementing a decision like bureaucracies do, it 
would have no choice and its actions would be ‘inevitable’. However, RSOs do 
more than follow the mandates they are given. As “unique institutional 
amalgamations of their member states and transnational bureaucracies”614, they 
might decide, for instance, on the interpretation and on the application of said 
mandates. This apparent contradiction between simply following orders, on the 
one hand, and actively and politically interpreting them, on the other hand, is 
found not only in the difference between rhetoric and practice, but also within 
the discourse itself. Hence, in 2006 during the stalemate between Sudan and the 
international community when the GoS was not willing to approve any further 
international involvement, the AU Commission would argue for a “consistent, 
flexible, broad and robust interpretation of the AMIS mandate.”615 At the same 
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time, and given the demands following the signature of the DPA, the EU also 
“urged the AU to take all necessary steps for a robust interpretation of the AMIS 
mandate to ensure a more forceful protection of the civilian population.”616 This 
basically meant that since a new mandate was not foreseen at the time, the RSO 
would change the way the same decision was being applied. In sum, the card of 
‘necessity’, as seen in chapter 6, trumps the ‘neutral implementation’. 
A second frequent argument refers to the commonly held principle of 
sovereignty and the consequent need of host nations to authorize the actions 
taking place in their territories. Thus, the consent of government in Sudan, Chad 
and Central African Republic is a recurrent justification in the discourse of both 
RSOs: 
The planning of the operation [EUFOR] is 
taking place in full coordination with the UN and in 
consultation with African partners, and its deployment 
has been welcomed by the governments of Chad and the 
Central African Republic.617 
In this respect, [the Peace and Security] Council 
notes that the GoS has formally expressed its support for 
the enhancement of AMIS and pledged full cooperation 
in that regard.618 
To highlight the consent of the host nation is to indirectly acknowledge 
the principle of sovereignty and equality among nations that is at the core of 
international law. However, the consent of the host state alone is a weak 
argument for the legitimation of a mission – especially if the government in the 
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host state was put in place by the interveners,619 which is not the case our case 
studies, or is exactly the actor that is behind human rights violations and is being 
perceived as illegitimate itself to give such authorization. Hence, once more, 
RSOs choose to ‘ignore’ this political nature of the supposedly neutral 
authorization. 
Another general principle of law evoked by RSOs is that parties are 
bound to their commitments and agreements should be kept (i.e. pacta sunt 
servanda). Hence, on can see, in parallel to references to UN authorization and 
consent of the host states, the idea that the parties in the conflict in Darfur are 
bound to what they signed and that their previous agreements to the presence of 
the organizations is another argument that justifies RSOs’ actions of mediation, 
peacekeeping, and the like. Indeed, one can note a process of ‘positivization’ of 
rights and obligations by which the parties in the conflict are gradually held more 
responsible for their acts in accordance to the documents they sign. As the 
conflict goes on, general condemnations of violence and violation of human 
rights are replaced by condemnations of the fact that specific agreements are 
being broken: first the Humanitarian Ceasefire, followed by the Declaration of 
Principles, the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 and the Doha Agreement of 
2010, and the various other written commitments. At first, only violence was 
unacceptable, then the violation of agreements could not be tolerated neither: 
AMIS would like to remind the SLA/M that as a 
signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement, the Movement 
is expected to abide by DPA ceasefire provisions and to 
refrain from all acts of provocation, intimidation and 
                                                
619  See, for instance: Olsson, Christian, ""Legitimate Violence" in the Prose of 
Counterinsurgency: An Impossible Necessity?". 
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interference with AMIS’ peacekeeping mission in 
Darfur.620 
This reference to commitment also included the bilateral agreements 
between Chad and Sudan during the various moments in which their relationship 
turned violent. By following this logic o ‘positivization’, if a party in conflict had 
not signed the newest agreement, it would still be bound to the last declaration, 
communiqué or agreement it signed. Such was the case, according to the EU, of 
the nonsignatories groups of the DPA in 2006: 
The Council in particular emphasises the need to 
involve the non-signatories in the effective monitoring 
of the cease-fire and the investigation of violations 
committed. The nonsignatories should be held fully 
responsible for the fulfilment of their commitments set 
out in the N’djamena Agreement [of 2004].621 
Hence, actions against these groups (e.g. targeted sanctions) would be 
justified not only because they perpetrate violent acts, but also because they 
break more or less formal commitments. And these agreements between the 
parties in conflict and the RSOs are used to justify the latters’ presence and 
actions of conflict management: 
I should, however, like to stress that at the end of 
the meeting, the Parties issued a Joint Statement in 
which they reaffirmed their commitment to seek a 
peaceful and negotiated solution to the problems in 
Darfur under the leadership of the African Union and in 
accordance with the letter and spirit of the N’djamena 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and the two Abuja 
Protocols.622 
                                                
620 Amis Headquarters, "AMIS Strongly Condemns Acts of Intimidation by Armed Faction in 
Darfur", Khartoum, 2007. Emphasis mine. 
621 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Sudan/Darfur," para. 7. 
622 African Union Commission, "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in 
the Dafur Region of the Sudan", PSC/AHG/4 (XXIII), Addis Ababa, 2005. para. 27. 
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Finally, the fourth trend refers to the legality of the action(s) based on the 
internal law of the organizations themselves. In this common practice, RSOs link 
their acts to the compliance to their own internal rules that are set up by their 
treaties. It is a recurrent procedure, for instance, to evoke treaty articles that lay 
down the principles for action as well as the rules for decisionmaking such as 
consensus or qualified majority. When imposing sanctions to the parties in the 
conflict in Darfur, for example, the EU turns to its community law: 
The Treaty, in Articles 60 and 301, empowers 
the Council to take, under certain conditions, measures 
aimed at the interruption or reduction of payments or 
movement of capital and of economic relations with 
regard to third countries.623 
 It is also common practice to refer to previous decisions of the same 
body. Thus, a mission of the EU is said to be legal not only because it was 
authorized by the UNSC, but also because it was authorized by the Council of 
the EU, which in turn refers to the European Council for more general 
endorsement of its actions. In parallel, the AU Commissioner evokes to the 
authorization of the Peace and Security Council to act as mediator or to appoint a 
special representative, and the PSC on its side refers to the endorsement of the 
AU Assembly: 
The PSC requested me to take all necessary steps 
to expedite the implementation of the enhancement of 
AMIS and, in this respect, to explore all possibilities for 
shortening the timeframe envisaged, including the 
emergency deployment of personnel, to ensure that the 
                                                
623 Council of the European Union, "Council Regulation imposing certain specific restrictive 
measures directed against persons impeding the peace process and breaking 
international lawin the conflict in the Darfur region in Sudan", 10603/05, Brussels, 
2005. 
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requirements for an effective presence on the ground are 
met as early as possible.624 
In sum, RSOs recurrently look at (international) law and its general 
principles to legitimate their actions. Even if legality is not a synonym of 
political legitimacy – and such equation holds even less water in international 
relations – it is still an important argument in the legitimation of regional security 
organizations. By portraying this intricate and complex set of principles and laws 
that are usually perceived as being neutral, the regional bureaucracy then appears 
as an impersonal body, or a ‘vehicle’ that is simply applying and complying with 
legal norms. 
3) Defending the bureaucracy 
However, for this formula of legitimation based on legality to work, the 
bureaucracy has to be regarded as impersonal, and indeed unbiased. It has to not 
only implement the policies according to the rules of the game but also ensure 
the quality of the policy implementation: a minimum of ethical standards, 
transparency, accountability, and openness. At least it has to be seen as acting 
accordingly. If the image of the organization is that of a corrupt, incompetent, 
biased, or oppressive bureaucracy that violates human rights, then it is not 
anymore an administration that simply applies the law. In sum, bad governance 
“undermines public perception of legitimacy”625 regardless of other sources such 
as legality, necessity, or positive outcome. 
                                                
624 African Union Commission, "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in 
the Dafur Region of the Sudan," para. 3. 
625 Schmidt, Vivien A., "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, 
Output and ‘Throughput’", 3. 
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Vivien Schmidt introduces this notion of quality of the policy 
implementation in EU studies as “throughput legitimacy”626, which refers to 
inclusiveness and openness as well as transparency and accountability of 
governance, and lastly its correspondence to ethical standards. Hence, in her 
discursive institutionalist framework, the construction of legitimacy would go 
beyond the dichotomy of politics of decision-making (input) and the outcomes of 
policies (output) and open the ‘black box’ of what happens during the policy-
implementation. Robert Keohane and Allen Buchanan, albeit in a normative 
approach to legitimacy, also argue for institutional integrity and minimum moral 
acceptability – respect for human rights – as two of the main substantive criteria 
for the legitimacy of global governance institutions:627 
It also appears that an institution should be 
presumed to be illegitimate if its practices or procedures 
predictably undermine the pursuit of the very goals in 
terms of which it justifies its existence.628 
According to this research’s conceptual approach, ideas related to 
throughput legitimacy or the minimum moral acceptability of policy 
implementation – as well as all the other supposed principles of legitimacy – 
constitute arguments of legitimation. However, contrarily to justifications based 
in positive output, legality, necessity or multilateralism629, throughput-related 
arguments are not sufficient on their own. Rather, they facilitate or at least do not 
hamper the legitimation discourse because the process to achieve other goals 
abides to minimum ethics standards: it is not corrupt or biased. As Schmidt 
                                                
626 Ibid. 
627  Buchanan, Allen and Robert O. Keohane, "The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions", 419-24. 
628 Ibid.: 423. 
629 These four arguments are grosso modo the core arguments in each of this research’s empirical. 
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shows, while, on the one hand, good throughput has little effect on the general 
perception of legitimacy, bad throughput, on the other, might undermine other 
possible ‘sources of legitimacy’.630 
Hence, RSOs speak out in defence of their bureaucracies and of the 
quality of the policy implementation. Confronted with the failure of the Abuja 
Agreement of 2006, for example, the AU stressed the need to increase openness 
and inclusiveness of the peace process that it was leading by a series of 
consultations with rebels in all fronts, civil society, and government 
representatives. Even if the AU portrayed the DPA to be “a fair deal”631 right 
after it was signed, not all parties saw it as such and the organization was in 
occasions perceived as biased because it would have privileged the GoS or 
alternatively the main rebel factions and their leaders. An all-inclusive 
consultation was then depicted as the solution as it is clearly stated by the Special 
Envoy for Darfur, Salim Ahmed Salim: 
The one thing which we don’t want is not to 
consult everybody. One of the – I wouldn’t want to call 
it error – but one of the shortcomings we had in Abuja is 
that we had people who were outside […] and wanted to 
join in the negotiations, as a means of protecting the 
position of their movements. We said no, we will stick 
to the movements which were there. But there were 
people […] who wanted to be part of the agreement but 
at one time literally threatened us even, that “if you 
don’t do that you will have the consequences” and so 
on. But this time round, honestly, we are going to see to 
                                                
630 Schmidt, Vivien A., "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, 
Output and ‘Throughput’", 9. 
631 Konare, Alpha Omar, "Statement by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Status of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Situation in Darfur", Addis Ababa, 2006. 
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it that we are going to try and consult, literally, as 
widely as possible. That is important.632 
If the AU were to consult only with the GoS or only with the rebels, it 
would risk to be perceived as biased towards one side or the other. An all-
inclusive consultation appears as a sine qua non condition for the people to agree 
with the AU policies, supposedly increasing the quality of governance that is not 
by the people or for the people, but with the people as the idea behind throughput 
legitimacy. That is why ‘openness’ – to all groups – is also highlighted: 
The movements have an important role to play. 
The government has an important role to play. But the 
government and the movements are not the only 
stakeholders. We have other stakeholders. We are going 
to have representatives of civil society, representatives 
of traditional leaders, and representatives of women 
groups and so on. This is definitely an important 
development.633 
In this regard, throughput-related legitimation arguments of RSOs are 
usually reactive, meaning that they are evoked in response to policy failures, 
scandals or accusations of bad governance. As a matter of fact, the AU press 
releases and press conferences were usually motivated by attacks on its personnel 
or accusations of misbehaviour. For instance, when confronted with media 
accusations of sexual misconduct of AMIS soldiers in Darfur in 2006, which 
included rape and child abuse, the AU promptly spoke out in defence of its 
mission. It then called a press conference and announced the creation of a 
committee of inquiry to investigate said allegations. This committee was 
presided by the AU Commission Director for Women Gender and Development 
                                                
632  Salim, Salim Ahmed, "Near verbatim transcript of the Joint Press Conference by UN 
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson and African Union Special 
Envoy for Darfur Salim Ahmed Salim", Khartoum, 2007. Emphasis mine. 
633  Salim, Salim Ahmed, "Statement by the AU Special Envoy, Salim Ahmed Salim, Upon 
Arrival at Sirte Airport." 
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and included the organizations external to AMIS (e.g. UNIFEM, NGOs, UN), 
which would ensure its transparency: 
I emphasise my commitment that you work 
expeditiously and transparently, providing a 
comprehensive investigation into the matter. This is why 
I included in your membership also those not working 
with us in the AMIS. That is also why I excluded 
members of our Forward Headquarters and the Sectors 
in Darfur from participation as Committee members. 
Those of you selected have been chosen by virtue of 
your proven integrity, experience and commitment.634 
Furthermore, the official discourse pointed to the perpetrators as ‘bad 
apples’ among a majority of good soldiers and hardworking personnel and 
recalled the condemnation of rape. In its discourse from 2006 onwards, there 
were also more frequent references to gender-based violence as if to address 
previous critiques: 
It is our duty to ensure, through this 
investigation that no errant soldier compromises the best 
efforts of thousands of committed Africans working 
hard and giving their best to this AMIS operation. Rape 
is a heinous crime. We will also ensure that such a crime 
is not used by anyone to pursue other objectives.635 
But the ‘defence’ of the regional bureaucracy requires more than the 
reaction to scandals and corruption. As argued in the other empirical chapters, 
the organizations are also compelled to justify the perceived lack of action in 
relation to current and future expectations. So far we have shown examples of 
legitimation of inaction by the appeal to the hard work, the continuous 
                                                
634 Kingibe, Baba Gana, "An Address by Ambassador Baba Kingibe at the Inauguration of the 
Committee of Enquiry to Investigate Allegations of Sexual Misconducts Against 
Members of the AU Forces in Darfur", Khartoum, 2006. 
635  Byanyima, Winnie, "Response to the Statement by the Special Representative of the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of AMIS at the Inauguration of the 
Committee of Enquiry to Investigate Allegations of Sexual Misconduct against 
Members of the AU Forces in Darfur. ", Karthoum, 2006. 
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engagement in other areas shown to be related to the original crisis (e.g. Chad 
and CAR) and the pledge to ‘remain committed’ through other policies (e.g. 
financial support). In the image of inevitable regionalism, RSOs evoke what 
cannot be avoided (e.g. mountains, deserts, distances, roads or, simply put, 
geography) to justify perceived inaction or policy failure. 
Indeed, a frequent ‘explanation’ refers to the hardship of the context in 
which the mission or the policies take place. During the first years, for instance, 
it was common place to compare the size of Darfur to the ‘size of France’ in 
order to highlight the difficulties, even impossibility, of monitoring such a vast 
territory. RSOs constantly refer to logistical and geographical challenges relating 
to the quality of the roads, the access to water, and the distance to the nearest 
harbour, among others.  
A region roughly the size of France, but with 
only two main roads. The landscape almost a desert and 
inaccessible mountains. That is the geographical set for 
Darfur, the eastern province of Sudan. […] With the 
adverse conditions of the desert this is a task [the 
deployment of AMIS] not easily achieved. When the 
fuel shortage added to extremely heavy rains at the end 
of August, the heaviest since 50 years, the deployment 
of the peace support force was delayed by several 
weeks.636 
These geographical challenges are taken as given, they cannot be 
avoided, and by consequence are portrayed as inevitable. As a matter of fact, a 
claim to the unusual hardship of the context happened even before the launching 
of UNAMID in a sort of ‘pre-emptive excuse’ to the challenges ahead: 
                                                
636 Council of the European Union, "EU assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan " 
ESDP Newsletter 2005. 
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The establishment of a multidimensional 
operation in the Darfur region of the Sudan will face 
formidable logistical challenges. Darfur is a remote and 
arid region, with harsh environmental conditions, poor 
communications, underdeveloped, poor infrastructure 
and extremely long land transport and supply lines from 
Port Sudan. The scarcity of water presents a particularly 
difficult challenge, which must be addressed at both the 
political and logistics level, between all parties. 637 
By emphasising how challenging the operation or the policy will be or 
how hard the context is, the organization tries to set the parameters against which 
its actions should be assessed and therefore considered effective or ineffective 
within the limits of what would be possible for them to realize. The organization 
is then, in the literal meaning of it, irresponsible because the perceived failure 
has an explanation that is supposedly beyond the organizations’ reach. 
4) Still a place for tradition and identity? 
As seen so far, the European Union and the African Union, as regional 
bureaucracies, make extensive use of the legal-bureaucratic argument of 
domination, clamming to follow internal law and other applicable norms while 
portraying themselves as neutral, impersonal and unbiased along with minimal 
ethical standards. But the use of this type of argument is by no means exclusive 
to RSOs as most political institutions actually claim that they respect legal 
norms, even when law was obviously enacted by the ruler, or even the occupier, 
to perpetuate the status quo and the inequality. 
                                                
637 African Union Commission, "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission and the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on the Hybrid Operations in Darfur", PSC/PR/2(LXXIX), 
Addis Ababa, 2007. para. 104. 
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But Weber also argues that different legitimations might co-exist.638 It is 
then logical to look for the other two Weberian justifications of domination in the 
discourse of regional organizations: the charisma and the tradition. Regarding the 
former, it is safe to say that personal charisma is not a legitimation trend for 
RSOs. While the organization might highlight the curriculum and the (previous) 
performances of some people in their ranks (e.g. the special representatives, 
chief-mediator, etc.), they arguably do so as to justify the appointments as 
corresponding to what is expected of a person in a given position. Furthermore, 
the people whose achievements and biographies are mentioned are in fact part of 
the bureaucracy and, even if they might add their personal style to the 
policymaking, they are at the end of the day seen as simply performing their 
functions. 
Regarding the argument of tradition, in Weber word’s “that which is 
customary and has always been,”639 it is possible to say that it finds its place in 
the legitimation discourse of regional organizations, but it is much less frequent 
than the legal-bureaucratic argument. In the case of the European Union, 
references to EU’s tradition in the context of Darfur are almost inexistent. What 
one might find are passages that highlight the ‘historical ties’ between Africa and 
the EU as to underpin the partnership and the EU’s role in Darfur and its 
neighbours. But even then this kind of argument is very rare640. 
                                                
638 Weber, Max, "Politics as Vocation." 
639  For a detailed argument, see Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An outline of an 
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640  A notable exception is Javier Solana’s newspaper article on the EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
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The African Union, on its side, appeals to tradition and to its regional 
identity as an African organization in its legitimation discourse. Even if seldom, 
it is worth mentioning that the AU from time to time evokes its ‘African 
character’, the ‘African solidarity’, or the ‘brotherhood’ in an attempt to justify 
its actions and the organization’s position in Darfur. This type of argument 
usually appears in speeches from high-ranked officials and are delivered to local 
audiences that could relate to them. The paragraphs below, for instance, appear 
in a speech delivered by the Chairperson of the AU Commission in an attempt to 
justify the organization’s role in the process leading to the Darfur Peace 
Agreement in 2006: 
In our traditional African society when your 
neighbour’s home is on fire, you do not stand by and 
watch without doing anything. Neighbours rush out with 
whatever they can get hold of put out the burning fire 
because they know that it could be their own homes that 
are affected next. 
[…] 
Our coming to Darfur is also totally consistent 
with the tradition of fraternity and solidarity with each 
other. Indeed we peoples are all the same. We are first 
and foremost, a community of peoples, irrespective of 
which country we come from. 641 
In the same speech, tradition and identity seem to evoke not only the 
natural course of action, but also an obligation. In front of violence and crisis 
afflicting our ‘brothers and sisters’, inaction was not an option: 
That was why the AU came into Darfur. Your 
brothers and sisters from other parts of Africa came only 
                                                
641 Konare, Alpha Omar, "Solidarity Message from Aplha Omar Konare, Chairperson of the 
African Commission", Khartoum, 2007. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080709040518/http://amis-sudan.org/dpaeasy.html. 13 
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to help, because they could not stand idly by and watch 
while innocent people suffer so much and die.642 
Interestingly, both the legal-bureaucratic argument and the argument of 
tradition would point to the inevitability of the actions and policies. While the 
former establishes that the compliance with the rules and decisions is just the 
natural course of action as the organization is the impersonal vehicle that applies 
them, the latter shows that the choice of action is just how things have always 
been or should be according to one’s identity. Hence, tradition would tell us how 
things naturally are: 
Our willingness of working together is stronger 
than ever. Nothing more natural! We both represent the 
Union of States bound by history and geography. We 
both have the same mandate: reinforce solidarity 
between the European Union and the African Union.643 
The extracts above, however, exemplifies a trend that is very marginal in 
both organizations in comparison to legitimation by law and the emphasis on the 
neutral and impersonal character of the regional bureaucracy. Appeals to 
tradition and identity might be more frequent in the AU’s discourse in relation to 
the crises in Darfur exactly because the organization is from the region where the 
crisis takes place. But even then, organizations appeal to legitimation by law 
much more frequently than to their identities and traditions. Hence, the extract 
above also shows that while ‘solidarity and partnership’ might be justified by 
historical ties, they are above all legitimated by the (legal) mandates that both 
organizations have. 
                                                
642 Ibid. 
643  Solana, Javier, "Intervention de Javier Solana, Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Union 
européenne, Haut Représentant pour la Politique extérieure et de Sécurité commune ". 
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Conclusion 
The image of inevitable regionalism is above all expressed by the legal-
bureaucratic argument: regional organization as an unbiased and neutral body 
inevitably follows the law as well as the orders – mandates – it receives. But this 
comes as an expected conclusion, which is confirmed in the empirical analyses, 
because regional security organizations are, after all, transnational bureaucracies 
and their political decisionmaking is indeed diminished in front of the states’ 
initiatives – especially in the intergovernmental security sector. This is valid for 
both the EU and the AU that, despite presenting very different sizes of their 
bureaucracies, still depend much on the political decisions of their member 
states. In other words, it is reasonable to say that it is ‘only following orders’ 
when it is indeed executing the intergovernmental decisions and the treaties 
previously signed by states. 
However, the legal-bureaucratic argument presupposes, as previously 
argued, that the organization is perceived as impersonal and unbiased. It needs to 
speak out in defence of the quality of its governance and administration – the so-
called throughput legitimacy. As Schmidt claims, while good throughput makes 
the organization “disappear from public view, leaving front and centre both 
national input politics and EU output policy”644, bad throughput makes it visible 
by putting it under (negative) flashlights. And by visible we mean an 
organization that does more than simply follow the rules and abide to 
international and community law. Bad throughput can undermine the legal-
                                                
644 Schmidt, Vivien A., "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, 
Output and ‘Throughput’", 14. 
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bureaucratic argument and that is why RSOs speak go out in defence of their 
missions, personnel and administration. 
Finally, the image of inevitable regionalism is not without its own 
internal contradictions, of which two are mentioned above. First, despite the 
image of impersonal bureaucracies that follow decisions made elsewhere, these 
rules and mandates are open to the organization’s interpretation and their own 
choices of how to apply them. Hence, the need to broadly ‘interpret a mandate’. 
Second, in security governance, where multiple legal systems co-exist, the very 
choice of which rules or decisions to follow and implement is already a political 
choice that is not always acknowledged. To this end, it suffices to look at how 
differently the EU and the AU viewed and positioned themselves in relations the 
decisions of the International Criminal Court, itself part of the international legal 
system, in the previous chapter. 
Finally, and in parallel to the legal-bureaucratic argument, there is still 
place for tradition and identity, which also point to natural – or inevitable – 
courses of action. These arguments are in large majority restricted to the African 
Union, which links tradition and identity – the brotherhood of Africa – in its 
discourse to once more justify its actions in Darfur. Traditions and identities are 
not neutral or unbiased, yet they might be seen just as inevitable as legality and 
the implementation of a mandate. This type of argument, however, is marginal in 
comparison to legitimation by law and the legal-bureaucratic justification.  
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Chapter 8 
THE MULTILATERAL REGIONALISM 
 
The growing practice of inter-regionalism makes the classical 
distinction between regionalism and globalism obsolete. 
Inter-regionalism therefore points to a direction different 
from a fragmented order in which globalists feared would be 
characterised by clash of regional blocs.645 
 
In the image of multilateral regionalism, RSOs voice arguments that 
potentially justify their policies and their existences by making reference to the 
collective nature of their actions along with other organizations and to the mutual 
recognition of their standings as security actors. The endorsement of other 
organizations and the plurality of actors involved in various phases of the policy 
implementation, by consequence, would support the legitimacy claims of RSOs, 
in general, and their position within the regional security governance of a 
particular crisis. 
In essence, the image evokes the inter-organizational relations among 
various institutions and is underpinned by a norm dictating an intrinsic value in 
collective as opposed to individual or unilateral policies. While it is understood 
that institutionalized collective action enhances the output of policies, and it is 
argued that this is the main driver of inter-organizational relations, the very fact 
of acting together is portrayed as an intrinsic value related to openness, plurality, 
and participation. 
                                                
645 Acharya, Amitav, The End of American World Order, 89-90. 
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Hence, the image of multilateral regionalism focuses on the 
‘participation’ of other organizations: the mutual endorsement, the daily 
cooperation on the ground, the synergy of policies, and the long-term 
partnership, all might serve as argument. By being partners in specific policies 
and contexts and by strengthening and institutionalizing their partnerships, RSOs 
also publicly endorse each other’s existences and, to a certain extent, mimic what 
states have been doing for centuries in their mutual recognition. 
Through the image of multilateral regionalism, regional organizations 
legitimate their positions within security governance. Such is the case of the 
African Union’s quasi-permanent quest for ‘leadership’ in the international 
community’s initiatives towards the crisis in Darfur. And such the case of quest 
of the European Union – an outsider to Darfur and to Africa – for ‘ownership’ 
via the partnership and endorsement of the African Union. The below sections 2 
and 3 expose these cases in particular. 
Finally, as with other images, arguments of multilateral regionalism 
might also justify the gap between what is expected of regional organizations and 
its actions. By highlighting the plurality of organizations that are present and 
acting in the same system of governance, RSOs might establish their actions, 
which would be perceived as insufficient on their own, as being in fact 
complementary to others that together might reach the expected goals. In this 
regard, the analysis of these argument points to a ‘diffusion of responsibility’ 
within security governance among the different actors involved in crisis 
management. 
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1) The legitimation arguments of inter-organizationalism 
As shown in chapter 2, the context of crisis management in Darfur is 
marked by the co-existence of different actors in various levels: the national 
governments in the affected region (Sudan, Chad, CAR...), third countries 
(United States, China, Norway, Qatar, Libya, France…), the United Nations and 
its multiple bodies (UNSC, Human Rights Council, Secretary General, 
UNHRC…), regional organizations from within and outside the region (e.g. EU, 
AU, Arab League, NATO…) as well as non-governmental organizations. 
Beyond this heterogeneity, what is important to this research on regionalism is 
the place occupied by RSOs within this multi-level governance or, more 
precisely, what they claim to be their standing within the system and in relation 
to the United Nations. 
The same chapter 2 shows that, in a legal point of view, the relationship 
between the UN and the regional organizations resembles a pyramid: a 
hierarchical, vertical relationship in which the UNSC – on top – would be 
constantly kept informed and would oversee the security policies and actions of 
regional bodies and agencies – on the bottom. As seen in chapter 7, the AU and 
the EU make constant references to the legality of their acts in Darfur and Chad, 
which in turn is based above all on the approval by the UNSC. Outside a purely 
legal framework, however, the practical day-to-day interactions are heterarchical 
and the UN is not capable of engaging regional organizations in a ‘hub and 
spoke’ system. Hence, when regional organizations interact among themselves 
and build partnerships to different degrees of institutionalization, they might do it 
at the margins of the framework provided by the UN system. This enhanced 
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cooperation is often portrayed as an improvement to global governance, as in the 
work of Kirchner and Sperling:  
Another form of promoting global governance 
could be through greater interaction among regional 
organisations, and a concomitant closer cooperation by 
regional organisations with the UN.”646 
To such interactions between two or more organizations, in this case 
regional organizations, is given the name of ‘inter-organizationalism’. Since the 
mid-1980s and following the proliferation of regional organizations in the wave 
of New Regionalism, the number of inter-organizational relations has grown 
considerably. If the institutional interaction among RSOs happens across regions, 
this process counts not only as inter-organizationalism but also as trans- or 
interregionalism 647 . Arguably the most evoked example of inter-
organizationalism in the security field, which might be considered a case of 
interregionalism 648 , is the relationship between NATO and the EU. More 
relevant to this research and to the international response to Darfur, however, is 
the interaction and possible cooperation between the European Union, in one 
continent, and the African Union, in another.  
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Little research has been done within security studies literature on the 
relationships between regional organizations.649 In an original effort of theory 
building, Rafael Biermann approaches inter-organizationalism as a networking of 
organizations that, despite being reluctant to give up part of their autonomy, end 
up doing so out of necessity. Using rational-choice institutionalism, he argues 
that in order to network, organizations need to share a similar domain, or issue 
area, and a minimum of common interests that would enable their decision to 
cooperate. Hence, Biermann argues, these “networks arise to achieve better 
policy output through synergy” 650. In other words, organizations come together 
because they can be more effective in the pursuit of their interests when pooling 
their resources. 
Yet, while output synergies are certainly an important factor driving 
inter-organizationalism that encourages organizations to give up part of their 
autonomy to work together, it is also important to acknowledge a more 
subjective factor: the idea that cooperation and collective action might serve as 
an argument in the legitimating discourse of these organizations. Biermann 
briefly touches upon this subjective aspect of inter-organizationalism when he 
says that an organization might interact with another of “stronger reputation to 
improve its own image” and that “positions in an institutional network affect the 
visibility and reputation and, thus, the attractiveness of an organization.”651 Yet 
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in the conclusion of his article, inter-organizationalism is once more reduced to a 
rational-choice calculation aiming at effectiveness: 
Inter-organizational networking is a response to 
challenges of transnational character that single 
organizations (and states) cannot master on their own. 
The goal is better policy output or added value through 
synergy. Resource pooling and provision are the 
primary means to create synergy.652 
The analysis of the legitimating discourse of the EU and AU shows that 
the organizations seldom connect their cooperation to the fact that they would be 
more effective working together. In general, their interactions are portrayed as 
important because ‘things should be done together’. In the accounts of both 
organizations about their policies in response to the crisis in Darfur, their 
partnership and the multilateral nature of their policymaking appear as arguments 
capable of justifying their policies, which clearly goes beyond the positive 
outcome. In the image of multilateral regionalism, inter-organizational 
cooperation is an argument not only because it produces good results, but also 
because collective action is seen as having a value in its own, which might be 
independent from the output it produces. Hence, the necessity of partnership in 
crisis management and peace operations, as Pugh and Sidhu put it, “is in large 
part based on the need for legitimacy”.653 
It is perhaps out of this ‘need for legitimacy’ that both the EU and the AU 
put much emphasis on how their policies towards the crisis in Darfur are 
collective, plural, and multilateral. Indeed, very often one sees references to the 
multiplicity of actors participating in the decision-making or the implementation 
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of policies. Such was the case when AU Commission Chairperson, Baba 
Kingibe, detailed the process of monitoring and investigation of the DPA: 
Whenever we receive reports of ceasefire 
violations, an investigation team comprising 
representatives of the AU, GoS, JEM, SLA, and the US 
and EU representing the international community, 
investigate such reports.654 
In a similar fashion, the AU also highlighted the collective aspect of the 
mediation, which aimed at bringing non-signatories on board the DPA: 
Considerable effort continued to be deployed by 
the AU and the international partners, including in 
particular the United States, the United Kingdom and 
the European Union, to bring Abdulwahid and Khalil on 
board.655 
In their discourse, RSOs take time to name partners and other 
organizations acting alongside them. More than a standard practice, these careful 
mentions also highlight this multilateral dimension of policies and, as such, 
might legitimate them: 
The Council [of the European Union] agreed to 
actively promote, in coordination with the UN, AU and 
US, the resumption of the political process by bringing 
the parties together for peace negotiations.656 
The African Union Chairperson and the United 
Nations Secretary-General chaired a high-level meeting 
on the crisis in Darfur this afternoon on 21 September 
2007. Representatives from 26 States attended, 
including Sudan, the permanent members of the 
Security Council, members of the AU Peace and 
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Security Council and countries from the region. High-
level officials from the European Union and the League 
of Arab States also attended.657 
When explaining why it decided to exclude the non-signatories of the 
DPA from the Ceasefire Commission and the Joint Commission that were 
monitoring the agreement – a controversial decision at the time – the AU 
promptly depicts it as a multilateral decision: 
It should also be pointed out that the decision 
was not taken unilaterally by AMIS. It was only 
announced after consultations had been held with the 
international Partners involved in the CFC and the JC 
and the discussion that took place at the last Session of 
the Joint Commission referred to already.658 
Hence, policies are often seen as joint efforts, which are in turn based on 
the partnerships that the organizations sustain with their peers and other actors. 
Moreover, the rhetoric of the EU and the AU on their cooperation is always 
positive and their discourses seem to align most of the time. Biermann remarks 
that inter-organizational relations present both patterns of cooperation and 
rivalry. If the author is right to say that “rivalry is more widespread than the 
cooperation rhetoric of organizations makes us believe”659, then the fact that 
RSOs only emphasize the cooperation in detriment of the often hidden rivalries 
is yet another indicator that collective action has a value per se. 
While the AU tends to emphasize its partnership with the United Nations 
and to ignore much of the time its partnership with the EU, merging it with the 
‘general support’ of the international community, the EU very often highlights 
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the coordination with its African partner. This difference in approach is arguably 
a reflection of the position both organizations occupy, or aspire, in the security 
governance. For the EU, as an outsider to the region, the endorsement of a 
regional representative is crucial while for the AU, which seeks a leadership role, 
it is the partnership with the global organization that matters the most. 
2) EU’s quest for regional ownership 
Even if EU’s actions in Darfur and Chad are portrayed as beneficial, even 
if they are legal and authorized by the host governments, and even if they are 
indeed depicted as necessary because of the dramatic situation afflicting the local 
population, the EU still needs to reconcile its actions in Africa with the fact that 
it is an outsider to the region. In the current normative context marked by both 
‘anti-imperialism’ and the norm according to which regions should take care of 
their own (security) problems, the EU has to legitimate its position in the African 
regional security governance. Therefore, for the EU, it is the image of 
multilateral regionalism that potentially fills this gap by evoking the regional 
ownership and the endorsement provided by the African Union. 
The logic of EU’s image of multilateral regionalism and its quest for 
regional ownership presents two, usually overlapping, ‘steps’. In a first step, it 
reinforces AU’s position of authority and constructs the organizations as the 
representative of Africa to the extent that the crisis in Darfur is concerned. It 
does so with at least three fairly similar patterns. Firstly, the EU acknowledges 
the positive contribution of the African Union, its efforts and policies, to the 
crisis management in Darfur. Hence, when commenting on peace talks in Abuja 
in 2006 that eventually led to the signature of the DPA, the EU “commends the 
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African Union (AU) and the Sudanese parties negotiating in Abuja for the 
progress achieved towards a peace agreement to settle the conflict in Darfur.”660 
Once the agreement was signed, the Council of the EU “emphasized the vital 
role of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for the peace process in Darfur, and for 
DPA implementation in particular.”661 
Secondly, and related to the first pattern, the EU constantly welcomed, in 
a first moment, the initiatives of the African Union as in the case of the AU’s 
mediation that lead to the signature of the 2004 Ceasefire and, in a second 
moment, the joint initiative of the AU along with the United Nations.  
I warmly welcome the signature this afternoon 
of the agreement on the modalities of the cease-fire in 
Darfur under the sponsorship of the African Union. I 
congratulate the African Union and Commissioner 
Djinnit for this breakthrough.662 
It expresses support for the AU/UN Mediation 
and welcomes its achievements so far, including efforts 
for increased participation of Darfurians, especially 
women, civil society organisations and internally 
displaced persons and refugees, in the peace process.663 
Thirdly, the EU highlights the leadership position that the AU enjoys in 
the crisis management of Darfur, from its mediation efforts to the actual missions 
on the ground. In this regard, the European Union reaffirms that the “AU 
constitutes [to be] the central actor in the prevention, management and resolution 
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of armed conflicts in Africa”664 and, more specifically, that it leads the efforts in 
relation to Darfur: 
The Council welcomes the urgently needed 
deployment of the military elements of the expanded 
African Union (AU) force in Darfur (AMIS II) and fully 
supports the leading role of the African Union.665 
In sum, when the EU “urges all parties in the Darfur conflict to cooperate 
fully with the AU” or when it reaffirms that the mediation is an ‘AU-led 
mediation’ and that peace “must be negotiated […] in the framework set out by 
the African Union”666 , it potentially enhances AU’s position within Africa’s 
regional security governance. Ultimately this represents the recognition, by the 
EU, of the AU’s authority, rights, and obligations vis-à-vis the conflict in Darfur. 
By enhancing the AU’s position, the EU enhances its own because it then 
cooperates with the organization that it presents as the leader of the international 
response and, in this sense, the ‘representative’ of the African continent. Simply 
put, and if successful, the EU legitimates the AU position in order to legitimate 
itself. But it needs to somehow link its actions and its participation in the security 
governance of Darfur to the African Union. Thus, the second ‘step’ in the EU’s 
image of multilateral regionalism is to highlight the endorsement of the AU to 
the EU’s actions and as well as the inter-organizational partnership in order to 
ensure support from precisely the organization that has the authority to do so and 
whose position of authority the EU was helping to construct. It is by associating 
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itself with the African Union that the EU argues for the regional ownership of its 
actions: 
Despite the support from the international 
community, it is the African Union that decides on the 
mission [AMIS 2]. “African ownership is the principle 
of our co-operation. The African Union is in the driving 
seat and we assist wherever we can,” explains Colonel 
Reinhard Linz, the liaison ofﬁcer of the EU to the 
African Union in Addis Ababa.667 
Two patterns stand out in the effort to create a link between EU’s policies 
and the AU’s regional ownership. On the one hand, the EU emphasises the fact 
that its actions and its participation in the crisis management of Darfur followed 
an ‘invitation’ or were pending the request by the African Union. Hence, since 
the initial years of the international response, the EU had “taken up the invitation 
by the African Union to be represented in the Joint Commission”668 and it would 
“continue and increase, based on AU requests, its support to the AU mission in 
Sudan”669. As a matter of fact, variants of the phrase ‘in response to a request 
from the AU’ can be read in most documents that deal with the support action to 
AMIS 2. 
On the other hand, the EU links its policies to the AU by highlighting the 
partnership between both organizations for peace and security. Said partnership 
has been institutionalized since the initial years of the African Union and even 
earlier in the Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000. In 2007, it culminated in the 
signature of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, which included a joint strategy 
for peace and security – in Africa, of course. While the CSDP missions in Africa 
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are, in a sense, the most visible policies that are associated to this partnership – 
and the support mission to AMIS 2 is a crucial example – the key to the AU-EU 
rapprochement is the African Peace Facility (APF). Created in 2003 as a EU 
financial instrument following the demand of AU Maputo Summit of the same 
year, the APF aims at providing ‘predictable financial resources’ to capacity-
building of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in general and 
specific AU initiatives of crisis management such as peace operations, mediation 
efforts, and the Continental Early Warning System. Indeed, much of the financial 
support to the AU’s policies in Darfur came from the funds of the APF. 
Moreover, full-time representatives have been exchanged between the two 
parties and there is continuous dialogue between the AU Peace and Security 
Council and the EU Political and Security Committee.670 
Hence, in its quest for ownership, the EU very frequently refers to its 
policies in Darfur as deriving from the evolving inter-organizational partnership 
with the African Union. This pattern was stronger in the initial years of the crisis 
management, from 2004 up until the end of 2007, because it concerned in 
particular how the Support Mission to AMIS 2 or the participation of the EU in 
the peace process were ‘tangible results’ of the partnership: 
The EU supporting action to AMIS was a 
concrete example of the ever closer relations that are 
developing between the EU and the AU and that were 
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highlighted by the recent EU-Africa summit in 
Lisbon.671 
The co-operation launched with the African 
Union is an important new development step in the 
management of conflicts in Africa. The creation of this 
monitoring mechanism of the Darfur ceasefire is a 
tangible result of this co-operation.672 
At least in the discourse, the AU-EU partnership for the response to 
Darfur appears as a one-way stream, meaning that the EU makes much more 
references to the AU’s leadership and its willingness to contribute to the AU-led 
process than the AU makes references to their mutual partnership or to the EU’s 
actions. When the EU contributions are mentioned by the African Union, they 
were most often amalgamated with those of other ‘partners’ and the general 
support of the international community. 
3) AU’s quest for leadership 
As a natural insider to its region, the AU does not look for regional 
ownership in other organizations; it can claim it on its own right. Instead, it turns 
to multilateralism in order to support its claim for the position of leadership in 
the regional security governance. As with the EU’s quest for ownership, the 
AU’s image of multilateralism in the context of Darfur presents two overlapping 
steps: the affirmation of leadership and authority, on the one hand, and the 
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depiction that said position is supported by the international community673, on 
the other. 
Since the early days of the international response, the AU stated that it is 
“expected to play a lead role”674 in improving the security in Darfur and fighting 
impunity and the mediation efforts in Darfur were said to be “AU-led 
mediation”. In a similar fashion, the organization also reaffirmed its authority in 
various opportunities as when it states that the parties in the conflict agreed to 
reach a peaceful solution “under the leadership of the African Union”675 and 
when it stressed that the same parties – the rebel groups and the government of 
Sudan – need “to comply with the relevant decisions of the African Union”676. 
Right after the signature of the first Peace Agreement in 2006, the AU 
Chairperson Special Envoy, Ahmed Salim, confirms “the overall political 
leadership role of the AU in the DPA implementation process”677.  
From 2006 onwards, the AU often claims to share the ‘leadership’ of the 
international response with the United Nations, which is due to the growing 
participation of the UN in the mediation process (i.e. joint-mediation), the 
logistical support (light and heavy support packages), and the hybrid mission 
UNAMID that was being discussed for more than a year before it was finally 
deployed in January 2008. Hence, references to this joint-leadership such as the 
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two examples below – the first one on the need of a common framework and the 
second on the re-launch of the peace process in 2007 – became very common in 
the AU’s discourse. 
[…] if everyone is doing the negotiation, then no 
one is doing the negotiation. There is a need for all 
negotiations to converge under the AU and UN 
leadership.678 
The negotiations will take place in Libya, under 
the leadership of the AU and UN Special Envoys in 
partnership with the countries of the region and with the 
support of the wider international community.679 
In sum, in most documents related to Darfur there are mentions of the 
exclusive or shared leadership of the African Union among its partners in the 
efforts of the international community. This prominent position is then 
legitimated by, among other arguments, references to the collective endorsement 
made by the very same international partners. Therefore, the second step consists 
in showcasing the support of the international community to the leadership 
position that the AU claims to have. When commenting on the Abuja round of 
the peace process in 2005, for example, the AU Commissioner stresses the 
international community political support, which goes beyond the legal 
endorsement of the UN as seen in chapter 7: 
I am pleased to report that in all these 
interactions, our Partners have consistently expressed 
their appreciation of the efforts and leadership of the 
AU as well as their continued support both for the steps 
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taken for the resumption of the Abuja Peace Talks and 
the operations of AMIS.680 
The report of the Chairperson of the Commission in the following year 
retrospectively highlights the collective aspects of AU’s actions along with the 
leading position of the organization. In other words, the practice of partnership 
also legitimates the AU’s leadership: 
It is also worth noting that the AMIS operation 
in Darfur was ab initio conceived and executed in the 
spirit of partnership with the international community. 
While the AU took the lead in addressing the crisis, with 
its member states contributing troops and civilian police, 
the partners provided the necessary logistical support 
and finance and assisted in the planning and training.681 
Arguably, an image of African leadership of the international response 
was not only in AU’s interest but also crucial to the whole system of governance 
in place. As it became clear that even an enhanced AMIS 2 was unable to sustain 
the peace effort in Darfur – mainly due to the unpredictable funds and lack of 
capacity afflicting the mission – a stronger intervention by the UN was then 
foreseen. In a first moment, the possibility of a full transition from the AMIS 2 to 
the United Nations Mission in Sudan, which was already active in the South of 
Sudan, was on the table. This meant that the AU would withdraw considerably 
from the conflict in Darfur at a time when its focus was starting to shift towards 
the crisis in Somalia after the downfall of the United Islamic Courts – a shift that 
would culminate in the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, in February 2007. 
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The Government of Sudan notoriously opposed the transition to the UN 
mission on the grounds of sovereignty and anti-imperialism, affirming that it was 
a plot to dominate the country’s national politics in support of a ‘hidden agenda’. 
Interestingly enough, and regardless of its reasons, the GoS actually voiced the 
most assertive arguments in favour of regionalism; probably stronger than any 
RSO did during the crisis management. A transition to the UN, according to the 
GoS, “would reflect badly on the desire of Africans to resolve their own 
problems” and that “the continent, having come out of colonialism, should be 
able to solve its problems by itself”682. The GoS even made reference to RSO’s 
comparative advantages of cultural and religious proximity when calling 
attention to the “sensitivities in Darfur, which, being an Islamic society with 
grained Islamic values, required that caution be exercised in any attempt to 
handover the Mission to the UN.”683 Simply put, priority should be given to 
strengthening AMIS and not to transitioning to UNMIS.  
With the Sudanese rejection of UNSC Resolution 1706 of 2006, the UN 
and the GoS reached a ‘compromise’ according to which there would be a 
transition to a hybrid mission. More importantly, the mission would enjoy a 
strong ‘African character’ in which the AU’s leadership was a central piece, as 
the Chairperson Report form 2007 reaffirms: 
On peacekeeping, the African Union and the 
United Nations appealed for support in their efforts to 
ensure deployment of a force that would be able to 
effectively fulfill its mandate and which would have an 
immediate positive impact in Darfur, while reiterating 
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their commitment to ensuring the predominantly African 
character of the joint AU-UN operation.684 
 This compromise meant above all that the soldiers deployed for 
UNAMID would be chosen primarily from African countries. It also meant that 
the AU and the UN would jointly appoint the UN-AU Representative for Darfur, 
who would be heading the hybrid mission, as well as the UNAMID Force 
Commander. As a matter of fact, African diplomats have so far always occupied 
both positions of the hybrid mission. 
The moment of transition to UNAMID is then particularly important for 
the regional organization as it risked having its perceived role diminished by the 
larger participation of the UN. In this sense, the AU goes in defence of its 
prominent position. When commenting on the UNSC Resolution 1706, for 
example, the AU Commissioner voiced that “the lead role of the African Union 
[was] not adequately reflected in the resolution”.685 Furthermore, Africa’s role as 
co-leader with the UN was non-negotiable: 
The meeting we are talking about and at which 
we will participate, will take place under the leadership 
of the African Union and the United Nations. That is a 
matter of principle! We will not subcontract our 
leadership and we will not allow our leadership to be 
subordinated. All our partners agree on that. It is now a 
matter of putting our teams into place and maintaining 
our leadership.686 
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The challenge at the time was not only to enhance – and eventually 
legitimate – the organization’s position by insisting on its leadership, but also to 
maintain AU’s prominent role in order to persuade the GoS of said African 
character and enhance the international response as a whole. 
4) The governance of actions and inactions  
The African and European cases are two examples of the same trend, 
which is to justify one’s actions and position within security governance by 
appealing to the endorsement of partners and the partnerships between 
themselves as arguments. While the EU ‘borrows’ the African ownership via the 
partnership, the AU solidifies its leadership position with the endorsement of 
other organizations and governments. Indeed, RSOs turn to the heterarchical and 
plural nature of security governance for arguments of legitimation. Hence, it is 
possible to identify two general trends in which governance becomes an 
argument for, on the one hand, the legitimation of actions and institutions via 
‘mutual recognition’ and, on the other hand, for the legitimation of perceived 
inaction via ‘diffusion of responsibilities’. 
In the international system, the mutual recognition of states and 
governments has largely served to legitimate their existences687. Allen Buchanan 
calls this phenomenon ‘recognitional legitimacy’. 688  What does it mean to 
recognize if not to accept the existence of a state in this current configuration as 
well as the authority of government in place over its people and territory? 
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Recognition of a state by its peers is crucial during or in the aftermath of, for 
example, wars of independence. And recognition of a government’s authority is a 
key factor in the legitimation struggle of rebel movements and different parties in 
a civil war. Recognition is not only juridical, but also political. 689  When 
recognized, states and their governments become part of the society of states. 
Arguably, the recognition of a state by a powerful state, or by a government in its 
own region, or by a traditional ‘neutral’ state matter more or less depending on 
the context. 
This process of recognition usually happens via solemn and official 
declarations, but practices such as state visit and public endorsement might carry 
equal weight. Another form of ‘recognition’, it might be said, is the accession of 
states to the membership of international organizations, the UN above all, but 
also others such as the WTO, and of course regional organizations. The 
accession of South Sudan to the African Union merely 20 days after its secession 
from the north in 2011, for example, was seen as a necessary step in its 
independence process. The participation of states within international 
organizations, on the one hand, might enhance their legitimacy because they 
become members of a community. The same participation, on the other hand, 
might enhance the legitimacy of the organization itself because international 
organizations might be legitimated “through the consent that states express in 
joining an institution, and accepting is rules and decisions”690. Buchanan calls 
                                                
689 Delcourt, Barbara, "Usages du droit international dans le processus de legitimation de la 
politique exterieure europeenne". 
690 Zaum, Dominik, "International Organizations, Legitimacy, and Legitimation," 11. 
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this relationship between organizations and members states a “reciprocal 
legitimation”691. 
For both ‘reciprocal legitimation’ and ‘recognitional legitimacy’, 
Buchanan adopts a normative approach to legitimacy. This means that if they 
follow the pre-established criteria, the membership of a state will legitimate the 
organization and the state itself and the recognition will legitimate the state or the 
government being accepted. As presented in chapter 3, this understanding is at 
odds with our own approach to legitimation as an intersubjective process of 
justification. Yet, both of Buchanan’s insights point to relevant phenomena in 
security governance and could be seen as arguments of legitimation that might – 
or might not – legitimate the organizations, states and their peers. His work, 
despite the differences in the approach to legitimacy, is the starting point to the 
identification of a trend of ‘mutual recognition’692 among peers in the regional 
security governance of Darfur – and arguably of other systems – that might be 
seen as arguments of legitimation according to an image of multilateral 
regionalism. 
Hence, in a similar fashion to the recognition of states, regional 
organizations also mutually recognize their peers by means of voicing their 
support and their endorsement for their actions and their participation in the 
security governance, by means of highlighting their partnership, and by means of 
acknowledging the other’s rights and the value in their existence. The security 
                                                
691  Buchanan, Allen, "Reciprocal Legitimation: Reframing the problem of international 
legitimacy". 
692  On mutual recognition and legitimacy, see also: Frost, Mervyn, Ethics in International 
Relations: A Constitutive Theory; Frost, Mervyn, "Legitimacy and International 
Organizations: The Changing Ethical Context," 37. 
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governance responding to the crisis in Darfur in Sudan and its adjacent areas 
from 2003 onwards has regional features mainly because of the positions 
occupied by regional organizations such as the European Union and the African 
Union. Put together along with roles and policies implemented by the United 
Nations, the national governments of the region, third-countries, and other 
member of the so-called international community, one clearly sees the 
heterarchical nature of governance and the multiplicity of sites of authority. 
References to value in each other’s roles and policies are numerous 
during the whole period. For instance, when the EU “urges the regional actors to 
work for the convergence of all mediation initiatives and their integration within 
the broader AU/UN framework”693 or “expresses its full support to the efforts of 
UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim to revive the 
political process”694 it is, in all but name, recognizing the rightfulness of the AU 
and the UN in responding to the crisis in Darfur. Likewise, when an AU 
representative expresses “profound gratitude to the AU international partners and 
their agencies for their commitment to the peace process in Darfur”695 or, more 
specifically, “satisfaction at the support which the United Nations, the European 
Union (EU), the League of Arab States and the bilateral Partners are giving to the 
AU”696, it is not only acknowledging their contribution but also their right to 
participate. 
                                                
693 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Sudan/Darfur", 12159/07, Brussels, 
2007. para. 3. 
694 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Sudan," para. 2. 
695  Amis Headquarters, "The Office of the Implementation of Abuja Peace Agreement 
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What we are here identifying as a trend of mutual recognition is 
admittedly a common practice in most, if not all, international organizations. 
Indeed, most of the references are subtle and so is this ‘mutual’ character, but 
this pattern is everywhere in the organizations’ discourses. Yet, it is an indicator 
that the image of multilateralism – of collective action and plurality of 
participants – matters as an argument of legitimation and, therefore, is part of the 
normative context in which RSOs legitimate themselves. Furthermore, RSOs and 
other organizations tend to align their discourses in terms of objectives and 
means to achieve them such as in the very common statements relating to 
‘political solution’, the constant need to ‘re-energize the peace process’ and seek 
a ‘lasting solution’ that would ‘bring justice’, and ‘gender-based violence’ in 
later years. 
However, ‘mutual recognition’ is not the only trend of legitimation 
appealing to multilateralism and its plurality of actors. As seen in previous 
chapter, the justification of perceived inaction can be as important as the 
justification of actions. Commenting on the new expectations on the Security 
Council since late 1980, Robert Keohane argues that “inaction became as 
culpable as action.”697 And this is certainly true for regional organizations as well 
– if not for the entire organization, at least to its foreign policy and its security 
dimension – as long as they have to manage the expectations, on the one side, 
and the outcome they bring to governance of security, on the other side. By being 
part of this security governance, RSOs can allude to it in order to ‘diffuse the 
responsibility’ that could otherwise fall exclusively on their shoulders.  
                                                
697  Keohane, Robert O., "The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism", GARNET Working 
Paper, 6 (2006), 9. 
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In chapter 5, it has been shown that RSOs might justify perceived 
inaction by blaming the parties involved for their lack of cooperation, by 
referring to actions in other areas that would be ‘interdependent’ with the main 
issue, or by domesticating the peace process and moving the burden of action to 
the national government, in this case the GoS. In chapter 7, we see that RSOs 
might also put the blame of failure or inaction in factors ‘beyond their control’ 
such as the remote geographical location and the logistical challenges and by 
consequence portray a lack of choice in the first place. An additional way of 
justifying inaction – or more precisely, of reducing expectations – is to shift 
responsibility to other organizations in particular or to diffuse the responsibility 
for action among multiple parties of the system of governance through a sort of 
‘division of labour’. 
Since 2004, for example, the AU would advocate that, in the overarching 
response to Darfur, the organization was responsible for the political process, the 
monitoring, and creation of a safe environment while the UN was responsible for 
ensuring the humanitarian action and the remaining of the international 
community would have a financial and logistical support role. As the transition 
to UNAMID became a reality, this division of labour – arguably also a division 
of responsibilities – was altered and the UN would gradually share the security 
and political roles along with the humanitarian.  
Another example is the shift of responsibility towards the UN. If RSOs 
do not expressly challenge the UNSC primacy, neither do they reaffirm it in their 
official discourse on the missions. However, when they do refer to the UN’s 
standing in security governance – meaning that the reference goes beyond the 
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UN endorsement, authorization or the partnership – RSOs seem to put greater 
emphasis on the responsibilities that come along with said primary role.  
Council recalled that the United Nations Security 
Council has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The 
United Nations, therefore, is expected to provide 
continued and increased support to enhance the capacity 
of UNAMID and to take the necessary steps to 
significantly and rapidly improve the resources needed 
for the smooth transition from AMIS to UNAMID in 
order to accomplish all identified tasks by the deadline 
of 31 December 2007.698 
As already stressed by Council, at its Libreville 
meeting, the international community, in particular the 
UN Security Council and its members, should continue 
to exert constant pressure on all the Parties so that they 
abide by their commitments and extend full cooperation 
to the AU.  
The general idea behind diffusion of responsibility is that the EU and the 
AU claim to be part of a larger engagement and to be part of complementary 
effort by supporting other actors, regional and global organizations. Inter-
organizationalism constitutes a recurrent argument for justifying the EU’s actions 
in Darfur via ownership and partnership with the AU. Accordingly, after EU 
gradual disengagement from Sudan, it would still be indirectly engaged through 
its partners and still contributing to find a solution. 
Conclusion 
Multilateralism, here understood as a collective action – actions that 
enjoy the participation of multiple actors – with a certain degree of 
                                                
698 Peace and Security Council, "Press Statement of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the 
Status of Implementation of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID)", Addis Ababa, 2007. Emphasis mine. 
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institutionalization699, marks the fourth and final image of regionalism that is 
presented in the legitimating discourse of the regional organizations in our case 
studies. Contrarily to early and statecentric definitions, multilateralism is not 
understood in this research as limited to the collective actions of states, but 
would include other polities such as regional and global organizations. One the 
one hand, regional organizations are themselves products of the collective, 
therefore multilateral, actions of states and they highlight this dimension when 
referring to the consensus or to the participation of its membership in their 
actions. On the other hand, and this was the focus of this chapter, RSOs can also 
base their legitimacy claims on the collective nature of the actions among 
themselves and their peers. 
How good the support and the endorsements of other organizations as 
arguments of legitimation are – what is the capacity of collective 
legitimization700 – will depend on the position the organization occupies within 
the security governance. An endorsement of the UNSC, which formally holds the 
primacy of maintenance of peace and security, is certainly a strong argument in 
most cases701. Yet, RSOs might also enjoy the support of their peers. For the EU, 
AU’s support was crucial given its ‘Africa character’, as it is seen in the constant 
references it makes to AU’s approval to its actions. Although not a formal 
authorization, since the AU doesn’t hold the primacy in security issues as the 
UNSC does, its endorsements and its requests of action would still weight heavy 
for EU’s quest of ownership. But equally crucial was to reinforce and sustain 
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AU’s position within security governance both as the leader and the 
representative of Africa via the endorsement of others from inside and outside 
the region. 
The image of multilateral regionalism, in this regard, goes beyond self-
legitimation and becomes mutual legitimation as the arguments of partnership 
and collective actions are as good as the position – or the reputation – of the 
partner(s), which is often also confused with the legitimacy of the whole system 
of ruling. Hence, in occasions, the whole system of governance seems to be the 
object of legitimation. The fact that the AU would take the leadership role would 
ensure ownership not only to the EU’s actions, but also to the entire international 
response: 
The support of the international community to 
the African union is unequivocal: the African Union has 
and will continue to have the political responsibility of 
the operation; and it will continue to have the exclusive 
role in the deployment and the conduct of the operation 
AMIS 2. This is the vital issue: the prevention and the 
resolution of conflicts in Africa are in the hands of 
Africans themselves.702 
Multilateral regionalism is the discourse that potentially justifies the 
action by saying that they are collective actions and justifies the position of the 
RSO via the endorsement and the partnership with other actors. As much as they 
might seem to be purely protocolary and diplomatic, practices of recognition are 
in fact also part of the legitimating discourse of RSOs, even if they are not 
consciously conceived as such by the actors. ‘To do things together’ seems to be 
a value in itself such as ‘producing good results’, ‘being legal’, or ‘solving a 
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security issue’. Finally, the image of multilateralism, as with the other images 
presented in previous chapters, might also justify perceived inaction by diffusing 
the responsibility into collective responsibility.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 Like most fashions, fashions in legitimization change from 
time to time, and the crucial periods in political history are 
those transitional years of conflict between old and new 
concepts of legitimacy, the historical interstices between the 
initial challenge to the established concept and the general 
acceptance of its replacement.703 
 
Taken together, the fours images presented in this thesis are the current 
‘fashion in legitimation’ of security regionalism and of the new sites of authority 
in security governance that are the regional organizations. In the process of 
legitimation, regional organizations tell us a story, an ‘autobiography’, about 
what they do, about their policies, and about their role as security actors. These 
stories are capable of justifying not only the organization’s actions but also their 
standing between national states and global institutions. But more than that, these 
stories – the images of security regionalism – allow us to shed light on the 
normative context, the shared standards about appropriate behaviour and about 
rightfulness of ruling, in which security regionalism is embedded. 
Of all possible narratives, the African Union and the European Union tell 
us those stories that portray their policies and their existence as beneficial for a 
given community, as necessary to restore order and peace in the face of violence 
and chaos, as inevitable given that they ‘simply’ follow their mandates and are 
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only implementing decisions as neutral bureaucracies, and as multilateral 
because they are acting collectively and in partnership with other actors within 
the same system of governance. By telling specifically these stories, the 
organizations privilege some narratives over others. They do not tell us, for 
instance, the stories of how their policies are democratic by virtue of an open and 
accountable decision-making process, of how they enjoy the support of the 
scientific and epistemic communities whose findings would endorse their 
actions, or of how their leaders are charismatic and have a unique capacity to 
rule. These stories are most certainly fashions of legitimation in other policy 
areas, for other groups of institutions, and in other epochs. When it comes to 
security regionalism, however, and based on the case studies this thesis has 
analysed, it is safe to argue for four images that are representative of the 
legitimacy claims of regional organizations. 
The first image is the one of beneficial regionalism according to which 
RSOs highlight their contributions and the positive outcome of their actions and 
policies of crisis management. It is a consequentialist image in the sense that the 
justification for the actions is underpinned by the idea that these actions produce 
positive results for a given community. By comparing this narrative to the 
dichotomy of input and output democratic legitimacy that is referenced mainly in 
EU studies, it is possible to conclude that the legitimacy claims of RSOs’ 
policies privilege output-related arguments of government, and ruling, for the 
people as opposed to what would be input-related arguments of participation and 
government by the people. Hence, a possible image of democratic legitimacy is 
actually incomplete and what is left is the consequentialist argument of output. 
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By looking at the dynamics within the image of beneficial regionalism it 
is also possible to conclude that security missions and policies of crisis 
management can be both objects of legitimation – what is being legitimated – 
while also serving as arguments for the legitimation for another object, in this 
case the existence of regional organizations and their security-related institutions 
and mandates as well as the relative position they occupy within security 
governance. Within this image, we can identify a pattern of legitimation by 
which RSOs seem to struggle to stay relevant by highlighting not only that they 
are doing something good but also that they are doing something at all. 
In particular, the EU and AU missions in Darfur were authorized and 
endorsed by the UNSC, approved by a decision-making process following the 
standard procedures as established in the treaties, and enjoyed the consent, albeit 
reluctant, of the host state of Sudan. In sum, these missions and other policies 
responding to the crisis in Darfur were not controversial, at least in legal terms. 
This ‘struggle to be and remain relevant’ not only reveals that organizations use 
their policies to legitimate their standings as security actors, but also that the 
processes of legitimation of policies and of the organizations are indissociable. 
The second image, necessary regionalism, refers to the role of the 
regional organization as a security actor and to its policies a necessity given the 
security issue on the ground that is, in turn, also constructed at least partially by 
the same legitimating discourse. This image can be broken down into two steps. 
The first one refers to the logic of ‘dramatization’ of an issue. In the case studies, 
it is the situation in Darfur and adjacent areas that is constantly portrayed as a 
dramatic, chaotic, and violent. Consequently, it is established that there is a 
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necessity to do something in response. If there is no security issue or if there is 
no risk of its reoccurrence, then there is no need of an organization acting as 
security provider. Hence, RSOs participate in the process of establishing what 
constitutes a threat and to whom, and how can it be solved. The AU and the EU 
are security actors not only in the sense they act as security providers, but also 
because they participate in the construction of security and, therefore, ‘speak 
security’. 
The second step of the image of necessary regionalism consists of the 
depiction of the RSO and of its policies as a sine qua non condition for the 
solution of the crisis – the dramatized issue. On the one hand, there is chaos and 
violence in the absence the organization and its actions. On the other, stability 
and peace are granted by the RSO’s policies, be it in retrospective according to 
the organization’s narrative or as a scenario in which stability and peace are 
somehow anticipated following a future action. In sum, the image works by 
opposition between chaos and order, between death and life, with the 
organization and its policies as the necessary ‘condition of triumph’ over 
violence that ensures peace, at least as part of a larger effort. Power relations are 
then legitimated by rationalization, by the ‘rational’ argument that they are 
necessary to restore and keep order and peace. 
But regional organizations are not only security actors, they are also 
bureaucracies and might also present themselves as somehow ‘a-political’ and 
depersonalized bodies that are simply applying the law and following decisions 
that are taken elsewhere. In essence, this is the main argument behind the image 
of inevitable regionalism, meaning that the policies implemented by the RSO are 
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nothing more than the natural – and inevitable – course of action, which is 
determined by law and by other political decisions lying outside the 
bureaucracies that, in turn, are only ‘doing their job’ as assigned. In sum, 
thorough this image, the relation of domination that is inherent to every social 
action is then concealed behind a veil of ‘legality and ‘impartiality’. 
The key concept behind the image of inevitable regionalism is the 
Weberian legal-bureaucratic principle and, simply put, the idea that regional 
organizations, as bureaucracies, are only following their mandates and are, 
therefore, legitimated by the ‘virtue of legality’. Thus, the largest pattern of 
argument within this image is the ‘legitimation by law’. Furthermore, for this 
image to function, it is crucial that, on the one hand, the bureaucracy is indeed 
perceived as being neutral, transparent, and impersonal and, on the other, that 
law itself is seen as objective. Therefore, both the European Union and the 
African Union not only portray their actions and their presence in Darfur as 
lawful and impartial, but they also come in defence of their bureaucracy in the 
face of accusations such as corruption, bias, or mismanagement. 
The fourth and last image is that of multilateral regionalism. Its central 
argument refers both to the collective character of the policies implemented by 
the regional organization and to the mutual endorsements received by various 
organizations that support its particular positions within security governance. 
Underpinning this argument is the assumption that ‘doing things together’ is 
preferable to ‘doing things alone’. Hence, RSOs make constant references to 
their inter-organizational relations. More than simply enhancing the effectiveness 
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of policy implementation, the cooperation and partnership between organizations 
might also serve to justify their policies. 
Simply put, the image functions through two-step process. First, the 
organization constructs and values the standing of other institutions within 
security governance. Secondly, it highlights the fact that these other 
organizations support its claims to legitimacy and to the position it occupies. 
Hence, the AU turns to the EU’s support and other’s, for example, to legitimate 
its position as the ‘leader’ of the crisis management in the continent while the EU 
turns to the AU’s endorsement so that it can ensure a regional footprint and 
‘ownership’ to its intervention in Africa. In this regard, the image of multilateral 
regionalism allows for the identification of a pattern of mutual recognition that is 
somehow analogous to the well-established – and more formal – pattern of 
recognition between sovereign states. 
Images of legitimation are certainly and in part bound to what ‘happens’, 
the perceived institutional reality. But they are only versions of it – stories that 
‘translate’ what happens according to the normative values that the organization 
holds and what its personnel thinks that others believe. A discourse of self-
legitimation “is the idea that rulers […] have about the underpinnings of 
legitimacy”704 and, as such, the images “pay tribute”705 to the values of their time 
regarding appropriate behaviour and what justifies unequal power relations. As 
regional organization become more intrusive, they also impose new relations of 
domination and might eventually constitute sites of authority. Hence, by studying 
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the legitimacy claims of regional organizations and analysing the images of 
security regionalism, it is possible to shed light on the normative context in 
which they evolve. 
In order to study legitimacy claims, this thesis has proposed a theoretical 
and conceptual framework of legitimation, understood as a social process of 
justification of unequal power relations between rulers and ruled. Every system 
of domination attempts to legitimate itself706, and regional organizations are no 
different. The legitimation process has been divided into several elements: the 
object of legitimation (what is being legitimated), the legitimating actor (who is 
legitimating), the audience of legitimation (the communities ‘granting’ 
legitimacy) and, finally, the arguments of legitimation that potentially connect 
the perceived institutional reality to the values and standards of appropriate 
behaviour of a given community. Moreover, the thesis proposed a methodology, 
including data collecting, for the analysis of the discourse of self-legitimation of 
regional organizations regarding their own missions and policies. In particular, it 
proposed a methodology for grasping the patterns of arguments of legitimation 
contained within the self-legitimation discourse of the African Union and the 
European Union – a study of their legitimacy claims. 
This conceptual and theoretical framework, which is accompanied by the 
empirical analysis of the case studies, allowed for the identification of the four 
images of regionalism as shown above. Moreover, it allows us to answer 
questions that appear at the intersection between the literatures of security, 
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legitimacy in international politics, and regionalism. Four questions, for instance, 
stood out as presented in the first four chapters. 
The first one, explored in chapter one, relates to the nature of the 
organizations as security actors. It is clear from the case studies that both 
organizations are not only security providers, but that they also ‘speak security’ – 
arguing about what constitutes a security issue or a threat and who or what is 
being threatened. As shown, one of the most prevalent arguments in the 
discourse of RSOs is the ‘dramatization’ of the context in which they are acting. 
Nevertheless, the EU and the AU do not point to the violence and chaos as a 
threat to their own existences. The referent object in the case studies is above all 
the people in Darfur and nearby areas as well as the regional order and stability. 
By speaking security, regional organizations portray their actions as a necessity. 
But in the same pattern, the argument of security functions as a double-edged 
sword that extends the perceived responsibility of the actor that is behind the 
dramatization the context. If the organization cannot cope with this responsibility 
– which it somehow helped creating by evoking security arguments – then the 
same image of necessity might turn into de-legitimation. 
The second question refers the nature of the EU and the AU as regional 
organizations and to what extent this regional trait appears as an argument in 
their legitimacy claims. As presented in chapter 2, would it be possible to say 
that RSOs see themselves as filling the gap in security provision created by the 
relative failure of both global and national levels? Ultimately, are RSOs actually 
challenging the current system and proposing an alternative? The short answer to 
these questions is no: we see in the image of inevitable regionalism that the 
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regional identity is only a marginal argument when compared to the legal-
bureaucratic and somehow depersonalized arguments in the legitimation by law; 
we see in the image of beneficial regionalism that RSOs very rarely make 
references to their supposedly ‘comparative advantages’ in security provision; 
and we see in the image of necessary regionalism that, despite presenting 
themselves and their actions as necessary solutions to the chaotic situation, they 
are not portrayed as the only solution to the chaos and violence. Rather, we can 
confirm in the image of multilateral regionalism that RSOs self-legitimate their 
position in complementarity to the multiplicity of sites of authority in security 
governance and, therefore, do not to challenge the core structure of security 
provision that is, in a sense, already heterarchical. 
The third question is about the nature and level of the legitimation of 
security regionalism. We saw in chapter 3 that legitimation can happen within 
fours levels: the differentiation between rulers and ruled, the existence of a 
specialized system of domination, the rules of the game and procedures of 
domination, and finally the leaders and groups in power. The empirical analysis 
shows that the legitimation of regional organization happens in deeper levels, 
meaning that legitimacy claims justify not only the policies of RSOs or their 
leaders, but also and more importantly their existence as a specialized body of 
domination.  
We also know from chapter 3 that legitimacy claims can confirm the 
desirability and the rightfulness of the status quo, expand the authoritative 
relation, or re-focus the argument in the event of a change in the normative 
context. Perhaps because they are new ‘systems of domination’, the legitimacy 
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claims of RSOs tend to expand and consolidate the authoritative relation. As a 
matter of fact, there are no remarkable and consistent changes of ‘fashion’ of 
legitimation in the period analysed. The four images of security regionalism are 
in fact common over the whole decade. However, in a sense, since regional 
security organizations are relatively new phenomena there is a ‘change’ in 
fashion that goes from non-existent – when RSOs did not exist or did not have 
such a security role – to what is portrayed as the four images. Hence, the 
legitimation of security regionalism tends to expand the system of domination by 
introducing new actors that do not rule out competing claim of authority, but 
rather act in ‘complementarity’. The point in the future in which the ‘expansion 
of the authoritative relation’ becomes ‘consolidation of the status quo’ can only 
be seen in retrospective. 
The fourth and final question refers to the relative importance of 
‘ordinary’ missions and day-to-day policies of crisis managements when 
compared to the highly controversial policies of humanitarian intervention 
without authorization of the host nation or the UNSC. While the literature has 
consistently focused on the cases in the later category, this thesis shows that not 
only ‘ordinary’ missions must be legitimated, but that much can be learned from 
the legitimation process of missions and policies of crisis management and, after 
all, they make up the majority of policies of both the EU and the AU. Moreover, 
they also cost social and financial resources to the detriment of other policies, 
mobilize troops and military hardware, constitute an intervention from the 
outside, involve multiple stakeholders, and still include the possibility of the use 
of force in self-defence or to enforce measures according to the agreements 
between warring parties or between the host state and interveners. 
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Finally, the empirical chapters also shed light on the possible 
contradictions within the legitimating discourse of regional security 
organizations and the ‘tools’ that might address them. To be clear, these are not 
contradictions in the sense that what the organization says contradicts what it is 
actually doing on the ground. Such a study would require a different set of 
methods; it would be closer to finding out what is ‘really happening’ and whether 
organizations are speaking ‘the truth’ than to an analysis of legitimation. Rather, 
we have aimed at unveiling the contradictions within the legitimation process 
itself and between its different elements such as the legitimacy claims and the 
audience’s perceptions. 
First and foremost, the biggest contradiction would be for an organization 
to try and legitimate a position as security actor and as security provider while 
actually being perceived as providing little or no security at all. Hence, the 
danger of the perceived inaction – of an organization being perceived as not 
doing what it is supposed to do – and the importance of the tools that are 
activated to justify this inaction. As a matter of fact, the justification of action is 
also a justification of inaction; both are two sides of the same coin. In a spectrum 
of ‘total inaction’ and ‘total action’, whatever the RSO does is located between 
both extremes. When it legitimates is action, an institution is at the same time 
legitimating the inevitable gap between what it does and what else could have 
been done. Hence, it is not so much as to justify and legitimate a given number 
of highly contentious policies, as it is about highlighting the policies that are 
actually implemented in order to justify and legitimate the existence of the 
organization and their raison d’être. 
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A closer look into the images of regionalism reveals the tools to manage 
the risk of perceived inaction. In the image of beneficial regionalism, RSOs 
highlight the wide array of policies they are implementing in the region, even if 
their impact is only marginal, and we can see that they struggle to claim their 
relevance in the context. When disengaging from the international response, such 
as at the end of a mission, the organizations claim to ‘remain active’ trough other 
policies. When facing criticism about the outcome of their policies, the 
organizations highlight the hard work and efforts made by their military and 
bureaucrats. In the image of inevitable regionalism, RSOs justify the perceived 
lack of action by pointing at factors beyond their control and, by consequence, 
‘inevitable’: the hardship of the context, the geographical isolation of Darfur, the 
lack of infrastructure, and the lack of compliance and cooperation from the 
parties in conflict. Finally, in the image of multilateral regionalism, RSOs 
attempt to ‘diffuse the responsibility’ that could fall exclusive on their shoulders 
by placing their policies in the larger context of the international response. 
A second possible contradiction is rather an absence that can turn into de-
legitimation if so perceived by any given audience. Through the analysis of the 
legitimacy claims and the four images, arguably the most noticeable absence is 
the pattern referring to democratic participation and decision-making, which 
would connect the people with the organization. In this regard, it is a 
combination of patterns in two images – beneficial and inevitable regionalism – 
that might serve as a tool to address this perceived lack of ‘input’-related 
arguments. Arguably, the combination of positive outcome and throughput 
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arguments of quality of policy implementation forms a “cordon sanitaire”707 that 
might conceal or compensate the lack of direct participation and democratic 
decision-making. Hence, this cordon sanitaire legitimates the organization as 
beneficial and enjoying at least minimum standards of policy implementation – it 
makes the regional level of power relation ‘disappear’. 
The third and final issue refers to the possible contradiction between, on 
the one hand, the pattern of legitimation by law and, one the other, the fact that 
oftentimes RSOs would argue for their own interpretation of law. In other words, 
while portraying themselves as de-politicized bureaucratic bodies the 
organizations might argue for their subjective interpretation of what a mandate 
means. Hence, a common occurrence in the legitimation discourse is the defence 
of a ‘robust interpretation’ of a mandate to fulfil certain goals. The tool to 
manage this contradiction is to be found in another image, the necessary 
regionalism, where RSOs appeal to the need of interpreting the mandate because 
the situation so requires – it is a security issue. In sum, necessity ‘trumps’ the 
objective and de-personalized application of law. This ‘triumph’ of security 
necessities over law can also be seen in the refusal, from the AU, to abide to the 
decisions of the ICC that were underpinned by a UNSC resolution. The main 
justification, in this case, is the necessity to privilege stability and security 
instead of justice. 
The table in the next page simplifies and brings all these elements 
together according to the images of security regionalism.  
                                                
707 Schmidt, Vivien A., "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, 
Output and ‘Throughput’", 8. 
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Table 5. The Images of Legitimation of Security Regionalism 
Main Argument Lessons Literatures  Inaction 
Beneficial Regionalism 
The RSO rules in 
the people’s 
benefit. Its 
policies and acts 
have a positive 
outcome – a 
consequentialist 
argument. 
Legitimation of 
policies and 
‘polities’ is 
indissociable: 
‘good’ policies 
serve as 
arguments in the 
legitimation of the 
organization. 
Little mention of 
‘comparative 
advantages’ 
1. Legitimation by 
idealization  
(J. Lagroye) 
 
2. Output 
legitimacy  
(F. Scharpf) 
 
The RSO 
struggles for 
being perceived as 
relevant, 
highlighting the 
policies and their 
outcomes, even if 
they only present 
marginal 
contributions.  
Necessary Regionalism 
The RSO’s 
actions and 
standing in the 
region are 
necessary given 
the dramatic, 
unstable, and 
violent situation 
on the ground. 
Two steps: 
situation is 
dramatic 
(dramatization) 
and the actions of 
the RSO restore 
peace and 
stability, or at 
least contribute to 
a solution. 
1. Security 
Studies and 
Securitization 
 
2. Legitimation by 
rationalization  
(J. Lagroye) 
Double-edged 
sword: excessive 
dramatization 
creates 
expectations and 
responsibilities 
the organization 
might not fulfil. 
Inevitable Regionalism 
As a bureaucracy, 
the RSO is neutral 
and impersonal. 
Its actions are the 
inevitable results 
of  ‘following 
orders’ and 
‘applying the law 
and mandate’. 
The naturalization 
of events by de-
politicization: 
reference to 
‘higher authority 
and law’. Yet, the 
RSO might still 
interpret its 
mandate. 
1. Legal-
bureaucratic 
domination  
(M. Weber) 
 
2. Legitimation by 
Law  
Factors ‘beyond 
the control’ of the 
RSO such as the 
hardship of the 
terrain or the non-
compliance of the 
parties in conflict 
explain the lack of 
positive outcome. 
Multilateral Regionalism 
The RSO acts in 
partnership with 
its peers and other 
actors. 
Multilateral 
actions, ‘doing 
things together’, 
are preferable to 
unilateral actions. 
Inter-organizational 
relations might 
improve the 
outcome by 
pooling strengths, 
but also reinforce 
the normative 
standing of a RSO 
by ‘mutual 
recognition’. 
1. Inter-
organizationalism 
and inter-
regionalism 
 
2. Multilateralism 
and governance  
‘Diffusion of 
responsibility’: 
shift of the burden 
of action to other 
organizations or 
the government 
via partnership or 
‘domestication’ of 
the process. 
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This thesis aimed at filling the gap located at the intersection between 
security studies, legitimation, and regionalism by looking particularly at the 
arguments of legitimation of regional security organizations. But other aspects of 
the legitimation process might be studied with different tools, methods, and 
perhaps by integrating different disciplines such as law, psychology, and political 
philosophy. It would be relevant to look, for instance, at specific audience’s 
responses to the legitimacy claims of regional organizations and regional 
projects, to what extent they are convinced by the arguments and how their own 
standards of ‘right to rule’ change over time. Another promising research could 
analyse the formulation of legitimation strategies, looking at how regional 
organizations conceive their own legitimacy claims and which audiences they are 
consciously targeting. Finally, the scope of research could be expanded to 
include other legitimating actors beyond the self-legitimation of regional 
organization by regional organizations. 
In their self-legitimation, regional organizations tell a story in which they 
evoke the normative context and claim that what they are and what they are 
doing is ‘beneficial’, ‘lawful and inevitable’, ‘necessary to save lives and bring 
peace and stability’ and ‘has the support of other actors’. Regional organizations 
such as the European Union and the African Union act as security actors while at 
the same time constructing and speaking security. They also contribute to the 
construction of regions and eventually to the impact of regionalism within global 
order. Finally, while growing intrusive in the lives of many, regional 
organizations constitute sites of authority. By building on the framework of self-
legitimation, we contribute to the understanding of the complex, intersubjective, 
and open-ended process of security regionalism. 
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